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PREFERRING ORDER TO JUSTICE
LAURA ROVNER & JEANNE THEOHARIS∗
In the decade since 9/11, much has been written about the “War on Terror” and
the lack of justice for people detained at Guantanamo or subjected to rendition and
torture in CIA black sites. A central focus of the critique is the unreviewability of
Executive branch action toward those detained and tried in military commissions. In
those critiques, the federal courts are regularly celebrated for their due process and other
rights protections. Yet in the past ten years, there has been little scrutiny of the
hundreds of terrorism cases tried in the Article III courts and the state of the rights of
people accused of terrrorism-related offenses in the federal system. The deference to
assertions of national security that degraded protections for detainees at Guantanamo
has similarly degraded the protections for Muslims facing terrorism charges in the
federal courts. This Essay provides a close examination of one of those cases—that of
Syed Fahad Hashmi—and reveals rights abridgement throughout the legal process
(intrusive surveillance, vague material support charges, the use of prolonged pre-trial
solitary confinement, classified evidence, the use of political activities to demonstrate
mindset and intent). The federal courts have permitted such rights abridgements,
∗ Laura Rovner is the Ronald V. Yegge Director of Clinical Programs &
Associate Professor of Law and the founding director of the Civil Rights Clinic at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Jeanne Theoharis is Professor of Political
Science at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York and the Co-Founder of
Educators for Civil Liberties. We are deeply grateful to Abu Yousuf, Amna Akbar,
Alan Chen, Steve Downs, Sally Eberhardt, Peter Erlinder, Owen Fiss, Arnold
Franklin, Susan Green, Karen Greenberg, Lisa Greenman, Faisal Hashmi, Shane
Kadidal, Alan Mills, Pardiss Kebriaei, Christopher Lasch, Sean Maher, Justin
Marceau, Alejandra Marchevsky, Bill Quigley, David Thomas, Steve Vladeck, and Eli
Wald for their insights, feedback, and insistence that this was a story that must be
told. We are also grateful to the editorial staff of the American University Law Review
for their thoroughness and thoughtful edits. We have learned a great deal from
recent conversations and correspondence between Jeanne Theoharis and Fahad
Hashmi, but the arguments and analysis here are ours alone and do not speak for
Hashmi or his counsel. Nevertheless, we remain concerned that just drawing
attention to the rights issues in his case in this forum will subject him to harsh
measures, just as the public attention around his case pretrial led the government to
push for extra security measures in his trial.
Beginning with a first meeting with Hashmi’s counsel in January 2008,
Professor Theoharis followed the case closely, attending the pretrial hearings and
meeting with Hashmi’s counsel and family repeatedly. The research here is thus also
drawn from her notes and observations of the pretrial process.
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largely abdicating their role as a check on Executive power and imperiling the rights of
those being tried in the Article III courts.
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INTRODUCTION
I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed
with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion
that the Negro’s great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the
White Citizen’s Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate,
who is more devoted to “order” than to justice; who prefers a negative peace
which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of
justice.
–Martin Luther King, Letter From Birmingham Jail, 19631

In the fall of 2010, in taxicabs across New York City, Human Rights
Watch premiered a new campaign entitled, “Try the Alleged 9/11

1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963),
available at http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/resources/article/annotated_
letter_from_birmingham/.
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2

Planners in New York: It Happened Here.” An array of New Yorkers
looked directly at the camera and spoke about why Guantanamo Bay
prison detainees should be tried in the federal courts in New York,
3
invoking the principles of fairness, justice, and closure.
Midway
through the video, a text box appeared, reading “[f]ederal courts
have convicted more than 400 people on terrorism-related charges
4
since 9/11.”
In the decade since 9/11, much has been written about the “War
on Terror” and the rights violations of people detained at
Guantanamo, in naval brigs, or subjected to rendition and torture in
5
CIA black sites.
Much of this criticism has focused on the
unreviewable nature of executive branch action due to the
government’s assertions that constitutional protections do not apply
to the detainees and/or the prerogative of the executive in matters of
6
national security during times of “war.” Executive branch officials
have used these grounds to deny detainees the opportunity to
confront their accusers, have access to counsel, see evidence against
them, and invoke the writ of habeas corpus to contest their indefinite
7
detentions without charge.
In challenging these detentions, advocates for the detainees
focused their efforts on federal court habeas review, and more
recently, as prosecutions of Guantanamo detainees have resumed,
many commentators have invoked the federal courts as exemplars of
8
justice, contrasting them to military commissions. Because of the
2. It Happened Here: New Yorkers for 9/11 Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 6,
2010), http://www.hrw.org/video/2010/11/05/it-happened-here-new-yorkers-911justice.
3. Id.
4. The video goes on to note that “Guantanamo’s military commissions have
only convicted five.” Id.
5. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Aberrations No More, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1085, 1089
(critiquing the Bush Administration’s use of interrogation under torture,
imprisonment without trial, denial of habeas corpus, unfettered use of military
commissions, and warrantless wiretapping in response to the “war on terror”); Owen
Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 238
(2006) (noting that the Supreme Court did not endorse the effective denial of
habeas but failed to protect “the principle of freedom”); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence
H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259,
1260 (2002) (arguing that the executive order establishing military tribunals for trials
of alleged terrorists is unconstitutional).
6. See Fiss, Aberrations No More, supra note 5, at 1090.
7. See id. at 1087.
8. See Morris Davis, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Gets His Way, SALON (May 2, 2012,
10:58 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/05/02/khalid_sheikh_mohammed_gets_
his_way/; Jonathan Hafetz, Even Terrorists Deserve to be Sentenced, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 3, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-hafetz/eventerrorists-deserve-to-be-sentenced_b_1475022.html; Laura Pitter, Guantanamo’s System
of Injustice: The First Trial of an Accused Terrorist Exposes the Flaws of “Reformed” Military
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prioritization of advocacy around Guantanamo detainees, many
human rights groups and advocates have been reluctant to scrutinize
and to speak out against the practices used in those courts for fear of
giving ammunition to conservatives and contradicting their own
message to bring the Guantanamo detainees into the system. The
federal courts are thus often referenced as the “gold standard” of
American justice and held up to show what due process looks like
9
when it is done right.
While liberals and conservatives disagree on whether Guantanamo
detainees should be tried in Article III courts, they generally start
from a similar premise: that the process available within the federal
courts for suspects of terrorism-related offenses protects the rights of
10
the accused and that reviewability reliably exists.
For many
conservatives, the concern is that the plentiful nature of those rights
will allow dangerous people to walk free and compromise national
11
secrets. For many liberals, the federal legal process itself is equated
with rights; most focus on the record of the federal courts to
demonstrate the system’s toughness, flexibility, and array of legal
Commissions, SALON (Jan. 19, 2012, 1:14 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/01/19/
guantanamos_system_of_injustice/. But see Benjamin Wittes, Human Rights Watch’s
Laura Pitter on Military Commissions—A Response, LAWFARE (Jan. 22, 2012, 11:11 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/01/human-rights-watchs-laura-pitter-on-militarycommissions-a-response/ (responding to Pitter’s assessment of the military
commission trial of United States v. Al Nashiri). Human Rights Watch asserts “[b]ut
despite these new rules, the military commissions remain substandard proceedings
that lack the independence, fairness, and time-tested procedures of US federal
courts.” The Guantanamo Trials, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/
features/guantanamo (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). The ACLU argues that “detainees
should be prosecuted in federal courts, which are well equipped to accommodate the
government’s legitimate national security interests without compromising the
fundamental rights of defendants,” Indefinite Detention: No Charges? No Trials? No
Justice., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/
indefinitedetention/questions.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012), where “[t]ime and
again the federal courts have proven themselves capable of handling terrorism cases
while protecting both American values and sensitive national security information,”
9/11 Defendants to be Tried in Federal Court, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/911-defendants-be-tried-federal-court.
9. James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the
War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 331 (2009).
10. But see Gareth Peirce, America’s Non-Compliance: The Case Against Extradition,
LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, May 13, 2010, at 18–22 (arguing that protections for
terrorism suspects do not exist because political influence has undermined the
independence of the judiciary); Glenn Greenwald, Federal Judge Complicity, SALON
(Apr. 23, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/04/23/federal_judge_
complicity/.
11. See, e.g., Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 2007, at A15; John Yoo, Op-Ed., The KSM Trial Will Be an Intelligence Bonanza
for al Qaeda, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2009, at A23; Vincent J. Vitkowsky, Try Mohammed at
Guantanamo,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
19,
2010,
11:36
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Vincent-J-Vitkowsky/try-mohammed-atguantanamo_b_505850.html.
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tools to handle national security secrets and achieve justice—in sum,
12
their longstanding ability to prosecute and convict terrorists.
But the question of whether the rights of terrorism suspects
actually are protected in the post-9/11 federal criminal justice system
goes largely unexamined. The two most significant reports on
federal terrorism prosecutions—the Center on Law and Security’s
13
Terrorist Trial Report Card and Human Rights First’s In Pursuit of
14
Justice —are not predominantly concerned with the rights of
terrorism suspects. Rather, they both reflect the position, outlined in
the 2010 Terrorist Trial Report Card, that “the overwhelming evidence
suggests that the structures and procedures, as well as the substantive
precedents, provide a strong and effective system of justice for
15
Similarly, the opening of Human
alleged crimes of terrorism.”
Rights First’s study of federal prosecutions states that “terrorism
prosecutions can present difficult challenges” but found that “the
federal courts have demonstrated their ability, over and over again, to
effectively and fairly convict and incapacitate terrorists in a broad
variety of terrorism cases . . . [and] that prosecuting terrorism
defendants in the court system generally leads to just, reliable
16
results.”
The very definition of justice in federal terrorism prosecutions has
17
been inextricably linked to conviction. Attorney General Eric
12. The incidences are too voluminous to cite in total. See, e.g., Daphne Eviatar,
Ghailani Trial and Sentence Affirms US Federal Court System, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25,
2011, 5:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daphne-eviatar/ghailani-trial-andsenten_b_813961.html; Donald J. Guter Gitmo Trials ‘Not the U.S. at its Best,’ MIAMI
HERALD
(Apr.
30,
2012),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/04/30/vprint/2776177/gitmo-trials-not-the-us-at-its.html; Pitter, supra note 8; Andrea Prasow,
Hidden Torture: Behind the Plea Bargain of Majid Khan, JURIST (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://jurist.org/forum/2012/03/andrea-prasow-majid-khan.php;
Andrew
Rosenthal, Justice Delayed, Torture Classified, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2012, 1:28 PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/justice-delayed-torture-classified.
13. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 TERRORIST TRIAL
REPORT CARD], available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/
TTRC%20Ten%20Year%20Issue.pdf; CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 (2010)
[hereinafter
2010
TERRORIST
TRIAL
REPORT
CARD],
available
at
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/02_TTRCFinalJan142.pdf.
14. RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Alumni_Affairs/USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf.
15. 2010 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 13, at iv.
16. RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 2009 UPDATE AND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Fair Trials:
Military Commissions, AMNESTY INT’L,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/security-and-human-rights/fair-trials
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Holder described the proposed trials of the alleged 9/11 plotters in
federal court, as “cases that have to be won. . . . I don’t expect that
18
we will have a contrary result.” While the U.S. government and
international human rights advocacy groups typically argue that nearcomplete rates of conviction do not indicate an open legal system
19
when evaluating the legal systems of other countries, advocates have
avoided using similar measures of evaluation to assess the openness—
or lack thereof—of the U.S. legal system.
Few scholars, then, have looked carefully at the hundreds of
terrorism cases in the Article III courts and how the deference to
assertions of national security that degraded protections for detainees
at Guantanamo has similarly degraded the protections for defendants
20
21
within the federal system. Guantanamo (without the accent) is
more than a prison in Cuba; it represents a particular way of seeing
the Constitution, of constructing the landscape as a murky terrain of
(last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (“Federal courts successfully prosecuted 523 terrorismrelated defendants between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2009. The
present conviction rate is 88%.”). Karen Greenberg critiques this tendency in Guilty
Until Proven Guilty: Threatening the Presumption of Innocence, TOMDISPATCH.COM (Nov.
18, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175322/, and notes that
even those who ordinarily would question the assertion that a successful trial means a
conviction have compromised that position in order to end military tribunals for
Guantanamo Bay detainees.
18. Warren Richey, Holder: ‘Failure Not an Option’ in New York 9/11 Terror Trial,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 19, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted),
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/1119/p02s13-usju.html.
19. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND
MACAU) 15–16 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
160451.pdf (spotlighting the inadequate remedies for defendants whose rights have
been violated and the conviction rate of the Chinese criminal justice system—where
only 1206 of 997,872 total defendants were acquitted in 2009). Condemning the
Chinese legal system, the report observes: “According to the China Law Yearbook, in
2009 the combined conviction rate for first- and second-instance criminal trials was
99.9 percent. Of 997,872 criminal defendants tried in 2009, 1,206 were acquitted.”
Id.
20. James Forman, Jr., in Exporting Harshness, explores five areas in which the U.S.
criminal justice system has influenced our approach to the War on Terror and argues
that “in contrasting the aberrant (Guantanamo) with the normal (our domestic
criminal justice system) we become blinded to the profound abnormality of our
domestic criminal system.” Forman, supra note 9, at 338. Indeed, many of the rights
issues discussed in this Essay are not unique to terrorism prosecutions; rather, our
point is that the aggregate impact of the abuses in these types of cases “transgresses . .
. principle[s] of ‘fundamental fairness’ in operation.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 448 (1992) (citation omitted).
21. We have omitted the accent on Guantanamo throughout this Essay. Its
absence functions as a metaphor for how rights are treated in the War on Terror,
both in the prison in Cuba and the United States. Aziz Huq also plays with the
accent to suggest President Obama’s superficial changes and fundamental
continuities with Bush Administration practice in Obama’s Minimalist Approach to
Guantanamo, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 22, 2009), http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=
obamas-minimalist-approach-to-guantanamo.
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lurking enemies where rights must have substantial limits and the
courts must be steadfast against such dangers. While many scholars
and human rights advocates have elegantly demonstrated the dangers
of these paradigms at work in the justification and maintenance of
22
Guantanamo and the continued detention of 169 men there, this
Essay argues that the federal system is similarly infected by such
paradigms and itself can produce and sustain unreviewability for
defendants facing terrorism-related charges.
This Essay’s thesis is that the preponderance of attention to places
23
such as Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and Baghram and policies such
24
as rendition, military commission trials, and indefinite detention
overshadow the rights violations endemic to the federal system, with
particularly severe impact over the past decade on Muslims facing
22. See, e.g., Lakhdar Boumediene, Op-Ed., My Guantánamo Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES
SUNDAY REVIEW, Jan. 8, 2012, at SR9; Julian Borger, Guantanamo: Ten Years of Limbo,
JULIAN BORGER’S GLOBAL SEC. BLOG, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2012, 12:50 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-securityblog/2012/jan/10/guantanamo-legacy-afghanistan; Julian Borger, Guantanamo, Ten
Years On, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/
06/guantanamo-ten-years; David Cole, Guantánamo: Ten Years and Counting, THE
NATION (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/165443/guantanamoten-years-and-counting; Murat Kurnaz, Notes from a Guantánamo Survivor, N.Y. TIMES
SUNDAY REVIEW (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/
sunday/notes-from-a-guantanamo-survivor.html.
23. As Jenny Martinez has observed, discussing the importance of Guantanamo
litigation and its appeal to litigators,
[t]he Guantanamo litigation in particular has generated enormous interest
in the legal community. When Rasul was filed in early 2002, the memory of
September l1th was still too fresh and the lawyers for the detainees received
hundreds of pieces of hate mail and had difficulty finding local counsel. But
as one lawyer involved put it, “By the time the case got to the Supreme
Court, you had to beat the lawyers off with a stick.”
Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1013, 1062 (2008). She notes, “[d]ozens of the nation’s biggest law firms and
hundreds of attorneys are currently involved in representing the Guantanamo
detainees or filing amicus briefs on their behalf. At this point, a law firm that does
not have its own Guantanamo detainee might have difficulty attracting summer
associates.” Id. at 1063.
24. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), Pub. L. No.
112-81, §§ 1021–22, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562–64 (2011). Commentary and criticism
around the provisions and passage of the 2012 NDAA were voluminous. David Cole,
Gitmo Forever? Congress’s Dangerous New Bill, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011,
5:25 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/dec/08/gitmo-foreverdangerous-new-bill; Glenn Greenwald, Three Myths About the Detention Bill, SALON
(Dec. 16, 2011, 6:56 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/12/16/three_myths_about_
the_detention_bill; Benjamin Wittes & Robert Chesney, NDAA FAQ: A Guide for the
Perplexed, LAWFARE (Dec. 19, 2011 3:31 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/
ndaa-faq-a-guide-for-the-perplexed; President Obama Signs Indefinite Detention Bill Into
Law, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/nationalsecurity/president-obama-signs-indefinite-detention-bill-law; US: Revised Detainee Bill
Still Fundamentally Flawed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/12/us-revised-detainee-bill-still-fundamentallyflawed.
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25

terrorism-related charges.
The lack of public attention to these
issues stems in part from a post-civil rights paradigm that assumes the
legal system in the United States is now relatively incorruptible,
making it necessary to go outside of U.S. legal jurisdiction to
26
circumvent the conundrum of the rights of terrorism suspects.
Accordingly, much of the focus on post-9/11 justice issues has
framed the problem and solution around Guantanamo: the prison
27
must be closed and the people either tried or released.
While
certainly a crucial part of the solution, this view of Guantanamo as a
discrete space and process—not just offshore, not just outside the
rule of law, but contained—is extraordinarily. Many civil libertarians
fear that raising questions about the fairness of the federal system will
28
only embolden conservative pressure for military commissions.
25. Such treatment follows from the treatment of other people of color within
the federal system. For a larger discussion of rights abuses at the hands of the federal
courts and prisons, see generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 7-8 (2010), discussing how the racial
disparities in prison rates for African Americans cannot be explained by drug-crime
rates; KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 1 (2010), stating “The U.S. prison
population is larger than at any time in the history of the penitentiary anywhere in
the world. Nearly half of the more than two million Americans behind bars are
African Americans, and an unprecedented number of black men will likely go to
prison during the course of their lives.” and ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE
RISE OF AMERICA’S PRISON EMPIRE 2 (2010), noting “Along the margins of American
society . . . imprisonment has become commonplace. One out of every six African
American men has spent time in prison, one out of every thirteen Hispanics. If one
takes a snapshot of those currently incarcerated, the socioeconomic indicators read
more like a fact sheet from Afghanistan than the first world.”
26. It functions under the twin assumptions that systematic racial oppression is a
flaw of the past and that the courts provide an able force in correcting civil rights and
civil liberties violations. This ignores the long history of legal lynching in this
country and the central role the law and the courts have played in
upholding/masking racial injustice even since the civil rights movement. See generally
MICHAEL J. PFEIFER, ROUGH JUSTICE: LYNCHING AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1874–1947
(2004) (comparing mob justice and lynching with the death penalty system today);
ELIZA STEELWATER, THE HANGMAN’S KNOT: LYNCHING, LEGAL EXECUTION, AND
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE WITH THE DEATH PENALTY (2003) (overviewing the history of
lynching and other forms of legalized execution in America).
27. See, e.g., Tom Parker, 10 Years On, 10 Reasons Guantanamo Must be Closed,
HUMAN RIGHTS NOW (Jan. 11, 2012, 9:28 AM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/
waronterror/10-years-on-10-reasons-guantanamo-must-be-closed/ (outlining ten
reasons why Guantanamo should be closed, including a legal requirement, disparate
notions of fair trials depending on detainee’s country of origin, and a lack of truth
and accountability); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A CALL TO COURAGE:
RECLAIMING OUR LIBERTIES TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, at 10 (2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/acalltocourage.pdf (lauding the criminal justice
system for prosecuting hundreds of suspected terrorists “in accordance with our
laws,” and contrasting that with the “discredited military commissions system”).
28. We are in no way defending the use of military commissions and remain
convinced of the urgency of moving the Guantanamo detainees into the federal
system; our point is that the federal system has significant and systemic problems and
that these must be—and should have been—highlighted at the same time as we push
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However inadvertent, this has obscured the devolution of rights
protection for people accused of terrorism-related charges here at
home, the schisms of race and class that have long riven the criminal
29
justice system and the disparate justice it produces, and the ways that
the prison at Guantanamo Bay is not an aberration but part of a
30
larger way of thinking about rights and security.
An examination of the criminal terrorism cases in the Article III
courts reveals a system similarly driven by fears of Muslim terror
suspects and a corresponding excessive and dangerous deference to
the prerogatives of the executive. A chilling tautology ensues in the
federal courts: the invocation of national security by the executive
proves the necessity of the government’s conduct and thus demands
its approval for the sake of national security. When it comes to
terrorism-related cases in the federal system, actions by U.S.
Attorneys, prison officials, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) are often insulated from real reviewability or sanction, despite a
31
process that is intended to ensure review.
Perhaps the most
insidious aspect of this is that the patina of due process obscures
these rights violations—making it much harder to turn public
attention to domestic rights abridgement that is as considerable as
that occurring in Guantanamo. Indeed, one inadvertent result of the
focus on habeas review in Guantanamo advocacy has been the lack of

for people to be moved into it.
29. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at 11 (likening the racial disparities in
mass incarceration to Jim Crow laws); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (highlighting the
discrepancies among the representation of racial groups in American prisons and
the ways the courts have increasingly shrunk the rights of individuals and suspects in
the post-civil rights era); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND PRISONS,
TORTURE, AND EMPIRE (2005); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003)
(detailing the historical and longstanding patterns of racial and class injustice
endemic to the criminal justice system and increasing role of federal criminal
prosecutions); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE
AGE OF CRISIS (2008) (asserting that African Americans have suffered
disproportionately from the expansion of the criminal justice system, which itself was
designed to foster economic restructuring and end racial upheaval and political
rebellion).
30. See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING
THE WAR ON TERROR 3–19 (2007) (arguing that the exigencies of terrorism do not
justify the broad curtailment of due process rights).
31. Courts on occasion have chastised the government’s tactics. See, e.g., United
States v. Cromitie, No. 09 Cr. 558 CM, 2011 WL 2693297, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29,
2011) (agreeing with the defense that the prosecution had engaged in sentencing
manipulation to ensure the defendant would receive a twenty-five year mandatory
minimum); Islamic Shura Council of S. Cal. v. FBI, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1117 (C.D.
Cal. 2011) (admonishing the government for providing false and misleading
information to the court). But rarely have these rebukes been accompanied by
penalty or decisive action against the government’s interests.
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rigorous investigation of due process and other rights issues in these
32
federal cases.
Human Rights Watch and other civil libertarians regularly use the
“400 convictions” figure without significant comment or caveat
33
regarding what happened in these cases. But a look at these 400
convictions raises questions about the protection of rights here at
home. Many of those cases have involved racially- and religiouslytargeted surveillance, the use of prolonged pretrial solitary
confinement, secret evidence, entrapment, and other rights
34
abridgement. In this piece, we examine one of those “400” cases—
that of Syed Fahad Hashmi.
Hashmi is a U.S. citizen who pled guilty to one count of conspiracy
to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO)
35
in the Southern District of New York in 2010.
A granular
36
examination of his case reveals a series of rights deprivations by
government officials that not only undermine the idea of fairness of
the federal system, but are all the more insidious because they are
sanctioned—indeed at times created—by the law itself. Subjecting
Hashmi’s case to closer scrutiny reveals that what initially might be
37
viewed as an individual instance of an “[im]perfect trial” is actually
more systemic in nature—not simply a stain on the fabric of the
federal system but increasingly woven into the fabric itself. Indeed, it
32. See, e.g., Category Archives:
Guantanamo:
Litigation, LAWFARE,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/?cat=13 (last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (providing regular
updates on litigation involving Guantanamo Bay detainees).
33. It Happened Here: New Yorkers for 9/11 Justice, supra note 2.
34. We do not have the space to detail the rights abridgement across the
hundreds of cases, but rights concerns abound, including the use of pretrial SAMs
(e.g., Oussama Kassir, Muhammad Warsame); inhumane pretrial conditions (e.g.,
Ehsanul Sadequee, Aafia Siddiqui); entrapment (e.g., Newburgh Four, Matin Siraj,
Yassin Aref); the use of tortured evidence (e.g., Ahmed Abu-Ali); and the use of
political speech and association as evidence (e.g., Tarek Mehanna). This Essay
focuses on the rights issues attending criminal terrorism prosecutions and postconviction treatment. There are numerous other areas of grave concern in the
federal system that similarly reveal excessive deference to claims of “national
security,” including: material witness and other pretextual arrests; the use of
immigration “violations” to detain Muslims; the use of the state secrets doctrine to
enable government secrecy; and the courts’ unwillingness to allow damages for
extraordinary rendition and abuse in post 9/11-detentions. Regrettably, we do not
have the space to consider them here.
35. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010), ECF No. 161.
36. Cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1501, 1504 (2010) (examining the federal trial of Ahmed Omar Abu
Ali using a similar, one-case approach and reaching a different conclusion).
37. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 256 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that
“while ‘the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial,’ it does not
guarantee ‘a perfect one’” (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681
(1986))).
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is precisely the ingrained nature of these problems that makes them
so difficult to see; the courts’ lack of review and substantive
separation from the Executive becomes more pronounced with each
repetition by the courts and the corresponding silence of civil
libertarians.
Hashmi’s case provides an appropriate lens to examine this issue
for a series of reasons. First, his prosecution originated with a
warrant issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, and his case was prosecuted through the Article III
38
courts. His prosecution was never connected to an act of terrorism
39
or violence—on U.S. soil or anywhere in the world.
Hashmi’s
case—which involved a Muslim U.S. citizen accused of providing
material support to a foreign terrorist organization—exemplifies the
kind of terror prosecutions that have increasingly taken place over
40
the last decade in the federal system. Like many of these cases,
media coverage was considerable at the outset about the successful
apprehension of a “homegrown terrorist” who was providing “military
41
gear to Al Qaeda,” but little mainstream media attention was
subsequently paid to the nature of the case, evidence, or treatment of
the suspect. The methods used in Hashmi’s case are typical of many
42
federal terrorism prosecutions over the past ten years —extensive
surveillance, charges of “material support,” the imposition of Special
Administrative Measures (SAMs), and use of the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) and terrorism-expert testimony.
One more unusual but significant aspect of Hashmi’s prosecution is

38. United States v. Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). This is
unlike some of the more widely covered federal prosecutions including Jose Padilla,
Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, John Walker Lindh, and Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, where a
portion of their prosecutions, incarceration, or interrogations occurred in other
localities.
39. See id. (listing the four counts on which Hashmi was indicted: (1) “conspiracy
to provide material support to al Qaeda”; (2) “substantive material support to al
Qaeda”; (3) “conspiracy to make or receive a contribution of funds, goods or services
to, and for the benefit of al Qaeda”; and (4) “a corresponding substantive charge”).
40. See 2011 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 13, at 19–21 (“Since 2007,
material support has gone from being charged in 11.6% of cases to 69.4% in 2010.
In 2011 so far, 87.5% of cases involve a material support charge.” (emphasis
omitted)).
41. See Terror Suspect Fights Extradition, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2006, 5:46 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/5054590.stm; see also Alison
Gendar et al., Terrorist Raised in New York: Suspect’s Troubling Early Signs, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (June 10, 2006), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/terrorist-raisedyork-suspect-troubling-early-signs-article-1.630794; Chris Zambelis, Arrest of American
Islamist Highlights Homegrown Terrorist Threat, TERRORISM FOCUS, JAMESTOWN FOUND.
(June 27, 2006, 3:09 PM), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_
ttnews[tt_news]=816.
42. See 2011 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 13.
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the First Amendment issues that arose throughout his prosecution,
not only in the material support charge itself, but also in the
targeting of Hashmi as a political activist and the treatment of his
(and others’) Islamic political speech.
43
Second, Hashmi is a U.S. citizen and had a robust defense team
that attempted, however unsuccessfully, to use the process to protect
his rights. Moreover, Hashmi grew up and was educated in New
York, just miles away from where he was held and prosecuted, and
people mobilized to bring more attention to the abridgement of his
44
rights than many other terrorism prosecutions of the past decade.
Thus, if a terrorism suspect indeed has rights and protections that he
could draw upon in federal court, it should have been Hashmi.
Finally, while completing his B.A. at Brooklyn College, Hashmi was
enrolled in a political science seminar on civil rights with Professor
Theoharis, where he wrote a paper on the abridgement of civil
liberties that Muslim-American groups were facing in the U.S. post9/11. So the question of his civil and human rights is not merely
45
academic but also provides a palpable reminder that one of the key
issues to be examined as to how the federal courts have confronted
the “War on Terror” must be the state of the rights of the terrorism
suspect himself.
This Essay proceeds in five parts, moving chronologically through
Hashmi’s case and assessing the rights concerns at every stage. Doing
so illuminates a rights abridgement that is greater than the sum of its
parts and constitutive of the entire process.
Part I discusses the rights issues in the government’s initial
surveillance of Hashmi; his subsequent arrest, charge and extradition;
and the rights concerns attendant to the charges of material support
and the government’s disparate reaction to “Islamic terrorism.” Part
43. Hashmi was represented by criminal defense lawyer Sean Maher from the
outset; David Ruhnke and Anthony Ricco subsequently joined his defense team.
44. Hashmi’s family and supporters began the Free Fahad website to provide
information and draw attention to the case.
See About Us, FREEFAHAD,
www.freefahad.com/?page_id=11 (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). Out of this grew the
Muslim Justice Initiative (MJI), a group created to provide support and assistance for
other families facing similar terrorism prosecutions. Id. According to its website,
“MJI was founded in 2008 in response to a climate of religious intolerance, racism
and curtailment of civil rights faced by Muslims including unwarranted surveillance,
harassment, threats, imprisonment, and even torture.” About Us, MUSLIM JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, www.muslimsforjustice.org/aboutus.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
45. Moreover, the lack of First Amendment protection for Muslim dissent is
particularly jarring in light of the open airing of opposing perspectives and difficult
ideas that is at the heart of university values. In the norms of the university
classroom, it is unacceptable to simply dismiss an idea and demonize the speaker—
let alone claim that an alternate perspective is not an idea—simply because a person
disagrees with it.
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II examines the rights violations on the road to trial, including the
inhumane conditions of Hashmi’s pretrial confinement; the effects of
those conditions on his health and due process rights; and the use of
CIPA, which impacted his ability to participate effectively in his own
defense, his right to a speedy trial, and to review the evidence against
him. Part III examines the First Amendment implications of the
court’s decisions to allow the government to present evidence of (and
terrorism-expert testimony about) Hashmi’s political speech and
association, and to permit an anonymous jury. It also examines the
First Amendment implications for those who sought to draw
attention to the rights issues in his case. Part IV looks at postconviction rights concerns, including the government’s decision to
send Hashmi to the federal Supermax prison and the conditions of
confinement there. The piece concludes with an assessment of the
ways that rights abridgement in terrorism trials has become stitched
into the fabric of American law and common sense.
I.

RIGHTS ISSUES IMPLICATED BY CHARGE/ARREST

We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made and when the
petitioner violated it. In doing so, we are not unmindful of the hardships
imposed by it upon a large group of American citizens. But hardships are
part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. . . . Citizenship has
its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden is
always heavier.
–Korematsu v. United States46

A. Criminalization of Islamic Political Speech and Association
The rights concerns in Hashmi’s case began even before his
indictment. They started with the massive expansion of intrusive

46. 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (citations omitted). The parallels between the U.S.
response to 9/11 and Pearl Harbor are substantial. While a full discussion of those
similarities is beyond the scope of this Essay, we are compelled to point out the most
obvious: that is, the use of threats to national security to legitimate race-based action
and the seeming absence of any requirement of evidence of a specific threat in order
to intern people was legitimized by the Supreme Court, similarly cowed by fear and
deference to executive claims of national security. The Court was adamant that
Korematsu was not interned “because of hostility to him or his race. He was
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures.” Id. at 223. In May 2011, then-Acting
Solicitor General Neal Katyal apologized for “the mistakes of that era” and
acknowledged that the Solicitor General owes a “great responsibility and a duty of
absolute candor in [making] representations to the Court.” Tracy Russo, Confession
of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases,
JUSTICE BLOG (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/1346.
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surveillance initiated in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Shortly
after and in response to 9/11, the New York Police Department
(NYPD) initiated an unprecedented transformation and expansion of
its mission into a domestic counterintelligence unit and surveillance
47
operation. As Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly explained, “It
became obvious we couldn’t rely solely on the federal government to
48
protect this city.” The extent of this conversion is still unknown;
however, in a Pulitzer Prize-winning series of investigative pieces, the
Associated Press has detailed how, with the help of the CIA, the
NYPD in the decade since 9/11 has “become one of the nation’s most
49
aggressive domestic intelligence agencies.”
According to the investigation, the NYPD Intelligence Division
began operating a Demographics Unit that engaged in extensive
surveillance and mapping of Sunni and Shi’a Muslim communities in
New York City, Long Island, and New Jersey. The Unit’s activities
include compiling information on 250 mosques, 12 Islamic schools,
31 Muslim student associations, and 263 places they termed “ethnic
hotspots” such as businesses, bookstores, coffee shops and restaurants
50
where Muslim New Yorkers ate, talked, and shopped. The NYPD
intensively monitored Muslim student associations at colleges and
universities in New York City and across the Northeast, sending
undercover detectives to spy on student groups (including at
51
Brooklyn College).
47. See Counter-Terrorism Initiatives, NYPD SHIELD, http://www.nypdshield.org/
public/initiatives.nypd (last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (listing some of the methods in
which the NYPD has engaged in counterterrorism since 9/11, including surveillance
and tactical deployments).
48. Day of Destruction:
Decade of War, MSNBC (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44292512/.
49. Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help, NYPD Moves Covertly in Muslim
Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 24, 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/huff-wires/20110824/bc-us-sept-11-nypd-intelligence-abridged/.
The
full
compendium of articles can be found here: Highlights of AP’s Probe into NYPD
Intelligence Operations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.ap.org/media-center/nypd/
investigation (last visited May 6, 2012).
50. Leonard Levitt, The NYPD: Spies, Spooks and Lies, NYPD CONFIDENTIAL (Sept.
5, 2011), http://nypdconfidential.com/columns/2011/110905.html.
51. These colleges and universities included Brooklyn College, City College,
Baruch College, Hunter College, Queens College, LaGuardia Community College,
St. John’s University, Yale University, Rutgers University, Columbia University,
Princeton University, Syracuse University, New York University and the University of
Pennsylvania. Chris Hawley, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students All Over Northeast,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-TheNews/2012/NYPD-monitored-Muslim-students-all-over-Northeast; Garth Johnston,
NYPD Spying on Muslim College Kids Now, GOTHAMIST (Oct. 11, 2011, 9:47 AM),
http://gothamist.com/2011/10/11/nypd_spying_on_muslim_college_kids.php.
This Essay focuses on the NYPD’s surveillance of Hashmi because of the recent
public revelations into these NYPD programs. Hashmi was also under FBI
surveillance but the extent is unknown publicly.
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While he was studying at Brooklyn College and active in the
52
Muslim student association on campus, Fahad Hashmi was a
religious and outspoken activist in the Muslim community and
member of the New York religious-political group Al Muhajiroun
53
(ALM).
This led to government monitoring of him and his
numerous political activities at Brooklyn College and around the New
54
York metro area. An avid debater in class and student meetings at
Brooklyn College and on city streets, he distributed religious-political
literature in Times Square and Jackson Heights, Queens and
demonstrated outside various embassies protesting the treatment of
Muslims in Kashmir, Chechnya and Palestine and calling for a
caliphate in Pakistan. A May 2002 article in Time magazine entitled
Al Qaeda now, which also appeared on the CNN website, included
55
mention of Hashmi’s political activities. The article quoted him at a
2002 Brooklyn College Muslim student meeting “praising” John
Walker Lindh and describing America as “the biggest terrorist in the
56
world.” He decried the unjust treatment Muslims were facing in
America and was deeply critical of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle
57
East. In the year before the beginning of the second Gulf War,
Hashmi caused campus controversy for his speeches at various
Muslim student associations across the New York area where he
claimed that the United States had greater aspirations in the Middle
58
East and was preparing to go to war against Iraq.
52. Because all of the men in Hashmi’s family have the first name of Syed, he was
known to friends and family as Fahad.
53. The United States has never declared ALM a terrorist organization. Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 27,
2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. While it is difficult to
get an accurate sense of ALM, the New York ALM appears to have been a small
Queens, New York-based spin-off of or group related to the controversial British
group Al Muhajiroun. The New York ALM may have transformed into the Queensbased Islamic Thinkers Society. Many members were young Muslim-Americans, a
number of them the children of immigrants. The Islamic Thinkers Society’s public
mission centered on nonviolent public advocacy that was determinedly critical of
U.S. policy and global atrocities against Muslims and called for the implementation
of an Islamic state.
54. See infra at Part III.A (discussing government’s reliance on Hashmi’s political
activities as a student during his trial).
55. Al Qaeda now, CNN (May 27, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-0527/politics/time.alqaeda_1_qaeda-al-qaeda-francis-x-taylor?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Public statements made by non-Muslims have not led to the same type of law
enforcement response. For example, Scott Roeder, the convicted killer of Dr.
George Tiller, a provider of late-term abortions, had posted the following statement
on an anti-abortion website: “Tiller is the concentration camp ‘Mengele’ of our day
and needs to be stopped before he and those who protect him bring judgment upon
on our nation.” Susan Saulny & Monica Davey, Seeking Clues on Suspect in Shooting of
Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009, at A1; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment
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Though his views were often well outside of mainstream political
debate, Hashmi’s activities fell within the customary protections of
59
the First Amendment. Yet, given the climate in the city and the ways
the NYPD and FBI had redefined their mandate, his outspokenness
60
precipitated extensive government surveillance of him.
In 2003,
Hashmi completed his bachelors’ degree in Political Science at
Brooklyn College. He then matriculated at London Metropolitan
University to pursue a Masters in International Relations. He
completed his degree in 2006.
On June 6, 2006, Hashmi was preparing to travel to Pakistan when
British police at Heathrow Airport arrested him on a warrant and
61
indictment issued by the Southern District of New York. Thrown to
the ground by British police, he had angry words for the arresting
officers. According to government accounts, which Hashmi disputed,
Hashmi told the arresting officers that he (or others) “will get you”
and expressed his happiness about the deaths of British and
American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hashmi disputed the
62
government’s account of his remarks.
Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J.
1, 35–36 (2011).
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411
(1989) (“[E]xpression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the country [is] situated
at the core of our First Amendment values.”); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537–38 (1980) (noting that discussions are protected); Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (plurality) (observing that “political belief and
association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First
Amendment”).
60. Targeting political activists has often worked at cross-purposes to national
security and reliably finding saboteurs or spies, as was amply demonstrated during
the Cold War. ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER: HOW COLD WAR SURVEILLANCE
AND SECRECY POLICY SHAPED THE RESPONSE TO 9/11, at 106 (2011). The FBI had a
robust record of surveilling and prosecuting political activists, but a rather shabby
record of finding Soviet spies. Id. at 142–43. In its post-9/11 approach to counterterrorism, the FBI has fallen back on old patterns. ATHAN THEOHARIS, THE QUEST
FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY 245 (2007). The summer before 9/11, a Phoenix FBI agent
had flagged a prospective terrorist in ALM member, Zakaria Soubra. Id. at 246.
Attending flight school in Arizona, Soubra had made sweeping criticisms of U.S.
foreign policy. The agent named him and nine others to watch. Unfortunately, this
focus on Soubra may have worked to obscure the man attending flight school in
Arizona who actually would help crash a plane on 9/11—Hani Hanjour. Id. Soubra
stood by his criticisms of U.S. foreign policy but resolutely professed his innocence of
any act of terrorism. Placed in federal detention without charge for a year, the
government never filed any charges again him or linked him to any act of terrorism
but still deported him to Lebanon.
61. Warrant for Arrest at 1, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006).
62. There are numerous versions of what Hashmi allegedly said to British
authorities during the arrest—an arrest not made by U.S. officials. There is no
disagreement that Hashmi was forcibly arrested by multiple officers, and that he
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Hashmi was charged with two counts of providing and conspiring
to provide material support to al Qaeda and two counts of making
and conspiring to make a contribution of goods or services to al
63
64
Qaeda. His arrest received considerable media attention. As with
many terror indictments, the media maintained little distance from
the U.S. Attorney’s press conference. The government had caught a
65
“homegrown terrorist” —a “quartermaster” as they described
66
Hashmi. “If we are engaged in a war against terror—and we most
certainly are,” FBI Assistant Director Mark J. Mershon explained in
the Bureau’s press release, “then Syed Hashmi aided the enemy by
67
supplying military gear to al Qaeda.”
New York Police
Commissioner Raymond Kelly declared “[t]his arrest reinforces the
spoke back to the officers. However imprudent or disrespectful, comments made
upon arrest are certainly not anomalous to Hashmi or terrorism-related arrests,
despite how his comments would subsequently be used to justify his conditions of
confinement. Indeed, these comments became a bit of a moving target; in the
government’s last motion requesting an anonymous jury, they had added that
Hashmi tried to bite British authorities. Government’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion for Anonymous Jury & Other Related Protective Measures at 8,
United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. April 20, 2010), ECF No.
147.
63. Indictment at 1, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y.
May 24, 2006). The government charged Hashmi with conspiring to provide and
providing “material support or resources” to a designated foreign terrorist
organization (FTO) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
prohibits
knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempt[ing] or conspir[ing] to do so . . . . To violate this
paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a
designated terrorist organization . . . that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorist activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorism.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006). The material support ban was first passed as part of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250. Hashmi was also charged with conspiracy to
contribute and contributing “funds, goods, and services” thereto in violation of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b). Indictment,
supra, at 3.
64. E.g., Anemona Hartocollis & Al Baker, U.S. Citizen Is Accused of Helping Al
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at B3; Kevin Sullivan & Michelle Garcia, Britain Holds
Suspect in Al-Qaeda Case, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A18; New York Man Accused of
Supplying al Qaeda Faces Extradition to U.S., CNN WIRE (June 8, 2006),
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/06/07/wednesday/index.html?iref=st
orysearch.
65. Gendar et al., supra note 41; Zambelis, supra note 41.
66. Terror Suspect Linked to Al Qaeda Loses Extradition Battle, DAILY MAIL ONLINE,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-443477/Terror-suspect-linked-Al-Qaedaloses-extradition-battle.html (last updated Mar. 20, 2007, 11:23 AM).
67. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Announces First
Extradition from United Kingdom on Terrorism Charges 2 (May 26, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May07/hashmiextraditionpr.pdf.
Mershon added, “[i]n a global community, terrorism anywhere is a threat to people
everywhere.” Id.
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. . . fact that a terrorist may have roots in Queens and still betray us,”
and praised the NYPD and FBI “who understood this and kept
68
Hashmi on our radar.”
B. Material Support and the First Amendment
Hashmi faced charges of providing material support to al Qaeda.
Numerous scholars have argued that material support bans are the
“black box” of domestic terrorism prosecutions—they allow all sorts
of constitutionally protected activities to be classified as suspect, if not
69
criminal. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have relied on
the statute’s vague nature—what the Bush Department of Justice
(DOJ) described as “strategic overinclusiveness”—to advance the
70
tactic of preventive prosecutions.
Justified, as President Bush
asserted, by the “new threats we face,” the theory of preventive
prosecution rests upon identifying dangerous characteristics that
71
portend forthcoming terrorism.
72
Material support charges carry comparatively high sentences.
They often target small acts and religious and political associations,
which are interpreted as manifestations of impending terrorist
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 198 (2006) (asserting
that “[b]uilding on the 1996 Antiterrorism Act [AEDPA], the Patriot Act expanded
guilt by association”); Eric Umansky, Department of Pre-Crime: Why Are Citizens Being
Locked Up for “Un-American” Thoughts?, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2008, 12:00 AM),
http://motherjones.com/politics/2008/02/department-pre-crime (observing that
the material support provisions “give the government a shot at convictions traditional
criminal laws could never provide”).
70. Jeff Breinholt, Terrorist Financing, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 6 (2003),
available at www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5104.pdf. They
write, “[t]he need to prevent certain results is so great that we criminalize conduct
that leads up to, but does not necessarily reach, the bad result we are seeking to
prevent.” Id. In the months following the September 11 attacks, Attorney General
Ashcroft was even more explicit about this approach, stating that “the central thrust
of our campaign against terror must be proactive prevention and disruption, and not
primarily reactive investigation and prosecution. We cannot wait for terrorists to
strike to begin investigations and make arrests. We must prevent first and prosecute
second.” Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Components of
the Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2001/November/01_ag_580.htm.
For surveys of the use of material support and related criminal offenses as
preemptive tools, see generally Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008);
Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (2007).
71. See generally Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 70.
72. 2011 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 13, at 20. Material support
charges can result in sentences of up to fifteen years per charge: “Where material
support is the top charge, the resulting sentence is 7.8 times longer than for
defendants not charged with terrorism or national security.” Id.
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73

actions. Indeed, Hashmi was never accused of being a member of al
Qaeda, of having any direct contact to al Qaeda, or being involved in
any act by al Qaeda. Rather, his prosecution hinged on his
membership in ALM—a group deeply and religiously critical of the
United States that had never been designated by the U.S. as a
terrorist organization—and his involvement with a person alleged to
74
have provided socks, raincoats, and ponchos to al Qaeda.
The Supreme Court legitimized this tradeoff of rights for national
75
security in its decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.
Brought by the Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) and the Center for
Constitutional Rights, the case challenged certain aspects of the
material support ban—and its definition of material support—as
76
overly vague and in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.
The Supreme Court ruled for the first time in its history that speech
advocating only lawful, nonviolent activity with or on behalf of FTOs
can be subject to criminal penalty, even where the speakers’ intent is
to discourage violence, because such speech was potentially
77
legitimizing of these groups. According to the HLP Court, such
73. For a discussion of the ways in which the government has used religious
speech as a proxy for terrorism risk, see Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of
Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833 (2011). See also
Umansky, supra note 69 (explaining that merely expressing political sympathy,
driving a taxi, or donating money earmarked for peaceful activities have all been
interpreted as materially supporting terrorist activities). In certain key ways, this
functions as a new McCarthyism—inoculated through the fearsome—sounding
“material support” but bearing a stark resemblance in practice to the criminalization
of belief and association of a half century ago. Since the HUAC trials of the
McCarthy period, the government has moved political repression outside the view of
the public. There will be no video footage of prosecutors haranguing defendants
HUAC-style because that type of public scrutiny did damage to the state’s ability to
extract confessions and tied defendants to wider publics by revealing the political
nature of government targeting. See generally VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES
(1980) (providing an in-depth history of the McCarthy era); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY
ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998) (same); David Cole, The New
McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(2003) (tracing the evolution of political repression from the McCarthy era to the
current post-9/11 climate).
74. See, e.g., Defendant’s Response to Government’s Motion to Admit Certain
Evidence at Trial at 1–2, United States v. Hashmi, 1:06-Cr-442 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), ECF
No. 123.
75. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
76. Id. at 2714. While the Supreme Court’s ruling was devastating to anyone
concerned with the First Amendment, the case itself was so narrowly constructed
(focusing on nonviolent speech with a FTO, rather than nonviolent acts of
association) that it would have pertained to only a small handful of the material
support cases in the past decade, had the Court ruled otherwise. But it opened the
door wider for even more material support prosecutions in the future.
77. Id. at 2728–29. For a discussion of the Court’s differing applications of strict
scrutiny in HLP and its decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, see
David Cole, The Roberts Court vs. Free Speech, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Aug. 19, 2010),
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/424/.
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speech constitutes “material support” of terrorism as defined by 18
78
U.S.C. § 2339B.
With speech advocating only legal, peaceful activity imperiled by
the Supreme Court’s ruling in HLP, the state of First Amendment
79
protection for more controversial speech is even thinner. So-termed
“jihadist” ideas, membership in radical Islamic political groups, and
even growing religiosity for Muslims are often treated not simply as
political/religious beliefs or association, but as acts portending
80
danger and intent in and of themselves. The driving thesis for this
sort of law enforcement was laid out in a 2007 NYPD report on
radicalization and homegrown terrorism:
The NYPD’s understanding of the threat from Islamic-based
terrorism to New York City has evolved since September 11, 2001.
While the threat from overseas remains, terrorist attacks or
thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Australia and Canada since
2001 fit a different paradigm. Rather than being directed from alQaeda abroad, these plots have been conceptualized and planned
by “unremarkable” local residents/citizens who sought to attack
their country of residence, utilizing al-Qaeda as their inspiration
and ideological reference point. . . . Where once we would have
defined the initial indicator of the threat at the point where a
terrorist or group of terrorists would actually plan an attack, we
have now shifted our focus to a much earlier point . . . a process of
radicalization. The culmination of this process is a terrorist
81
attack.

Drawing a clear link between increased religiosity for Muslims,
political activity, and terrorism, the report listed indications of
possible growing radicalization, including: “[g]iving up cigarettes,
drinking, gambling and urban hip-hop gangster clothes”; “[w]earing
traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard”; and “[b]ecoming
82
involved in social activism and community issues.” The report cited
78. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2717–18.
79. There is much commentary condemning the HLP decision; some of the most
incisive comes from Owen Fiss, who notes,
Like warrantless wiretapping, the risk of a criminal prosecution for political
advocacy—for example, an utterance by an American citizen in an American
forum that a foreign terrorist organization has a just cause—poses a threat to
our democracy, but the danger is greater. The risk of warrantless
wiretapping inhibits speech; the risk of a criminal prosecution stops it
altogether.
Owen Fiss, The World We Live In, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 295, 296 (2011).
80. See, e.g., Mitchell D. Silber & Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The
Homegrown Threat, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV. 31 (2007), http://www.nypdshield.org/
public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 31.
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Hashmi’s case as an example of dangerous radicalization, claiming
that “by the time he graduated in 2003 with a degree in political
science, Hashmi had become something of a magnet and
powerhouse recruiter for al-Muhajiroun”—despite also noting that
his case “did not involve any direct threat to New York City or to the
83
U.S. homeland.”
Hashmi was a public, outspoken activist extremely critical of U.S.
foreign policy and the treatment of Muslims in America, and a Salafi
Muslim whose utopia was a religious state. This combination draws
particular suspicion in post-9/11 America. Certain Islamic political
ideas critical of the United States—particularly those framed in
religious terms—have largely been placed outside the protections of
the Constitution because they are considered “jihadist” incitement or
84
intent rather than ideas. Islamic political dissent condemning U.S.
practices and advancing religious prescriptions has become, as early
twentieth-century political theorist Randolph Bourne might have
described it, “subject to ferocious penalties,” in this decade after
85
9/11.
For eleven months, American citizen Fahad Hashmi fought his
extradition back to the United States, fearing the inhumane
86
treatment he would face in U.S. courts and prisons. He lost, in part,
because he was a U.S. citizen. In May 2007, Hashmi became the first
U.S citizen to be extradited under terrorism laws relaxing standards
87
for extradition passed after 9/11. While the British government did
83. Id. at 66, 69.
84. A particularly troubling illustration of this is the prosecution of Tarek
Mehanna, who was recently convicted of providing material support to an FTO for
engaging in activities such as translating a publication called, “39 Ways to Serve and
Participate in Jihad,” from Arabic to English, watching “jihadi videos,” and
participating in online discussions. We discuss the Mehanna case in more detail infra
at notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the ways in which the government has used religious speech
as a proxy for terrorism risk, see Huq, supra note 73.
85. Randolph S. Bourne, The State, in UNTIMELY PAPERS 143 (James Oppenheim
ed., 1919).
86. Jeanne Theoharis, My Student, The ‘Terrorist’, THE CHRON. (Apr. 3, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/My-Student-the-Terrorist/126937/.
87. Alan Feuer, In First for Britain, U.S. Citizen Is Extradited on Terror Charges, N.Y.
TIMES (May 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/30/nyregion/30terror.
html. Several non-U.S. citizens apprehended in Britain and wanted by the United
States have succeeded in delaying or preventing their extradition to the U.S. under
international human rights provisions that prohibit inhumane treatment, such as
prolonged solitary confinement and sensory deprivation. See, e.g., Ahmad v. United
Kingdom, App. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010)
[hereinafter Eur. Ct. H.R. Partial Decision], http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Babar%20%7C%20Ahmad&
sessionid=91655196&skin=hudoc-en. Here, Hashmi’s citizenship may have worked
against him as it gave the United States greater jurisdictional claims.
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not ask much of the U.S. in terms of concrete assurances of fair
treatment of Hashmi, it did require the U.S. to give a cursory account
of the basis of the case against him. The “centerpiece” of their case,
the U.S. government’s affidavit publicly asserted, was the testimony of
88
a cooperating witness, Junaid Babar.
Babar—also a U.S. citizen—was an acquaintance of Hashmi’s from
New York who stayed with him at his London apartment for two
weeks in early 2004. During that time, according to Babar’s
statement, Babar had in his luggage raincoats, ponchos, and
waterproof socks and later delivered these materials to a senior
89
member of al Qaeda in South Waziristan, Pakistan. In addition,
Hashmi allowed Babar to use his cell phone, which Babar allegedly
used to call other co-conspirators in terrorist plots, including Omar
90
Khyam. Nonetheless, in Babar’s own statement, Hashmi had been
91
“very much of an outsider.”

88. Transcript of Bail Hearing at 5–6, 9, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2007). Defense counsel noted that in the same
statement, Babar recounted interactions with over forty different individuals over a
three-year period. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 16; Indictment, supra note 63, at 2. This disclosure was invaluable for
the pretrial civil rights advocacy around Hashmi’s case, as it meant that the
government had publicly disclosed the “centerpiece” of its case. Given that much of
the evidence was classified under CIPA, it would have been difficult, if not
impossible, for counsel and other advocates to discuss the case otherwise, making any
attention to the rights issues even harder to raise in absence of any clear and public
sense of the case itself. The fuzziness of the indictment made it difficult to figure out
what material support the government was alleging he provided. Over the course of
the prosecution, besides the socks, ponchos, raincoats, and use of his cell phone, the
government began to highlight a small amount of cash, $300, that Hashmi gave
Babar to help pay for a plane ticket to Pakistan—even though the FBI had Babar on
tape saying that he had asked Hashmi for money for a plane ticket because his
daughter was sick and he needed to go to Pakistan to see her, and not for any sort of
conspiracy.
90. Transcript of Bail Hearing, supra note 88, at 7–8.
91. During questioning by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Babar had made
a number of statements about Hashmi’s lack of knowledge or centrality in any
conspiracy. Discussing one meeting with Khyam where Hashmi was present, Babar
explained, “[n]othing of relevance was discussed this time because Fahad was
present.” Id. at 9–10. In this testimony Babar provided in 2006, Babar was asked
“[s]o as far as Fahad was concerned, was he part of the group, the organization or an
outsider?” to which he responded “[h]e wasn’t part of the group . . . [h]e was a—very
much an outsider.” Id. at 10. Further on in his testimony, Babar explains why
nothing was discussed with Khyam during this aforementioned meeting:
Q: Can you help us, please, why nothing was discussed about Jihad during
that car journey?
A: Well, one of the reasons was because Fahad was with me, and Ausman
[Omar Khyam] had never met Fahad, and Ausman knew that Fahad was a
member of Al Muhajiroun, so it wasn’t discussed in front of Fahad.
Q: Perhaps we are getting some idea of the sort of working but why not
say anything about jihadism etc. in the presence of ALM or someone who
was a member of ALM?
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Despite the U.S. Attorney’s and FBI’s claims, what the DOJ had
been compelled to reveal publicly was that the government was not
actually accusing Hashmi of supplying military gear himself or of
having any direct contact with al Qaeda. Rather, the accusation
stemmed from Hashmi hosting an acquaintance who had materials in
92
his luggage, and, the “military gear” in that luggage amounted to
93
raincoats, ponchos and waterproof socks.
Returning to the U.S. from Pakistan in 2004, Babar himself had
been arrested on five charges of material support and quickly
cooperated with government authorities who interviewed him in a
94
midtown hotel for two weeks.
Pleading guilty to five counts of
material support, Babar agreed to serve as a government witness in
terrorism cases in Britain and Canada as well as in Hashmi’s trial, and
received a reduced sentence in return for his cooperation. Hashmi’s
case was to be his last trial testimony.
The use of material support prosecutions to target religious
95
political activists is not unique to Hashmi’s case.
The recent
prosecution of Tarek Mehanna, an American citizen and pharmacy
school graduate from Sudbury, Massachusetts, presents a similar set
of rights concerns. The government’s surveillance of Mehanna who,
like Hashmi, was deeply religious and determinedly critical of U.S.
foreign policy and American treatment of Muslims, dated back at
least to 2001; in 2008, the FBI interviewed him and sought his
96
cooperation as an informant, which he refused. In October 2009,
A: Because ALM is a very public group, and basically they just talk too
much.
Id. at 11.
92. See Indictment, supra note 63, at 2–3 (charging Hashmi with “providing
military gear to co-conspirators not named as defendants” and contributing “funds,
goods, and services” to assist al Qaeda rather than alleging direct contact with them).
93. Transcript of Bail Hearing, supra note 88, at 16.
94. Id. at 12–13.
95. See Eric Lichtblau, A Nation at War: Legal Issues; 1996 Statute Becomes the Justice
Department’s Antiterror Weapon of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15 (“In several
dozen cases both high profile and little noticed, [§ 2339B] has become the Justice
Department’s main weapon in pursuing people it contends are linked to terrorists.”).
96. United States v. Mehanna, 699 F. Supp. 2d 160, 160 (D. Mass. 2009) (alleging
that from “sometime in 2001 until about the return of the Indictment in November,
2009, Mehanna conspired to provide material support and resources to terrorists”).
In August 2006, while the Mehanna family traveled to Egypt for a summer holiday,
the FBI entered the Mehanna home—using a “sneak and peek” warrant (a tactic
legalized by the USA PATRIOT Act)—and surreptitiously went through his materials
and made copies of his hard drives. Seven months after being interviewed by the
FBI, he was arrested for false statements allegedly made to a federal officer two years
earlier and released on bail. One year later, Mehanna, under curfew and FBI
surveillance, was again arrested, this time on material support charges. He was held
two years pretrial in solitary confinement. Defendant’s Opposition to Government’s
Motion in Limine to Limit Defense Comment & Inquiry Regarding Inadmissible

ROVNER-THEOHARIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1354

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/14/2012 7:12 PM

[Vol. 61:1331

the government filed charges of material support for terrorism
against Mehanna, based on allegations that he had translated a
publication, 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad, from Arabic to
English and participated in online discussions at Tibyan Publications;
watched “jihadi videos” with friends; and loaned compact discs to
97
The
people in the Boston area to create “like-minded youth.”
ACLU wrote an amicus brief supporting Mehanna’s motion to
dismiss the indictment, arguing that the entirety of the government’s
98
case constituted protected expression and association. At trial, the
judge precluded the defense from introducing evidence that the FBI
99
pressured Mehanna to become an informant. In December 2011,
Mehanna was found guilty of seven charges of material support and
in April 2012, he was sentenced to seventeen-and-a-half years in
100
prison.
The surveillance and targeting of Muslim critics such as Hashmi
101
and Mehanna raises significant constitutional issues.
The concern
Subject Matter (#279) at 8, United States v. Mehanna, No. 1:09-cr-10017-GAO (D.
Mass. Oct. 11, 2011), ECF No. 292.
97. Second Superseding Indictment at 3, 7–8, United States v. Mehanna, No.
1:09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. June 17, 2010), ECF No. 83. The prosecution also cited
a trip that Mehanna took to Yemen in 2004, even though the government did not
claim Mehanna had attended a training camp (in 2004 al Qaeda did not have an
active presence in Yemen). Id. at 5.
98. [Proposed] Memorandum of Law Amicus Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Portions of the Second Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Mehanna, No.
09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. July 29, 2011). The court denied permission for the
memorandum to be filed, holding that it was not appropriate for a criminal
prosecution at this level. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 5, United States v.
Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Aug. 10, 2011).
99. Government’s Motion in Limine to Limit Defense Comment & Inquiry
Regarding Inadmissible Subject Matter at 5–6, United States v. Mehanna, No. 1:09-cr10017-GAO (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2011), ECF No. 279.
100. Milton J. Valencia, Tarek Mehanna Guilty of Terror Charges, BOS. GLOBE (Dec.
20, 2011), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2011/12/20/tarek-mehanna-guiltyterror-charges/chpbwimRMbvdNMOladJ08J/story.html;
see
Tarek’s
Sentencing
Statement, FREE TAREK (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.freetarek.com/tareks-sentencingstatement/. For commentary on the First Amendment implications, see Ross Caputi,
Tarek Mehanna: Punished for Speaking Truth to Power, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2012,
11:27 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/16/
tarek-mehanna-punished-speaking-truth; David Cole, 39 Ways to Limit Free Speech, N.Y.
REV.
OF
BOOKS
BLOG
(Apr.
19,
2012,
3:15
PM),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/19/39-ways-limit-free-speech/;
Andrew F. March, A Dangerous Mind?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/opinion/sunday/a-dangerous-mind.html?_
r=2. One of the jurors came to Mehanna’s sentencing to speak to the judge and
plead for mercy; the judge refused to hear her. Milton J. Valencia, Juror Says
Mehanna Deserved Mercy, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/
local/massachusetts/articles/2012/04/15/juror_says_mehanna_deserved_mercy.
101. While selective prosecution on the basis of race, religion or protected speech
would violate the First and Fifth Amendments, such violations are notoriously
difficult to prove. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 596, 608 (1985) (noting that a
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is not only the threat to speech by equating Islamic critiques of the
U.S. with intent for or actions of material support. It is also the
threat to freedom of association, because much of what material
support prosecutions target are associations with or recruiting other
102
“like-minded” people.
Indeed, the material support statutes, as
David Cole observes, are “materially indistinguishable from the
McCarthy-era laws that penalized association with the Communist
Party,” “require no ‘specific intent,’ and punish people solely for
103
their associational support of specified groups.”
In its treatment of the threat of Islamic terrorism and the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has attempted to sidestep its own
history during the McCarthy Era with a contorted reasoning that
undermines the protections of the First Amendment while claiming
104
otherwise.
In the HLP decision, the Court, in keeping with its
precedents, refrained from criminalizing the right of an American to
105
be a member of al Qaeda or other FTO. However, it is unclear how
successful selective prosecution claim must allege that the decision to prosecute “had
a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose”); see
also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) (applying a “rigorous
standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim”). Indeed, Lawrence
Rosenthal has argued that Wayte appears to hold that if the government can
articulate a non-censoring reason for investigating a person based on his speech, the
First Amendment does not bar such investigations, even if they might chill protected
speech. Rosenthal, supra note 58, at 42. By way of example, he offers that
“[s]urveillance of a mosque known for the radical views of its clergy and congregants
. . . would easily pass the Wayte test because the government could claim that its
purpose was to identify suspected terrorists, not to chill the expression of radical
Islamist views.” Id. Glenn Greenwald has also noted the DOJ’s increasing number of
prosecutions “[f]or disseminating political views the government dislikes or
considers threatening.” Glenn Greenwald, The DOJ’s Escalating Criminalization of
Speech, SALON (Sept. 4, 2011, 12:05 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/09/04/
speech_23/.
102. See Cole, supra note 73, at 10 (“The material support law is a classic instance
of guilt by association. It imposes liability regardless of an individual’s own
intentions or purposes, based solely on the individual’s connection to others who
have committed illegal acts.”).
103. Constitutional Implications of Statutes Penalizing Material Support to Terrorist
Organizations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 141–42 (2004)
(testimony of David Cole). See generally Gordon Silverstein & John Hanley, The
Supreme Court and Public Opinion in Times of War and Crisis, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1453
(2010) (demonstrating the historical pattern between Supreme Court decisions and
public opinion in times of war).
104. Corresponding to the climate, this includes the fear of the influence of the
Communist Party as an agent of a foreign power, which motivated the Court’s rightsabridging decision in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509, 515 (1951) (plurality
opinion), and its return to more substantive First Amendment protections in Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957), Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18–19 (1966),
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 597,
603, 605 (1967), and United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967).
105. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718, 2723 (2010)
(affirming the constitutionality of the material support statute by noting that the
statute does not prohibit mere membership in FTOs).
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membership would be possible, given the difficulty of distinguishing
between legal activities associated with mere membership and those
activities that may rise to the level of material support by
106
“legitimizing” or otherwise “coordinating” with the FTO. The oral
argument in HLP is revealing: Justice Scalia ahistorically minimizes
the Court’s similar fears of Communism in the 1950s by referring to
the Communist Party as “a philosophical organization” and seems
unwilling to grant radical Islamic political ideas the status of a
“philosophy,” implicitly rendering any ideas espoused by FTOs and
their supporters outside of First Amendment protection:
JUSTICE SCALIA: I think it’s very unrealistic to compare these
terrorist organizations with the Communist Party. Those cases
involved philosophy. The Communist Party was . . . more than . . .
an organization that . . . had some unlawful ends. It was also a
philosophy of . . . extreme socialism. And . . . many people
subscribed to that philosophy.
I don’t think that Hamas or any of these terrorist organizations
represent such a philosophical organization.
MR. COLE: Your Honor, this . . . Court accepted Congress’s
findings. Congress’s findings were not that this was a philosophical
debating society, but that it was an international criminal
conspiracy directed by our enemy to overthrow us through
terrorism.
JUSTICE SCALIA: That may be, but people joined it for
philosophical reasons.
MR. COLE: Oh, sure—
JUSTICE SCALIA: They joined it for philosophical reasons.
These terrorist organizations have very practical objectives. And
the only reason for joining them or assisting them is to assist those
107
practical objectives.

In contrast to the Court’s obfuscation of these issues in HLP,
108
Justice Douglass’ dissent in Dennis v. United States is instructive. It
illuminates the foundational constitutional issues now at stake in

106. See id. at 2725 (explaining that material support to FTOs, in adding
legitimacy to the groups, “makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit
members, and to raise funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks”). Given
the Court’s language, it is even more difficult to envision how a person could legally
be a member of an FTO: Could he go to a meeting? Could he tell others that he was
a member? Could he give someone a ride home after the meeting? Could he bring
cookies to the meeting? Could he try to sign up other members?
107. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–22, HLP, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 08-1498),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
08-1498.pdf.
108. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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material support prosecutions such as Hashmi’s.
There was a time in England when the concept of constructive
treason flourished. Men were punished not for raising a hand
against the king but for thinking murderous thoughts about him.
The Framers of the Constitution were alive to that abuse and took
steps to see that the practice would not flourish [in the U.S.].
Treason was defined to require overt acts—the evolution of a plot against
the country into an actual project. The present case is not one of
treason. But the analogy is close when the illegality is made to turn
on intent, not on the nature of the act. We then start probing
men’s minds for motive and purpose . . . . [T]hey get convicted not for
109
what they said but for the purpose with which they said it.”

C. Disparate Reaction to “Islamic Terrorism”
To more fully illuminate the significance of the rights abridgement
in the prosecution of cases like Hashmi’s, a comparison to the
government’s reaction to and treatment of domestic terrorism is
instructive. The most obvious difference is that material support
charges can only be brought against individuals who have provided
“material support” to any foreign organization the Secretary of State
110
has designated as terrorist.
There is no comparable legislation to
prosecute those who provide “material support” to domestic
terrorism; the already capacious charge of conspiracy is seen as
sufficient power for the government to address these individuals,
111
their criminal syndicates, and emergent conspiracies.
In the past few years, there have been several attacks by nonMuslims in the U.S. that inspired relatively muted official reactions

109. Id. at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339(A)–(B) (2006). We do not have space to address this
fully—and many others have done so more eloquently—but the designation of
certain organizations as FTOs is a political decision and subject to political winds and
shifting allegiances, as are who and which actions are then prosecuted as material
support. The decision to designate Al Shabaab as a terrorist organization in March
2008 and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in December 2009 has resulted in a host
of material support prosecutions for activities (travel, financial donations, etc.) that
people had been engaging in for years. Terrorist Groups: Al Shabaab, NAT’L
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2012). Relatedly, when Republican Party officials supported taking
Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK) off the list because it was an opposition group in Iran,
the DOJ did not prosecute those American public officials for providing material
support to the organization. David Cole, Chewing Gum for Terrorists, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 3,
2011, at A21.
111. See, e.g., Nick Bunkley, U.S. Judge in Michigan Acquits Militia Members of Sedition,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/us/hutareemilitia-members-acquitted-of-sedition.html?_r=1 (detailing how members of a
Christian militia charged with conspiracy were acquitted after the court held that the
prosecutors failed to prove the members had concrete plans to attack anyone).
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compared to the expansive security responses and legislation that
often followed (even unsuccessful) attacks carried out by Muslims.
For instance, James von Brunn, who had previously been arrested for
attempting to kidnap members of the Federal Reserve Board, opened
fire at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., killing a security
112
John Bedell shot two Pentagon police officers at a security
guard.
113
screening area before being killed himself.
Andrew Stack flew a
114
plane into a building containing IRS offices in Austin, Texas. Jared
Loughner began shooting at a “Congress on Your Corner” gathering,
seriously wounding Representative Gabrielle Giffords and killing six
115
people, including U.S. District Judge John Roll. These crimes have
been treated as the isolated actions of disturbed individuals and have
not resulted in dramatic expansions of law enforcement power and
116
surveillance over certain groups or populations.
II. RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN PREPARING FOR TRIAL
In addition to the rights issues leading to Hashmi’s indictment for
material support, he also encountered significant rights deprivations
during the three years he was held in New York awaiting trial. At the
end of May 2007, Hashmi was flown back to New York and detained
in the federal Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in Lower
Manhattan, thirteen miles from where he had grown up in Flushing,
117
Queens.
From his first moment back on U.S. soil, Hashmi was
118
placed in solitary confinement. On June 1, 2007, the judge denied
112. Bill Mears, Alleged Shooter Served 6 Years for Federal Reserve Incident, CNN (June
10, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-10/justice/shooting.suspect.record
_1_fake-bomb-von-brunn-trial?_s=PM:CRIME; Guard Killed During Shooting at
Holocaust Museum, CNN (June 10, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-0610/justice/museum.shooting_1_holocaust-museum-von-brunn-securityguard?_s=PM:CRIME.
113. Martha Raddatz et al., Pentagon Shooter John Patrick Bedell Had Troubled Past,
Run-Ins
with
the
Law,
ABC
WORLD
NEWS
(Mar.
5,
2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Politics/alleged-pentagon-shooter-john-patrick-bedelltroubled-past/story?id=10020408#.T0VldnJWoRK.
114. Sarah Netter et al., Austin Plane Crash Pilot May Have Raged Against IRS in
Suicide Note, ABC WORLD NEWS (Feb. 18, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/texasplane-crash-austin-office-complex-hit-single/story?id=9874966#.T0VNSnJWoRI.
115. Richard Esposito & Lee Ferran, Gabrielle Giffords’ Suspected Shooter Identified,
ABC WORLD NEWS (Jan. 8, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/jared-leeloughner-gabrielle-giffords-suspected-shooter-identified/story?id=12572164#.T0VMg
3JWoRI.
116. But see Tom Junod, Counter-Terrorism Is Getting Complicated, ESQUIRE (Jan. 18,
2012, 7:00 AM), available at http://www.esquire.com/features/waffle-houseterrorists-0212 (examining a recent incident of government overreach with domestic
terrorism).
117. Transcript of Bail Hearing, supra note 88, at 15–16; Theoharis, supra note 86.
118. Transcript of Oral Argument in SAMs Challenge Hearing at 2, United States
v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009).
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him bail in a courtroom overflowing with family and friends,
finding that Hashmi, a U.S. citizen with no criminal record, had a
“lack of respect for the rule of law” of the United States, and
“certainly nothing that would keep him here,” (even though a family
friend had offered a $500,000 surety bond and the defense’s bail
120
motion included agreement for a GPS tracking device).
Indeed,
Hashmi’s use of the legal process to protect his rights and challenge
his extradition became part of the court’s reasoning for denying him
121
bail.
The government’s decision to impose draconian pretrial detention
conditions on Hashmi—three years of solitary confinement and
sensory deprivation under Special Administrative Measures (SAMs)—
and to use CIPA to classify much of the evidence against him
produced further rights deprivations. These deprivations degraded
his health, his ability to participate in and prepare his defense, and
his right to assistance of counsel.
A. Conditions of Pretrial Confinement
In the first months of Hashmi’s pretrial confinement at MCC, he
was held in solitary confinement in the Special Housing Unit, but his
family was allowed to visit him together and could discuss their visits
with relatives and friends. He had a radio. He was able to receive
and read newspapers and magazines. His lawyer could talk freely
122
with others about his conversations with Hashmi.
Five months later, this changed. First, Hashmi was moved to the
123
more-restrictive 10 South unit of MCC and his conditions worsened
considerably. Then a month later, at the end of October 2007, the
Attorney General ordered Hashmi put under SAMs, which severely
restrict a prisoner’s communication and contact with the outside
124
world.
In later court documents, the government cited as the
119. Transcript of Bail Hearing, supra note 88, at 14–15, 31.
120. Id. at 17, 31–32.
121. Id. at 30–31.
122. Theoharis, supra note 86.
123. 10 South is widely regarded as the most restrictive unit at the Metropolitan
Correctional Center in New York. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Young, Attorney, to
Patrick Fitzgerald, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Nov. 5, 1998), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/letters.html
(describing 10 South as “the most restrictive housing unit in the facility”).
124. Memorandum & Order at 1, 4–6, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442LAP (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008), ECF No. 34; see also Memorandum for Harley G.
Lappin, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Prison, from The Acting Att’y Gen., United States v.
Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008), ECF No. 21-2 [hereinafter
Hashmi SAMs Document]. Hashmi’s SAMs were renewed each year until October
2011.
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grounds for Hashmi’s SAMs: (1) his former membership in an
“Islamic fundamentalist organization [ALM] whose members
promote the overthrow of Western society,” a group the United States
did not designate a terrorist organization; (2) the fact that Hashmi
had allowed the cooperating witness to store luggage in his
apartment and use his cell phone; and (3) Hashmi’s alleged
125
statements on arrest.
SAMs are prisoner-specific confinement and communication rules,
imposed by the Attorney General but carried out by the Federal
126
Bureau of Prisons (BOP).
Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 501.3, the
Attorney General may authorize the Director of the BOP to
implement SAMs only upon written notification “that there is a
substantial risk that a prisoner’s communications or contacts with
persons could result in death or serious bodily injury to persons, or
substantial damage to property that would entail the risk of death or
127
serious bodily injury to persons.” The SAMs “may include housing
the inmate in administrative detention and/or limiting certain
privileges, including, but not limited to, correspondence, visiting,
interviews with representatives of the news media, and use of the
telephone, as is reasonably necessary to protect persons against the
128
risk of acts of violence or terrorism.” A prisoner’s SAMs spell out in
intricate detail the nature of this isolation; including, for example,
how many pages of paper he can use in a letter or what part of the
129
newspaper he is allowed to have and after what sort of delay.
It
130
does not have to provide reasons for those particular restrictions.
Under his SAMs at the MCC, which remained in effect for the twoand-a-half-year duration of his pretrial detention, Hashmi was allowed
no contact with anyone other than his lawyer, and eventually his
125. Memorandum & Order, supra note 124, at 4–5. To clarify: the government
provided this justification in its briefs only after Hashmi challenged his SAMs in court.
The government provided no such justification in the SAMs themselves.
126. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2011). The authority for the SAMs derives mainly from
two statutory provisions. First, 5 U.S.C. § 301 grants the directors of executive
departments the power to create regulations designed to assist them in fulfilling their
official functions and those of their departments. Second, 18 U.S.C. § 4001 vests the
Attorney General with authority to control federal prisons and allows him to
promulgate rules governing those prisons.
127. Id. § 501.3(a).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Hamshi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 14 (limiting Hashmi’s
correspondence only to immediate family members in letters of no more than three
pieces of paper).
130. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(b) (requiring “written notification of the restrictions
imposed and the basis for these restrictions,” but providing that the “statement as to
the basis may be limited in the interest of prison security or safety or to protect
against acts of violence or terrorism”).
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Placed in solitary confinement, he was in
parents and brother.
almost complete isolation—even talking to other prisoners through
132
the walls was forbidden.
During his incarceration at MCC,
according to Hashmi’s counsel, “one inmate tried to say ‘assalam
alaikum,’ which basically means peace be unto you or hello, to
another inmate who was under SAM, and that person received an
133
incident report for saying hello to another detainee.” Hashmi’s cell
was electronically monitored inside and out, which meant he
134
showered and used the toilet within view of the camera.
Cell and
clothing sanitation declined; weeks would go by without a change of
clothes or cell-cleaning supplies. The temperature in his cell was
insufficiently regulated so that often it was too cold or too hot to
concentrate. The window was frosted, letting in very little natural
light.
He was allowed as many letters as he wanted to write to Congress
but allowed only one letter a week to a single member of his
135
immediate family.
He was forbidden any contact—directly or
136
He could read
through his attorneys—with the news media.
newspapers, but only limited portions approved by his jailers—and
137
not until thirty days after publication.
He was allowed only one
hour a day out of his cell to exercise in an indoor solitary cage (a
privilege that periodically was denied him) rather than in MCC’s
138
facility on the roof in fresh air.
Additionally, as a condition of
being allowed to represent him, his lawyer was required to sign an
affirmation acknowledging Hashmi’s SAMs and agreeing not to
139
repeat anything he had talked about with Hashmi publicly.
The
same applied for Hashmi’s parents and brother, who were forbidden
from talking about their conversations with him, even with their
140
extended family.
131. Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 5, 7, 8, 11, 13 (limiting Hashmi
to visits and contact with only his immediate family and attorneys).
132. Id. at 16.
133. Transcript of Oral Argument SAMs Challenge Hearing, supra note 118, at 6.
134. Id. at 5–6.
135. See Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 14.
136. Id. at 15.
137. Id. at 17.
138. Transcript of Oral Argument SAMs Challenge Hearing, supra note 118,
at 5–6.
139. Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 1–3. The required attorney
affirmation, especially for pretrial defendants under SAMs, has been the subject of
some litigation. See United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92–94 (D. Mass. 2002)
(holding that defense counsel are not required to sign the affirmation because to do
so conflicts with the Sixth Amendment, even though the government modified the
affirmation requirement to make it subject to judicial determination).
140. Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 11–12.
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Despite the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings,
Hashmi was prohibited from participating in group prayer, including
141
In addition, the forced dirtiness of
Friday congregational prayer.
142
the cell (the cell contained a shower with no curtain) carried an
added burden for a religiously devout Muslim who prayed on the
floor five times a day. While Hashmi had a Qu’ran, other religious
reading materials, including prayer timetables, were often
circumscribed. News of the Muslim world was removed from his
143
Regardless of intent, these
thirty-day-old newspaper.
“administrative measures” imposed a disparate impact on an
observant Muslim pretrial suspect such as Hashmi.
The conditions at MCC 10 South where Hashmi was held have
drawn the criticism of human rights organizations. In February 2011,
Amnesty International wrote Attorney General Holder to address the
broader problem of inhumane pretrial conditions of confinement
144
that existed for many Muslim defendants.
Amnesty focused its
concern on the conditions in MCC 10 South, which, the group wrote,
“fall short of the USA’s obligations [under international law] in this
regard” and asserted that “the combined effects of prolonged
confinement to sparse cells with little natural light, no outdoor
exercise and extreme social isolation amount to cruel, inhuman or
145
degrading treatment.” Amnesty International further asserted that
“[t]he conditions also appear incompatible with the presumption of
innocence in the case of untried prisoners who have not committed
offences within the institution and whose detention should not be a
146
form of punishment.” Finally, Amnesty International observed that
the pretrial conditions Hashmi and others faced at MCC 10 South
rise to the level of torture by international standards:
The [UN Human Rights] Committee has noted that prolonged
solitary confinement may amount to torture or other ill-treatment
prohibited under Article 7 of the ICCPR (General Comment
20/44, 1992). The UN Committee against Torture has made
similar statements, with particular reference to the use of solitary
147
confinement during pre-trial detention.
141. Id. at 16.
142. Transcript of Oral Argument SAMs Challenge Hearing, supra note 118, at 6.
143. Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 17.
144. Letter from Susan Lee, Program Dir., Ams. Reg’l Program, Amnesty Int’l, to
Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. (Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/AMR51/029/2011/en/867a8f0e-9fd1-4dbf-a084cfe644c774b0/amr510292011en.pdf.
145. Id. at 2.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil
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While the U.S. is dismissive of international criticism of its own prison
conditions, in judging other countries’ human rights records, the
U.S. State Department has regularly treated the use of prolonged
148
solitary confinement as a human rights violation.
1.

Effects on health
For prisoners such as Fahad Hashmi, the SAMs exacerbate
conditions of confinement that already are extraordinarily isolating.
Such isolation has serious health effects, as documented by virtually
every mental health study that has examined long-term solitary
149
confinement.
Dr. Craig Haney, a psychologist at UC-Santa Cruz
150
who has studied the effects of solitary confinement for decades,
and Political Rights (ICCPR) both prohibit torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, and the United States has ratified both instruments. Id.
148. Glenn Greenwald provides a powerful summary of this tendency:
As is true for so much of what it does, the U.S. Government routinely
condemns similar acts—the use of prolonged solitary confinement in its
most extreme forms and lengthy pretrial detention—when used by other
countries. See, for instance, the 2009 State Department Human Rights
Report on Indonesia (“Officials held unruly detainees in solitary
confinement for up to six days on a rice-and-water diet”); Iran (“Common
methods of torture and abuse in prisons included prolonged solitary
confinement with extreme sensory deprivation . . . Prison conditions were
poor. Many prisoners were held in solitary confinement . . . Authorities
routinely held political prisoners in solitary confinement for extended
periods . . .”); . . . Israel (“Israeli human rights organizations reported that
Israeli interrogators . . . kept prisoners in harsh conditions, including solitary
confinement for long periods”); Iraq (“Individuals claimed to have been
subjected to psychological and physical abuse, including . . . solitary
confinement in Ashraf to discourage defections”); Yemen (“Sleep
deprivation and solitary confinement were other forms of abuse reported in
PSO prisons . . .”); . . . Burundi (“Human rights problems also included . . .
prolonged pretrial detention”).
Glenn Greenwald, U.N to Investigate Treatment of Bradley Manning, SALON (Dec. 23,
2010, 5:24 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/12/23/manning_4/singleton/.
149. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BURNEY, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2d ed. 1961); Frank
Rundle, The Roots of Violence at Soledad, in THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 163–72 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 1973); Robert G.
Slater, Psychiatric Intervention in an Atmosphere of Terror, 7 AM. J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY
5, 5–12 (1986); Robert G. Slater, Abuses of Psychiatry in a Correctional Setting, 7 AM. J. OF
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 5, 5–10 (1986).
For detailed reviews of all of these psychological issues, and references to the
many empirical studies that support these statements, see Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric
Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325 (2006); Craig Haney,
Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME &
DELINQ. 124 (2003); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A
Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 477 (1997). See also Expert Report of Dr. Craig Haney at 7, Silverstein v.
Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT (D. Colo. Apr. 13, 2009) (on file with
authors) (citing BURNEY, supra; Rundle, supra; Slater, Psychiatric Intervention in an
Atmosphere of Terror, supra; Slater, Abuses of Psychiatry in a Correctional Setting, supra).
150. See generally Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement, supra note 149 (analyzing case studies from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s,
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summarizes the types of psychological harms suffered by prisoners
151
These include “appetite and sleep
held in long-term isolation.
disturbances, anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, paranoia,
hallucinations, and self-mutilations,” as well as “cognitive dysfunction,
hallucinations . . . aggression, and rage, paranoia, hopelessness, a
sense of impending emotional breakdown . . . and suicidal ideation
152
and behavior.”
This constellation of symptoms, referred to as
“isolation panic” by social psychologist Hans Toch, “mark[s] an
important dichotomy for prisoners:
the ‘distinction between
153
imprisonment, which is tolerable, and isolation, which is not.’”
Haney has extensively documented the use of isolation, noting not
154
only the harm it can cause, but also its use as a torture technique.
In fact, Haney notes, “many of the negative effects of solitary
confinement are analogous to the acute reactions suffered by torture
155
and trauma victims.” Research suggests such effects are clear after
156
sixty days.
Indeed, Haney concludes, “there is not a single
published study of solitary or supermax-like confinement . . . lasting
for longer than ten days . . . that failed to result in negative
157
psychological effects.” Psychological studies have repeatedly found
that prolonged solitary confinement and sensory deprivation can
158
Given this wealth of
cause or exacerbate mental illness.
including one of the author’s own from 1993, on health impacts of solitary
confinement).
151. Expert Report of Dr. Craig Haney, supra note 149, at 5–22.
152. See id. at 8–9 (citing both U.S. and international literature on the adverse
effects of solitary confinement).
153. Id. at 8 (citing HANS TOCH, MEN IN CRISIS: HUMAN BREAKDOWNS IN PRISONS 54
(1975)).
154. Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement,
supra note 149, at 131.
155. Id. at 131–32; see also DON FOSTER, DETENTION & TORTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA:
PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL & HISTORICAL STUDIES 71–76 (1987) (comparing effects of
solitary confinement to post-traumatic stress syndrome and symptoms of
concentration camp survivors); Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 17 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 305–06 (1994) (discussing
reports of South African government’s routine use of torture, including use of
solitary confinement); Tim Shallice, Solitary Confinement—A Torture Revived?, NEW
SCIENTIST, Nov. 28, 1974, at 666–67 (citing historical uses of solitary confinement to
“break” prisoners and describing severe mental effects).
156. See, e.g., Ivan Zinger et al., The Psychological Effects of 60 Days in Administrative
Segregation, 43 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 47 (2001).
157. Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement,
supra note 149, at 132.
158. See Grassian, supra note 149, at 329 (noting early experiments with the use of
solitary confinement in American and European prison systems resulted in high
incidences of severe mental disturbance, as well as aggravation of existing psychiatric
illness). As a result, several states are examining their practices with respect to the
use of solitary confinement—both through legislative initiatives and internal reform
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documentation, in October 2011, United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Torture, Juan Méndez, called for UN member states to outlaw the
use of solitary confinement, with an absolute ban on uses in excess of
159
fifteen days. “Segregation, isolation, separation, cellular, lockdown,
Supermax, the hole, Secure Housing Unit . . . whatever the name,
solitary confinement should be banned by States as a punishment or
extortion technique,” Méndez reported, noting it causes serious
160
mental and physical harm and often amounts to torture.
Authorities—including the Supreme Court—have recognized the
161
inherent harms of isolation for over a century. In In re Medley, the
Court noted that prisoners subjected to solitary confinement:
fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition,
from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others
became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those
who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in
most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any
162
subsequent service to the community.

of prison policies. See, e.g., Anita Kumar, Legislators Ask[] for Federal Probe of Use of
Solitary in Va. Prisons, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/virginia-politics/post/legislators-asks-for-federal-probe-of-use-of-solitary-in-vaprisons/2012/03/20/gIQAYbaAQS_blog.html (Virginia state legislators’ call for a
federal probe into the state prison system’s use of solitary confinement and potential
abuses); Rina Palta, California’s Lawmakers Question Use of Isolation Cells, INFORMANT
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://informant.kalwnews.org/2011/08californias-lawmakingquestion-use-of-isolation-cells/ (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation announces plans to reform the policies of the controversial Security
Housing Units (SHUs), home to thousands of inmates held in solitary confinement
for an average of 6.8 years amid protests across the state); Lance Tapley, Reducing
Solitary
Confinement,
PORTLAND
PHOENIX
(Nov.
2,
2011),
http://portland.thephoenix.com/news/129316-reducing-solitaryconfinement/?page=1#TOPCONTENT (Maine reduced its use of solitary
confinement by 70%); Interim Charges Relating to Criminal Justice, TEX. SENATE (Jan. 13,
2012), http://www.senate.state.tx.us/assets/pdf/Senate_CJ_Charges_2012.
pdf (Texas Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst orders a legislative study on the overuse
and abuse of solitary confinement in Texas prisons).
159. Press Release, United Nations Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights,
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture calls for the prohibition of solitary confinement
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=11506&LangID=E.
160. Id. Méndez himself spent three days in solitary confinement as a political
prisoner during the military dictatorship in Argentina in the 1970s. Press Release,
United Nations, Press Conference by Human Rights Experts on Issue of Torture
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2011/111018_Torture.
doc.htm. He called it “the longest three days of my life.” Id.
161. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
162. Id. at 168; see also McClary v. Kelly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 195, 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(stating the notion that “prolonged isolation from social and environmental
stimulation increases the risk of developing mental illness does not strike this Court
as rocket science”).
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And yet, despite this recognition, the expansion of this pretrial
practice for terrorism suspects and post-conviction for tens of
thousands of prisoners has remained largely unchecked.
2.

Effects on due process/coercion
What is especially troubling about the use of pretrial isolation is its
potential as a coercive tool. Although public debate has circled
around the efficacy of using torture for gathering intelligence,
inhumane treatment—particularly the use of prolonged solitary
163
confinement—can be an effective means to secure convictions.
These methods can psychologically break down the accused, making
it difficult for them to participate effectively in their own defense. It
does so by severely impairing detainees’ mental health,
compromising their ability to focus, and making them more willing to
fire their lawyers or interrupt their own trials with impromptu
164
harangues. In turn, authorities can use behavior problems caused
by prolonged isolation to justify imposing further draconian
165
conditions. And the conditions make it more likely that people will
166
take a plea rather than risk a lifetime in such isolation.
Originally, the federal government created SAMs to target gang
leaders and prisoners in cases in which “there is a substantial risk that
a prisoner’s communications or contacts with persons could result in
163. See Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and
Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 81,
84, 86 (2003) (asserting that SAMs severely impact the attorney client relationship);
Peirce, supra note 10, at 19 (suggesting the threat of solitary confinement or an
indefinite sentence might induce a person to take a guilty plea or agree to cooperate
as a witness).
164. Neither the Center for Law and Security’s Terrorist Trial Report Card or
Human Rights First’s In Pursuit of Justice, the two research reports on domestic
terrorism prosecutions, keep track of the use of prolonged pretrial solitary
confinement.
165. See, e.g., Grassian, supra note 158, at 331 (noting “even a few days of solitary
confinement will predictably shift the [EEG] pattern toward an abnormal pattern
characteristic of stupor and delirium”); Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term
Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, supra note 149, at 130 (discussing case studies
that found a host of harmful effects from solitary confinement); Eric Lanes, The
Association of Administrative Segregation Placement and Other Risk Factors with the SelfInjury-Free Time of Male Prisoners, 48 J. OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 529, 539–40
(2009) (presenting data showing increased incidents of self-injurious behavior by
prisoners in administrative segregation); Deborah Sontag, Video is a Window into a
Terror Suspect’s Isolation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
12/04/us/04detain.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (citing lawyers for terror suspect Jose
Padilla who argued their client was unfit for trial because prolonged interrogation
had made him incapable of trusting his attorneys and damaged his mental
functioning to such an extent that prison staff remarked “his behavior was like that
of ‘a piece of furniture’”).
166. See Peirce, supra note 10, at 21 (highlighting the UN special rapporteur’s
appreciation of the coercive power of solitary confinement).

ROVNER‐THEOHARIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 7:12 PM

PREFERRING ORDER TO JUSTICE

1367

167

death or serious bodily injury to persons.” They instituted this ban
on communication for prisoners with a demonstrated reach beyond
168
169
prison. For example, in United States v. Felipe, the Second Circuit
cited 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 in upholding the extraordinarily restrictive
conditions of confinement imposed on a leader of the Latin Kings
who had a documented history of directing murderous conspiracies
from prison and communicating with an extensive network of co170
conspirators inside and outside of prison.
When the SAMs regulations were first promulgated by the
Department of Justice in 1996, civil libertarians raised a series of
alarms, particularly around prisoners’ First Amendment rights to free
171
speech and their Sixth Amendment rights to counsel.
But during
the initial notice and comment process, there was no explicit
discussion of these measures being used pretrial. After 9/11, the
DOJ substantially changed the standard for imposing and renewing
172
SAMs.
Finding the SAMs application and renewal process
burdensome and “unnecessarily static,” DOJ relaxed the standards

167. Scope of Rules: National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and
Terrorism, 61 Fed. Reg. 25,120, 25,120 (May 17, 1996) (interim rule with request for
comments); see also Dratel, supra note 163, at 84 (noting SAMs first appear in case law
in the context of a case involving the leader of the Latin Kings gang).
168. Scope of Rules: National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and
Terrorism, 61 Fed. Reg. at 25,120.
169. 148 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1998). Felipe’s communication restrictions, however,
were not SAMs, nor were they imposed pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 501.3. Rather, the
restrictions on his conditions of confinement were imposed by the sentencing court
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d), which “allows district courts to limit the
associational rights of defendants convicted of racketeering offenses.” Id. at 109; see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d) (2006). This is a significant difference for two reasons.
First, 18 U.S.C. § 3582 is applicable only in situations where the prisoner has been
convicted of the crime that serves as the basis for the restrictions, whereas pretrial
SAMs are justified solely by an accusation. Second, § 3582 restrictions are imposed
by a judge—an impartial decisionmaker—rather than by the executive branch, which
is prosecuting the SAMs prisoner for the very crimes that may be the basis for the
imposition of the SAMs.
170. 148 F.3d at 105, 107, 110 (reasoning that preventing Felipe from ordering
killings was a legitimate interest and the restrictions on his communications were
reasonably related to that interest).
171. See Scope of Rules: National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and
Terrorism, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,730, 33,730 (June 20, 1997) (responding to public
comments complaining of SAMs alleged infringement on First Amendment rights);
2010 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 13, at 51 (noting that SAMs have
raised concern among rights activists).
172. Compare National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 72
Fed. Reg. 16,271, 16,272 (Apr. 4, 2007) (conditioning renewal of SAMs on
certification that some reason for SAMs exist), with Scope of Rules: National
Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 62 Fed. Reg. at 33,732
(conditioning renewal of SAMs on certification that the original reasons for SAMs
continues to exist). The post 9/11 changes also expanded the definition of an
“inmate” against whom SAMs could be imposed. 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(c) (2011).
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173

considerably and expanded their use.
The government now had
the ability to impose SAMs for a year, whereas previously the period
was limited initially to 120 days. For renewals, the government did
not have to demonstrate that the original reason the person was put
under SAMs still existed, just that there was a reason to maintain the
174
Significantly, the government expanded pretrial use of
measures.
175
SAMs.
Cases in which the government asserted a relationship of
the accused to “terrorist activities”—particularly alleged connections
to al Qaeda—often could be enough to justify these measures,
176
thereby eliminating the need to establish “demonstrated reach.”
Courts gave the executive branch wide discretion to impose and
177
In the Southern District of New York, according to
renew SAMs.
Joshua Dratel, SAMs were often applied “reflexively,” with courts
178
unwilling to scrutinize them.
In Hashmi’s case, the government never alleged he had any reach
179
outside prison, or even any direct contact to al Qaeda, even though
the regulations authorizing the imposition of SAMs were created to
apply to prisoners with a demonstrated reach from behind bars.
Which raises the issue—why were the SAMs put on Hashmi?
173. National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 16,272 (extending the maximum initial period for which SAMs can be authorized
from 120 days to one year and expanding the category of inmates covered by the
rule); see Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and Detaining
Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System (June 9, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-564.html (describing the purpose
of SAMs as to “prevent acts of terrorism, acts of violence, or the disclosure of
classified information”); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Ahmed Ghailani
Transferred from Guantanamo Bay to New York for Prosecution on Terror Charges
(June 9, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-563.html.
174. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3.
175. See 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(c) (defining “inmates” covered by the rule to include
pretrial detainees and material witnesses).
176. See 2010 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 13, at 52 (finding that as
of 2010, thirty of forty detainees subject to SAMs were charged with terrorism-related
offenses); Dratel, supra note 163, at 104 (noting the “mantra—like resort to
‘terrorism’ and ‘national security’” to justify measures that restrict defendants’
rights).
177. See, e.g., United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 77, 81–82 (2d. Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (upholding pretrial restriction imposed on a suspect awaiting trial in the
Embassy bombing case); United States v. Ali, 396 F. Supp. 2d 703, 711 (E.D. Va.
2005) (deciding pretrial SAMs were not imposed for punishment and served a
legitimate government interest).
178. See Kareem Fahim, Restrictive Terms of Prisoner’s Confinement Add Fuel to Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A27.
179. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Emergency
Hearing to Prohibit the Attorney General from Restricting Defense Counsel’s Access
to Defendant & Impairing Defendant’s Constitutional Rights at 3, United States v.
Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2007), ECF No. 21 (arguing the
government violated Hashmi’s rights by imposing SAMs that were not uniquely
suited to the circumstances of his case and the allegations against him).
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While challenging his extradition, Hashmi had been housed at
Britain’s severe Belmarsh prison. Still, during his eleven months
there, Hashmi was permitted to talk, pray, exercise, and interact with
180
other prisoners. No complaint was ever made about his behavior at
Belmarsh, nor did the British government ever seek any charges
181
against him.
Similarly, there was no complaint about Hashmi’s
behavior during his first five months at MCC when he was not under
SAMs, and no evidence was ever proffered that he communicated or
attempted to communicate with dangerous individuals while in
182
custody.
The government publicly cited Hashmi’s “proclivity for violence” as
the reason for the SAMs, even though he had no criminal record and
was neither charged with committing an actual act of violence, nor
183
linked to any specific act of violence. Moreover, given that 14,773
people held in federal prison at the end of 2009 were convicted of a
184
violent crime, “proclivity for violence” seemed an implausible
justification for Hashmi’s SAMs since thousands of people behind
bars had demonstrated actual use of violence. The fact that Hashmi
talked back to British police when he was being arrested also became
part of the U.S. Attorney’s justification for his SAMs and the court’s
185
assent to the government’s wishes.
Still, this would have been the
case when Hashmi was returned to the United States in May, five
186
months prior to the imposition of the SAMs.
The fact that Hashmi was not willing to cooperate with authorities
provides an alternate explanation for the imposition of the SAMs.
The harshness of the conditions—which, in Hashmi’s case, worsened
over time—are a powerful inducement on the SAMs prisoner to

180. See Sentencing Transcript at 16, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442LAP (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2010) (describing, in his own words, Hashmi’s conditions of
confinement in Belmarsh).
181. See Government’s Letter in Opposition to Defense Motion at 2, United States
v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2009), ECF 75-2 (describing
Hashmi’s arrest in London and his extradition, with no reference to charges filed by
British authorities).
182. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Emergency
Hearing to Prohibit the Attorney General from Restricting Defense Counsel’s Access
to Defendant & Impairing Defendant’s Constitutional Rights, supra note 179, at 3
(noting absence of allegations warranting SAMs).
183. Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 4.
184. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 8, 33 (revised Oct. 27, 2011),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.
185. See Government’s Letter in Opposition to Defense Motion, supra note 181, at
2–3 (stating reasons for initial implementation of Hashmi’s SAMs).
186. Outbursts are not uncommon during arrests, yet the court was willing to
ascribe almost magical powers to Hashmi’s, which was treated as proof of the danger
of his communication.

ROVNER-THEOHARIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1370

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/14/2012 7:12 PM

[Vol. 61:1331

break, cooperate, and plead. In 2008, on the eve of the DOJ’s
decision whether to renew Hashmi’s pretrial SAMs for a second year,
the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University’s Law School
sent the Attorney General a letter highlighting their concerns about
Hashmi’s health, his due process rights, and the potentially coercive
nature of his SAMs restrictions: “we are concerned that the harsh
measures thus far imposed on Mr. Hashmi’s pretrial detention may,
whether intentionally or inadvertently, have the practical effect of
pressuring him into a plea bargain to which he otherwise might not
187
agree.”
Such use is not merely speculative. The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby,
188
suggested as much in his declaration in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, where
he stated that José Padilla’s total isolation for nearly a year was
necessary to build the “dependency” interrogators required to exploit
189
his intelligence value. But as Hashmi explained in a speech at his
sentencing three years later, “in all reality, I had nothing to cooperate
190
about . . . . A fact that even the government knows.”
Pretrial SAMs appear to be disproportionately applied against
191
Muslim defendants in terrorism prosecutions. On May 31, 2009, as
Hashmi awaited trial in isolation under SAMs, Scott Roeder walked
192
into a Wichita church and shot abortion provider George Tiller. A
Christian militant, Roeder committed a premeditated act of murder
193
stemming from his militant anti-abortion politics.
He was
187. Letter from the Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Law Sch. to Michael B.
Mukasey, Att’y Gen. 2 (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/
301ff4d661c066cf21_p7m6brynx.pdf.
188. 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
189. Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby at A58–A59, Padilla, 243 F.
Supp. 2d 42 (No. 02 CIV. 4445), 2002 WL 34342502; see Fiss, The War Against
Terrorism and the Rule of Law, supra note 5, at 237 (suggesting Lowell’s declaration
implied interrogators aimed to inspire a “complete sense of dependency on
[Padilla’s] interrogators and to convince him of the hopelessness of his situation”).
190. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 180, at 16–17. This also has a disturbing
parallel in Cold War practice. See generally VICTOR NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (1980);
ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998), arguing
that fears that Communists were infiltrating the fabric of American institutions
meant that political activists summoned before House Un-American Activities
Committee in the 1950s were often pushed to name names. In many cases, the
government knew who they knew—and, in a number, knew those summoned had no
crucial information to provide but sought to compel people to submit, to cow
dissident voices.
191. There is no published source that lists the prisoners under pretrial SAMs,
only numbers; we have worked back from the numbers, using information gathered
from lawyers, advocates, court documents, and media reports.
192. See AP: Man Admits Killing Kansas Abortion Doctor, MSNBC (Nov. 9, 2009,
10:29 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33802796/ns/us_news-crime_and_
courts#.TmPxPpgxW_E.
193. See Monica Davey, Doctor’s Killer Puts Abortion on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2010, at A1.
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unrepentant, admitting to the Associated Press in a pretrial interview
that he had killed because “preborn children’s lives were in
194
Roeder was affiliated with various radical
imminent danger.”
Christian movements including Christian Identity and the “Sovereign
195
Citizen” and Freeman movements.
Many anti-abortion activists
celebrated and wrote to Roeder in jail; some even came to visit.
David Barstow of the New York Times was allowed a pretrial “jailhouse
interview” with Roeder and noted in his cover story the “fan mail”
196
Roeder was receiving. Even though this was a pre-meditated killing
based on a religious-political belief that had a movement of
supporters who credited Roeder and expressed joy that Tiller’s clinic
was finally closed, Roeder’s rights and those of his supporters were
honored. Roeder was allowed to have mail, speak with the press,
make and receive calls, and have visitors. He was not put under
197
SAMs.
3.

The chilling effect of the SAMs on the accused and his counsel
The chilling effect of SAMs also gives rise to First Amendment
concerns. A particularly disturbing aspect of the measures is that
198
detailed exposition of the impact of SAMs itself becomes illegal.
This is because everyone in contact with a person under SAMs,
including lawyers and immediate family members, becomes subject to
the SAMs by virtue of the requirement that they not divulge any
199
communication with that person to a third party.
Lawyers and
family members face prosecution if they provide details of any
conversation or interaction with the detainee, thus making it illegal

194. AP: Man Admits Killing Kansas Abortion Doctor, supra note 192.
195. See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., TERROR FROM THE RIGHT: 75 PLOTS, CONSPIRACIES
36 (2009), available at
AND RACIST RAMPAGES SINCE OKLAHOMA CITY
http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_t
he_right_0.pdf (noting Roeder’s involvement with anti-government groups);
Leonard Zeskind, Racism, Anti-Semitism and the Murder of Dr. Tiller, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 2, 2009, 9:56 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leonard-zeskind/racismanti-semitism-and_b_210196.html.
196. David Barstow, An Abortion Battle, Fought to the Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009,
at A1.
197. See Amy Goodman, Two Standards of Detention, TRUTHDIG (July 8, 2009),
www.truthdif.com/report/item/20090708_two_standards_of_justice/.
198. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2009) (observing
that after a sentencing court implements SAMs, an attorney representing that
prisoner who has agreed to comply with the SAMs limitations can be prosecuted for
disclosing information obtained from the prisoner in the course of representation).
199. See Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 9, 11–12 (setting out nondivulgence requirement for Hashmi’s legal and non-legal contacts).
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to speak out publicly against the damage the SAMs are having on the
200
inmate.
In comparison, when civil libertarians sought to draw attention to
the draconian conditions Bradley Manning faced at Quantico, they
were assisted by reports from Manning’s lawyer, David Coombs, and
from David House, a co-founder of the Bradley Manning Support
201
Network.
In detailed reports about Manning’s confinement,
Coombs and House recounted their conversations with Manning—
providing examples of the dehumanizing nature of his conditions,
including Manning being forced to sleep naked and stand naked for
morning parade—as well as comments directly from Manning to
202
In
counter Pentagon claims about how he was being treated.
contrast, if Hashmi were to have written a letter to his attorneys while
under SAMs detailing his treatment at MCC, or provided specific
details about his confinement during visits with his parents, his
attorneys and family would have been prohibited under threat of
203
criminal sanction from publicly disseminating that information.
Pursuant to the SAMs, an attorney who represents a client is
required to sign an affirmation as a condition of being able to
204
communicate with her client and to represent him.
SAMs
requirements state that “[b]y signing the affirmation, the attorney
acknowledges his/her awareness and understanding of the SAM
provisions and his/her agreement to abide by these provisions,
particularly those that relate to contact between the inmate and his
205
attorney.”
The terms effectively prohibit counsel from disclosing
information learned from clients to anyone unless it is for the “sole

200. See id. at 1, 3 (exhibiting the attorney affirmation required under Hashmi’s
SAMs); see also Stewart, 590 F.3d at 112 (illustrating that an attorney who has signed
an affirmation agreeing to comply with SAMs can be prosecuted for disclosing
information obtained from the prisoner in the course of representation).
201. See Glenn Greenwald, The Inhumane Conditions of Bradley Manning’s Detention,
SALON (Dec. 15, 2010, 2:15 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/12/15/manning_3/
(citing House’s descriptions of Manning’s “palpable changes in . . . physical
appearance and behavior” over the course of his confinement); Denver Nicks, Bradley
Manning’s Life Behind Bars, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 17, 2010, 1:36 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/12/17/bradley-manning-wikileaksalleged-sources-life-in-prison.html.
202. Ed Pilkington, Stripped Naked Every Night, Bradley Manning Tells of Prison Ordeal,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/11/
stripped-naked-bradley-manning-prison; Michael Whitney, Breaking:
Military
Harassing David House, Jane Hamsher for Visiting Bradley Manning, FIREDOGLAKE (Jan.
23, 2011, 11:25 AM), http://fdlaction.firedoglake.com/2011/01/23/breakingmilitary-harassing-david-house-jane-hamsher-for-visiting-bradley-manning.
203. See Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 1–3.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 6.
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206

And the entity that
purpose of preparing the inmate’s defense.”
defines the scope of what might legitimately be included in this
purpose is the government itself—in other words, the opposing
207
counsel.
The vague language of the SAMs provisions coupled with the
Attorney General’s demonstrated willingness to prosecute violations
of these types of provisions can result in a chilling of lawyer speech.
Attorneys representing clients under SAMs are scared—and rightly
so. Josh Dratel, counsel to the defendants who were under SAMs in
208
the 1998 “Embassy Bombings case,” articulates the fear in this way:
“The S.A.M.s also unquestionably exert a chilling effect upon
counsel. Given the nature and scope of the proscriptions, it is
doubtful that any lawyer could maintain a perfect record of
compliance.
Thus, the government has maximum discretion
209
regarding whom to prosecute, for what conduct, and when.”
The prosecution of lawyer Lynne Stewart and court-appointed
210
translator Mohamed Yousry
provides a cautionary tale for
contravening these rules. Stewart was convicted in 2005 of five counts
of conspiracy to provide material support and making false
211
statements.
Stewart made a statement to the press about Sheikh
206. Id. at 7–8.
207. See id. at 10 (stating that if a government official determines the inmate is
using contact with his attorney to make non-legal communications, the inmate’s
ability to contact his attorney may be suspended or eliminated).
208. United States v. Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d 359, 361–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
209. Dratel, supra note 163, at 88.
210. Although it was equally as chilling as Stewart’s case, the successful
prosecution of the court-appointed translator Mohamed Yousry received less
attention. While pursuing his doctorate at New York University in Middle Eastern
Studies, Yousry served as the court-appointed translator for Rahman’s attorneys.
Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Translator’s Conviction Raises Legal Concerns, WASH.
POST (Jan. 16, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/01/15/AR2006011500940_pf.html. Pursuant to his responsibilities as a courtappointed translator, he translated Abdel-Rahman’s statements that Stewart
subsequently shared with the press. As a translator, Yousry had not been required to
sign the SAMs paperwork. But upon the urging of his graduate school advisor, Yousry
also interviewed the blind cleric Sheikh Abdel-Rahman for his dissertation, which
focused on Muslim fundamentalism in Egypt. Notebooks of his discussions with the
Sheikh, drafts of his dissertation and other books on Muslim fundamentalism—in
other words, the study of Islamic fundamentalism—became part of the government’s
case against him. One of the jurors explained the guilty verdict against Yousry:
“People are so fearful that if you disagree with the government on one thing it makes
you a terrorist. I have to plead guilty to being a coward. It doesn’t feel good, but I
punked out.” Id.
211. The charges against Stewart in the superseding indictment included:
“conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371”; “conspiring,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to provide and conceal material support to be used in
preparation for, and in carrying out, the conspiracy”; “providing and concealing
material support to the . . . conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2”; and
“making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.” United States v. Sattar,
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Omar Abdel Rahman’s thoughts on the Egyptian ceasefire while
212
She committed this violation in 2000 and
serving as his counsel.
was
reprimanded—but
not
prosecuted—by
the
Clinton
213
Administration for violating the terms of Abdel Rahman’s SAMs. In
the new political climate of spring 2002, however, John Ashcroft
announced the indictment of Stewart on several charges of
conspiring to provide material support for a terrorist offense. She
214
was convicted in February 2005.
The successful prosecution of Stewart has had a chilling effect on
lawyers throughout the country; many will not take these terror cases,
and those who do operate with excessive caution about what they say
215
in public and whom they consult for legal strategy.
Sean Maher,
Hashmi’s lawyer and co-chair of the national security committee of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, told the New
York Times he “knew talented private lawyers who were refusing to
take on terrorism cases because of potential violations of their
privacy, including monitoring of their communications with
216
clients.”
He observed, “I find it unfathomable that in our
adversarial system, we’ve created a process to weed out qualified
217
defense counsel.” Lynne Stewart raised a related concern,
[T]he fear, to me is, not the people who will say, “No, I won’t do

314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
212. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 98–99, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2009).
213. Abbe Smith, The Bounds of Zeal in Criminal Defense: Some Thoughts on Lynne
Stewart, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 31, 34 (2002).
214. Stewart’s prosecution is illuminated by comparison to the contempt of court
citations and four month prison sentences imposed by Judge Harold Medina on the
defense attorneys in Dennis. Upon being cited for contempt, lawyer George Crockett
commented, “I regard it as a badge of honor to be adjudicated in contempt for
vigorously prosecuting what I believe to be the proper conception of the American
Constitution.” STEVE BABSON ET AL., THE COLOR OF LAW: ERNIE GOODMAN, DETROIT,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS 194 (2010). Compare this with
Stewart’s comment after receiving her initial 28-month sentence: “I can do that
[time] standing on my head.” Stewart, 590 F.3d at 108 n.9 (alteration in original).
On remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Koedt
cited the lack of remorse exhibited by Stewart’s post-sentencing comments as a
justification for increasing her sentence from 28 to 120 months. Brief & Special
Appendix for Appellant-Defendant at 40, 49, United States v. Sattar, No. 10-3185
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011).
215. Philip Shenon, Lawyers Fear Monitoring in Cases on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/28/us/28lawyers.html?pagewanted=all.
In order to correspond or speak with a prisoner who is under SAMs—even for
purposes of receiving a request for representation—a lawyer must submit to a
background check and sign an affirmation acknowledging her awareness of the SAM
provisions and agreement to abide by these provisions. Some of those provisions are
extremely onerous and many lawyers understandably do not wish to subject
themselves—or their staff—to them.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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those cases,” which may also be an outgrowth—but the people who
will do the cases, but will now do them with an eye over their
shoulder to make sure that they’re doing [them] the way the
government thinks that the case should be done. In other words,
no challenge, no client-centered defense will take place if you’re
thinking all the time, “What am I going to do if they indict me like
218
they did Lynne Stewart.”

The issue of how lawyers will represent clients charged with—or
convicted of—terrorism-related offenses after Lynne Stewart’s
prosecution has significant implications for the attorney-client
219
relationship and the constitutional rights of lawyers and clients.
The fact that a client’s SAMs restrictions prohibit his lawyer from
speaking to the media about the client’s situation implicates both
constitutional and ethical issues. Twenty years ago, in Gentile v. State
220
Bar of Nevada, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
zealous representation of a client might require actions by lawyers
outside the courtroom. The Court emphasized that attorneys should
take steps before trial to protect the reputation of their clients and
limit the adverse consequences of the indictment, especially in cases
221
where the prosecution may be acting with improper motives.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct also recognize this
obligation of attorneys in the pretrial stages. While prohibiting
attorneys from “mak[ing] an extrajudicial statement that . . . will have
a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding in the matter,” the rules also expressly permit counsel to
“make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required
to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of
222
recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client.”
218. Convicted Attorney Lynne Stewart: “You Can’t Lock Up the Lawyers,” DEMOCRACY
NOW (Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.democracynow.org/2005/2/11/convicted_
attorney_lynne_stewart_you_cant; see also Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of
Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L.
REV. 173, 174 (2003) (discussing the issue of a lawyer’s “affective, positional, and
operational solidarity” with clients with reference to the Stewart case).
219. In somewhat unusual recognition of one aspect of this problem, Judge Young
issued an order modifying the provision of Richard Reid’s SAMs, which restricted
dissemination by Reid’s defense attorneys of communications from Reid to anyone.
Noting that “for years I have taught trial lawyers that: ‘[w]hen you get a case, shop
your ideas. Ask someone, ‘What about this? . . . Have you ever had a case where . . . ?
What if I argued . . . ? How do you think this would work?’” and recognizing that
“[t]his is still a profession,” Judge Young found that the provision restricting
dissemination “prevented precisely this type of trial preparation generally deemed
necessary for a proper defense.” United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D. Mass.
2002) (quoting WILLIAM G. YOUNG, REFLECTIONS OF A TRIAL JUDGE 102 (1998)).
220. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
221. Id. at 1043 (plurality opinion).
222. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a), (c) (2011).
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By prohibiting lawyers from disclosing information about their
clients, the SAMs can effectively muzzle defense lawyers in the public
sphere, raising serious legal and ethical questions regarding these
223
lawyers’ ability to zealously represent their clients.
Indeed, in
recent years, some commentators have argued not only that lawyers
have a right to practice “litigation public relations,” but that they have
a professional obligation to do so—especially when confronted with
224
media attention from the opposing side. As British solicitor Gareth
Peirce observed, the U.S. terrorism prosecutions demonstrate all too
clearly that “[t]here is no reticence in America in commenting on an
arrest, a trial, or the evidence the prosecution claims loudly, from the
225
outset, to possess.” But this coverage, at least for those under SAMs,
is overwhelmingly one-sided.
This one-sided media coverage was amply demonstrated in the
reporting surrounding Ahmed Ghailani’s trial. In June 2009,
Ghailani was transferred from Guantanamo to MCC to stand trial for
226
his alleged role in the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
He was immediately placed under SAMs. Tremendous media
attention followed his case, yet almost none of it noted the conditions
227
he was held under at MCC.
What reached the media and the
public was skewed toward the government’s position because the
defense was forbidden from speaking publicly about discussions with
their client. The most journalistically egregious article was a lengthy
New York Times piece about Ghailani’s mental state and insights on
228
the American legal process.
In the article, Ghailani, who is

223. The ambiguity of some of the SAMs provisions makes the situation even more
frightening from the lawyer’s perspective, as she does not necessarily have a clear
idea of which disclosures are likely to be perceived to be unauthorized in the eyes of
the government, who is also the opposing counsel.
224. See, e.g., John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyers’ Duty to Balance
News Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 77, 78–79 (2002) (arguing that
today’s litigants have both personal and legal interests at risk with regard to news
coverage and thus lawyers must now interact with reporters in order to ensure
balanced coverage of their client’s litigation).
225. Peirce, supra note 10, at 20. Peirce contrasts prosecutorial pretrial publicity
in the United States with that in the United Kingdom, explaining that “[i]n the UK,
the inhibiting Contempt of Court Act demands that any reporting that might
influence a jury be prohibited; the flurry occasioned by arrest and charge, even in
the most dramatically newsworthy cases, is immediately silenced until the trial
begins.” Id.
226. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 515, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
227. See Benjamin Weiser, Report Shows Detainee’s Insight Into Legal Process, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A16 (explaining that Ghailani was moved from
Guantanamo, which he describes as a “more pleasant” and “more relaxed” facility, to
the MCC, but does not mention Ghailani’s SAMs which would have provided context
for his comments).
228. See id.
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described as eating Snickers and discussing John Grisham novels,
gives his impressions of the ways the federal system is better than
Guantanamo—all taken from the notes of the government
psychiatrist because the defense psychiatrist and counsel were
forbidden by the SAMs from commenting publicly about discussions
with their client. New York Times readers thus were treated to a piece
on Ghailani’s mental state and opinions, without a chance for the
defense to put out alternate information—and without even a
mention in the article that the defense was forbidden by the government
to do so. This is particularly notable because the defense had
229
unsuccessfully challenged MCC’s strip-searching of Ghailani.
According to court proceedings, Dr. Katherine Porterfield, the
defense psychiatrist who examined him, found that strip-searching
“trigger[ed] the defendant’s P.T.S.D. and thus ma[de] him unable to
230
assist in his defense.”
Porterfield’s notes, however, could not be
made public due to the SAMs.
Such one-sided media attention is troubling, not only for the
accused whose right to a fair trial may be compromised by his lawyer’s
inability to rebut prosecution statements to the media, but also for
the public, who is entitled—perhaps obligated as a matter of civic
responsibility—to know what goes on in America’s prisons. As Justice
Kennedy eloquently exhorted in his 2003 address to the American
Bar Association, “[t]he subject is the concern and responsibility of
every member of our profession and of every citizen. This is your
231
justice system; these are your prisons.” Observing that “[w]hen the
door is locked against the prisoner, we do not think about what is
232
behind it,” Justice Kennedy urged “a greater responsibility. As a
profession, and as a people, we should know what happens after the
233
prisoner is taken away.”
Prisons—no less than courts—are part of
the justice system and public awareness of what goes on inside them
is crucial to the transparency that is a central value of that system.
The SAMs’ prohibition on the public disclosure of information from

229. See Larry Neumeister, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Guantanamo Detainee: I’ll Skip
Trial if Strip Searches Continue, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2010, 8:08 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/06/ahmed-khalfan-ghailani-gu_n_566517
.html.
230. Benjamin Weiser, Federal Judge Rejects Terrorism Suspect’s Plea to Halt His StripSearches, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at A23. Judge Kaplan ruled the strip-searches
“justified by the legitimate governmental interest in protecting the safety of prison
and court personnel and other inmates.” Id.
231. Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Address
Before the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 2 (Aug. 9, 2003).
232. Id. at 3.
233. Id.
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the prisoner directly or via his lawyer or immediate family deprive the
public of the opportunity to know the conditions in which those who
234
await trial or have been convicted of crimes are being held.
In comparison, the level of secrecy around SAMs surpasses, in
certain regards, the secrecy encountered by counsel for Guantanamo
detainees. Under the terms of a protective order governing access to
the men held at Guantanamo, information received from detainees is
deemed presumptively classified, but there is a process for reviewing
attorney notes from client meetings and detainee legal mail and
clearing at least some information for use in the representation of
detainees.
Indeed, lawyers’ access to the detainees and the
information they were able to bring back was critical in making
known some of the torture and abuse occurring at Guantanamo and
generating coverage by the media and advocacy by human rights
groups. This attention led to widespread public outrage and
condemnation, and eventually led to change in conditions there.
While the protective order raises significant confidentiality and other
rights concerns, in the SAMs context there is no process at all. All
communications from a prisoner are effectively classified and remain
so for as long as his SAMs are in effect, without a determination as to
the nature of the information that an attorney or a family member
may want to disseminate and whether security concerns are
235
implicated.
4.

The unreviewability of the SAMs
Compounding the rights deprivations inherent in pretrial
conditions for a SAMs prisoner are the courts’ unwillingness to

234. In doing so, the SAMs arguably also infringe upon the First Amendment
right of publishers and the press to publish and decide what to publish, as well as the
right of non-inmates to receive that information. Where the prisoner or his lawyer is
forced to forego communicating with the press, the rights of the publisher to publish
and to decide what to publish will be affected. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354
U.S. 436, 441 (1957) (detailing that an essential element of the liberty of free press is
freedom from all censorship over what shall be published); Phelps v. Wichita EagleBeacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the right to publish and to
exercise “editorial discretion concerning what to publish” is protected).
The liberty of free press also affects the rights of non-inmates to receive and
read the information published or reported. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
762–63 (1972) (“[F]reedom [of speech and press] . . . necessarily protects the right
to receive.” (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 395 (1950)
(“[T]he public has a right to every man’s views . . . .”). First Amendment protection
is afforded “to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
235. We are grateful for discussions with Guantanamo attorney Pardiss Kebriaei of
the Center for Constitutional Rights for illuminating the details of this disparity.
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intervene. While a pretrial prisoner is able to challenge the
236
application and conditions of his SAMs in court, Hashmi’s case
demonstrates that the process often does not result in substantive
reviewability. Rather, once the words “national security” are invoked,
237
the court almost always defers to the Executive.
Hashmi first challenged the constitutionality of his SAMs in late
238
On
2007, shortly after the Attorney General first imposed them.
January 16, 2008, the court found that it had jurisdiction to rule on
239
240
his conditions.
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that
“under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior
241
to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”
Under a due process analysis, however, “if a particular condition or
restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to
242
‘punishment,’” and is therefore constitutional. In setting forth this
standard, the Supreme Court carefully distinguished between
generalized restrictions imposed for the safety of the institution and
those that may constitute punishment prior to conviction in violation
243
of the Due Process Clause.
236. Prisoners who have had SAMs imposed pretrial generally have not been
subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, and instead have sought to challenge them through motions filed in their
criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d 76, 85–86 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
237. See United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 77, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (upholding SAMs imposed on a pretrial detainee—a secretary of Osama Bin
Ladin connected to the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy bombing cases—to prevent his
communication with co-conspirators); United States v. Ali, 396 F. Supp. 2d 703, 704,
711 (E.D. Va. 2005) (upholding SAMs imposed on an alleged member of al Qaeda
charged, inter alia, with conspiracy to assassinate the President and conspiracy to
commit air piracy). As evidenced by these cases, the court’s decision not to disturb
Hashmi’s pretrial SAMs was not unique.
238. See Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 79–80.
239. Id. at 76, 85–86. The government had simultaneously argued that Hashmi
had not exhausted his administrative remedies, as well as making the substantive
argument that the SAMs did not abridge Hashmi’s rights. Id. at 84.
240. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
241. Id. at 535–37 (in evaluating the constitutionality of conditions of pretrial
detention, proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the
detainee for under Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law); see also Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (“[T]he State does not acquire the power to
punish . . . until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with
due process of law.”); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317–18 (1946) (holding
that the Constitution prohibits legislative adjudication of guilt by proscribing bills of
attainder). Pretrial conditions of confinement also may not unduly burden a
detainee’s Sixth Amendment right “to a vigorous defense by an independent
attorney.” United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92 (D. Mass. 2002).
242. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
243. Id. at 538–39. Deprivations and restrictions on pretrial detainees that
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In Hashmi’s case, the court held that “the SAMs are reasonably
244
In arriving at this
related to legitimate penological interests.”
conclusion, the court specifically relied on “the evidence of the
Defendant’s willingness to provide aid to Al-Qaeda through his cell
phone and use of his apartment; the Defendant’s stated intention to
overthrow the United States through whatever means necessary; and
245
the Defendant’s threatening statements to British authorities.”
There are two reasons why this outcome is constitutionally
troubling. First, the factual basis for the SAMs upon which the court
relied had not been (and ultimately never was) established; namely,
246
the crimes with which Hashmi was charged. Given that everything
the government invoked to justify Hashmi’s SAMs related to his
charges—none of which alleged a specific act of violence—and not
any previous, separate, or already-proven demonstrated ability to
cause violence from behind bars, the presumption of innocence was
effectively abandoned. In this way, the serious deprivations entailed
by the SAMs effectively constituted punishment inflicted on an
individual pretrial detainee that could not be justified by deference
to the prison administrator’s expertise concerning the safety and
security of the institution. As a result, the Attorney General’s
decision to unilaterally impose the SAMs arguably violated Hashmi’s
247
due process right to be free from punishment prior to conviction.
Additionally problematic is the court’s reasoning that blurs the
distinction between a detention facility’s ability to impose
appropriate rules and regulations that apply to all pretrial detainees,
and the unilateral imposition of particularized severe restrictions by
order of the Attorney General on a specific pretrial detainee through
a SAM. The latter is constitutionally far different, as it constitutes
punishment imposed by a non-judicial official on an un-convicted
248
defendant. Here, the fact that the SAMs were directed and tailored
implicate other constitutional guarantees are constitutionally acceptable if imposed
by prison officials because they are related to institutional security and discipline, as
evaluated under the Turner test, and if they are not an exaggerated response to such
concerns.
244. Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
245. Id.
246. See Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124, at 4 (providing that the
Attorney General’s reasoning for imposing SAMs on Hashmi was based on his
interaction with co-conspirators in his crimes).
247. Such an interpretation would not have left the Attorney General without a
remedy. He could have petitioned the court for an order imposing various
restrictions on Hashmi’s pretrial confinement, which is governed by the provisions of
the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (2006).
248. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (prohibiting punishment of
pretrial detainees).
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solely to Hashmi strongly suggests their punitive character, especially
given the severity of the rights deprivations of a person not alleged to
have violated any institutional rule or to have violated the law while
249
incarcerated.
Another example of the deference to the determinations of
corrections officers occurred during the summer of 2008, when
Hashmi was punished for unauthorized gestures and insubordination
250
for practicing martial arts in his cell.
According to the incident
report, a correctional officer observed Hashmi “practicing shadow
boxing and other martial arts moves. [The officer] approached . . .
[and gave] Inmate Hashmi a direct order to cease his physical actions
and to inquire as to why he was performing such activities. Inmate
Hashmi stated to [the officer], ‘I AM PRACTICING FOR YOU
251
GUYS.’”
In the administrative disciplinary proceeding, Hashmi
provided a written statement contesting the charges:
In the name of Allah . . . I totally deny that events occur as the twoface individual (Berrios) claimed. I was exercising to relieve stress
as I normally do and this two-face individual (Berrios) came and
asked in a[n] entrapping way “Ah you[’re] practicing?” Neither
did he give any orders to stop working out. Proof of this can be
found in the audio recording which the Unit Manager gets a daily
252
transcript of from the FBI.

The government never produced the tape, and Hashmi lost his
limited family visits for three months and commissary for two
253
months.
Hashmi’s SAMs were renewed for a second year. On January 22,
2009, President Obama signed executive orders prohibiting torture
254
and ordering the closure of the Guantanamo prison. The next day,

249. See, e.g., id. at 537–38 (noting that the same considerations used to evaluate
whether an act of Congress is penal or regulatory also bear on the issue of whether
the regulation constitutes unconstitutional punishment of a pretrial detainee);
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (setting out factors for
evaluating the penal versus regulatory character of statutes). Applying the MendozaMartinez factors, the SAM involves “an affirmative disability or restraint,” which has
been historically “regarded as a punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
250. See Incident Report at 1, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-004220-LAP
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2009), ECF No. 75-4.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 3.
253. Id. at 1; see also Transcript of Oral Argument SAMs Challenge Hearing, supra
note 118, at 12–13 (showing that Hashmi’s punishment was imposed without the
BOP providing evidence of his actions via audio or video).
254. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. § 199 (2010); Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3
C.F.R. § 203 (2010).
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Hashmi challenged his SAMs in court for the second time. At the
hearing, Hashmi’s attorneys presented considerable medical
evidence of the impact that long-term solitary confinement and
sensory deprivation have on a person’s mental and physical health,
and the ways that these conditions hampered Hashmi’s ability to
256
participate in his own defense. The defense asked for a modest set
of changes to the SAMs: that Hashmi’s parents be allowed to visit
him together, as they had for the first five months of his incarceration
at MCC; that he be allowed exercise in MCC’s recreational facility on
the roof and with other prisoners; and that he be allowed to attend
257
group prayer and have a Muslim cellmate. The government, in its
argument, reminded the court that when it first imposed the SAMs
on Hashmi in late fall 2007, the court rejected Hashmi’s motion
258
because of the danger he posed to national security.
The
government reasserted the need for the measures to protect national
security and in accordance with the administrative needs of the
259
prison.
260
The court saw no urgency in Hashmi’s conditions and rejected all
of his requested modifications on the grounds that the government
provided “sufficient evidence” to support the conclusion that “the
261
SAMs are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
The court cited the martial arts incident as further proof of Hashmi’s
danger. Hashmi’s counsel requested the tape of the incident to
corroborate his statement and provide an independent witness, since
262
Hashmi’s cell was constantly monitored.
Failing to respond to
defense counsel’s request for audio evidence of the incident while
claiming that Hashmi had provided no rebuttal witnesses, the court
noted that “Hashmi was found guilty of practicing boxing and
263
threatening the staff.”
Moreover, this incident was deemed

255. Transcript of Oral Argument SAMs Challenge Hearing, supra note 118, at 2.
256. Id. at 2–11.
257. See id. at 14–17 (arguing that family visitation has “positive penological
effects,” that the prison should take adequate precautions to permit communal
prayer in accordance with Mr. Hashmi’s faith, and that outdoor exercise would give
Hashmi much needed natural sunlight and vitamin D).
258. See id. at 30 (explaining that the defense did not provide evidence showing
that the SAMs are no longer related to the penological purpose, and that the
government’s initial national security concerns remained valid).
259. Id. at 25.
260. Id. at 26. During the hearing, the court was impatient with the idea of any
urgency around Hashmi’s conditions (more than a year under SAMs plus a year and
a half of solitary confinement). Id. at 29.
261. Transcript of Oral Argument SAMs Challenge Hearing, supra note 118, at 26.
262. Id. at 12–13.
263. Id. at 27.
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evidence of his continuing danger, and Hashmi’s request to relax the
SAMs was denied because doing so “could well endanger BOP
264
personnel.”
Never acknowledging the body of medical and scholarly evidence
the defense presented on the impact of solitary confinement, the
court once again held, “As I’ve already found, the conditions of
Hashmi’s confinement are related to legitimate penological interests,
and thus are administrative and not punitive in nature, and thus are
265
constitutional.”
Given the harshness of Hashmi’s isolation, it is
difficult to imagine what conditions the court would consider
punitive, rather than administrative, regarding a Muslim suspect
266
accused of terrorism-related crimes.
In October 2009, Attorney
267
General Holder renewed Hashmi’s SAMs for another year.
The court’s approval of Hashmi’s three years of pretrial solitary
confinement was not an aberration. The longest case of pretrial
SAMs has been that of Canadian citizen and U.S. legal resident
268
Mohammed Warsame in Minnesota.
Warsame’s case bears
similarities to Hashmi’s in terms of the pretrial imposition of SAMs by
the DOJ, the coercive potential of these measures, and the court’s
unwillingness to intervene. In December 2003, the government
questioned and arrested Warsame, believing he had testimony to
269
Six weeks later, after it became
provide on Zacarias Moussaoui.
264. Id. at 27. To support the request that Hashmi’s elderly parents be allowed to
visit Hashmi together, the defense presented a doctor’s note attesting to his mother’s
hearing problem. Id. at 15. During this court proceeding, the government asserted
that it conveyed Hashmi’s mother’s hearing issue to BOP, and “because, based on
BOP’s observations there does not appear to be one, we have reached an impasse on
that particular issue.” Id. at 24. The court again did not choose to follow up on the
doctor’s attestation and instead took the BOP’s alleged observations of Hashmi’s
mother’s hearing as sufficient evidence for denying the request. Id. at 27.
265. Id. at 29.
266. Interestingly, when confronted with a non-Muslim prisoner convicted of arms
trafficking who was in isolation for an even shorter amount of time and who did not
have SAMs, Judge Shira Scheindlin ordered the government to transfer him to an
open population unit, noting that “I cannot shirk my duty under the Constitution . . .
to ensure that Bout’s confinement is not excessively harsh.” Opinion & Order at 17,
United States v. Bout, 1:08-cr-00365-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), ECF No. 79.
267. See Hashmi SAMs Document, supra note 124.
268. Position of Defendant with Respect to Sentencing at 1, 7, United States v.
Warsame, No. 0:04-cr-00029-JRT-FLN (D. Minn. July 2, 2009), ECF No. 169.
269. On December 8, 2003, Warsame was picked up at his home and taken for two
days for “voluntary” questioning to Camp Ripley in Northern Minnesota (about 100
miles from his home), where law enforcement officials had constructed an elaborate
structure to interrogate him. Id. at 12–22. Believing he had information on Zacarias
Moussaoui, they held Warsame in a specially-outfitted house for questioning, while in
the other house, a broad array of law enforcement (including the FBI, CIA, and a
live feed to the SDNY), unbeknownst to Warsame, could listen in. While they had
the capability to tape these interrogations, they did not. After Warsame asked to be
brought back to Minneapolis and to see a lawyer, they returned him but promptly
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clear that Warsame had no testimony, the government filed material
support charges against him for teaching English to Taliban nurses,
eating in the same room with Osama bin Laden, and sending $2,000
to people in Afghanistan whom the government claimed were
270
assisting Taliban efforts. The Attorney General put Warsame under
271
Warsame spent the next five-and-a-half years in pretrial
SAMs.
272
detention, most of it in solitary confinement.
Similar to Hashmi,
the government claimed the danger of Warsame’s communication
was due to the severity of the charges and Warsame’s supposed
273
associates being at large. After five years of pretrial detention, the
274
The
court seemed poised to modify Warsame’s conditions.
government objected, arguing: “There is every reason to believe that
if the defendant were moved to ‘a more normal pretrial detention
facility,’ the Marshals Service would not be able to adequately limit
the defendant’s ability to communicate with and contact known and
275
suspected terrorists.”
The government indicated it was open to
discussion with defense counsel about Warsame’s conditions. The
276
court stayed the order, and Warsame’s SAMs remained in place.
Six months later, Warsame accepted a government plea bargain of
one count of conspiracy to provide material support (the government
dropped the other four charges) and agreed to deportation following

arrested him on material witness charges. Even after they flew him to New York to
pressure him to testify against Moussaoui, Warsame maintained he had no testimony
to provide. Id.
270. Government’s Position with Respect to Sentencing at 3–4, 11, 18, United
States v. Warsame, No. 0:04-cr-00029-JRT-FLN (D. Minn. July 2, 2009), ECF No. 171.
271. See Position of Defendant with Respect to Sentencing, supra note 268, at 25–
26 (detailing the conditions of Warsame’s pretrial detention). Similar to the point
raised earlier regarding the application of Hashmi’s SAMs, the timeline of Warsame’s
case and SAMs raises questions about the application of SAMs being related to noncooperation. Warsame was originally wanted as a material witness; after his
unwillingness to testify, the government filed terrorism-related charges against him.
Motion to Vacate Order Directing the Marshals Service to Change Defendant’s
Conditions of Detention at 1, United States v. Warsame, No. 0:04-cr-00029-JRT-FLN
(D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2007), ECF No. 122. Many of the facts in the case were
uncontested by the defense—both sides concurred that Warsame had gone to
Afghanistan in 2000—but their meanings were sharply disputed. See Position of
Defendant with Respect to Sentencing, supra note 268, at 8–9 (stating that “Mr.
Warsame came to see Afghanistan as an Islamic utopia” at a time when the Taliban
was the legal government of Afghanistan and not considered an enemy of the United
States).
272. Position of Defendant with Respect to Sentencing, supra note 268, at 25–26.
273. Motion to Vacate Order Directing the Marshals Service to Change
Defendant’s Conditions of Detention, supra note 271, at 1–2.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 4.
276. Order at 2, United States v. Warsame, No. 0:04-cr-00029-JRT-FLN (D. Minn.
Sept. 28, 2007), ECF No. 123.
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277

Given that the government and the court
his prison term.
considered Warsame’s word dangerous enough to merit more than
five years under SAMs, its willingness to drop four counts and insist
on rapid deportation seems curious. Warsame was sentenced to 92
278
months in prison, including time served.
The court noted that
“both the prosecution and Warsame agreed that a sentence below the
guidelines was appropriate in this case” and that “the Court has seen
nothing in the record or the last five years of proceedings demonstrating that
279
Warsame poses an immediate danger.”
If the court had seen
nothing that suggested he posed an immediate danger, why had it
280
been reluctant to suspend Warsame’s SAMs?
The similarities
surrounding the use of pretrial SAMs on both Warsame and Hashmi
are notable, and in both cases they raise significant questions about
the purpose of the SAMs, their coercive potential, and their effect on
the fairness of the process afforded.

277. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1–2, United States v. Warsame, No. 0:04-cr00029-JRT-FLN (D. Minn. July 17, 2009), ECF No. 177.
278. United States v. Warsame, 651 F. Supp. 2d. 978, 982 (D. Minn. 2009).
279. Id. at 981 (emphasis added). The court did note, however, that Warsame
“admittedly trained at two terrorist training camps, and had access to al Qaeda
leadership” prior to the start of the proceedings. Id.
280. The plea and 92-month sentence raises questions as to whether Warsame
posed a significant security threat. Further, that one of the conditions of the plea
agreement was immediate deportation (Warsame’s American citizen wife and
children still lived in Minnesota) raised similar questions of arbitrary punitiveness. If
the government insisted on the administrative necessity of over five years of SAMs
and incarceration post-plea at the CMU in Terre Haute, forcing Warsame to leave
the country seems at odds with the immediate danger repeatedly asserted by the
government of Warsame’s unmonitored communication. Amy Forliti, Mohammed
Abdullah Warsame, Terror Suspect, Deported to Canada, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2010,
8:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/08/mohammed-abdullahwarsame_n_756263.html.
Here again, the similarities to Korematsu are too striking to go without mention.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216–17, 219, 223 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92, 95, 101 (1943). One of the most egregious aspects of
Korematsu was the Court’s willingness to uphold the constitutionality of the
evacuation order despite its apparent recognition of the lack of threat posed by
Japanese-American citizens. 323 U.S. at 216–17, 219, 223. In Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S.
283 (1944), decided the same day as Korematsu, the Court held that the continued
detention of Japanese-Americans was unwarranted. Id. at 302, 304. Unfortunately,
the Endo decision was not announced until December 18, 1944—one day after the
Roosevelt Administration announced that it would release the internees. Many
believe that the Court intentionally delayed its decision to allow the President, rather
than the Court, to end the internment. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS
AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 174–75 (2001); see
also Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu In Support of Petitioners at 17, Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 344–45
(1983).
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B. CIPA
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an
individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings,
the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the
individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
–Greene v. McElroy281

The application and use of SAMs in Hashmi’s case were one part of
a host of rights issues on the road to trial. The inability of Hashmi to
review the evidence against him raises further concern. Similar to
the court’s legitimization of Hashmi’s pretrial conditions of
confinement, here again the court prioritized the government’s
national security claims and was unwilling to take steps to protect
Hashmi’s right to review the evidence against him.
As a citizen charged in federal district court, Hashmi was
prosecuted based on evidence classified under the Classified
282
Information Procedures Act (CIPA).
Enacted in 1980 to prevent
graymailing by former U.S. intelligence officers accused of espionage
who could threaten to reveal U.S. secrets if prosecuted, CIPA
provides a way for the accused to use classified information in his
defense pursuant to an express set of conditions; notably, that
carefully delineated information is subject to a protective order
283
preventing its release.
In enacting CIPA, Congress accepted this
balance in an attempt to “reconcile two often conflicting interests:
the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the government’s need to
284
protect national security information involved in the trial.”
As a result of the use of CIPA in Hashmi’s case, his lawyers
underwent a security clearance, which took the better part of a year,
in order to review the government’s evidence against him. Lawyers
seeking CIPA top-secret clearance must undergo background checks
285
that include an FBI review of their financial and medical records.

281. 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
282. Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16
(2006)).
283. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of The Classified Information Procedures Act,
13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 277 (1986).
284. Id.
285. See United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118–23 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
aff’d by In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 532 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that counsel must submit to DOJ-initiated security clearance
procedure in order to have access to classified information).
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These clearances took many months, further degrading Hashmi’s
right to a speedy trial and his health. To give his defense counsel time
to actually review the CIPA evidence, Hashmi was continually
impelled to agree to exclude the time from the Speedy Trial Act
286
calculation.
Hashmi’s counsel was required to travel to an
undisclosed Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility to
review the classified evidence in their client’s case. This process
287
added considerable time to counsel’s case preparation, which
Hashmi spent in isolation.
Furthermore, Hashmi’s attorneys were forbidden from discussing
much of the government’s evidence with him and with outside
288
experts who did not have security clearances.
This sort of
stipulation makes preparing a case exceedingly difficult as it cordons
off defense counsel from a broader array of eyes and opinions on the
material. Given the CIPA requirements, Hashmi’s defense also was
required to preview their case for the government and to make a
289
premature decision about whether Hashmi would testify.
1.

Rights concerns regarding CIPA evidence
The use of CIPA is typically cited as a flexible feature of the federal
system to protect classified information. Civil liberties groups and
scholars have pointed to the benefits of CIPA to shield classified
290
information used in terrorism prosecutions in the federal courts.
But this skirts a hallowed facet of due process: the right of the
291
defendant to confront his accuser and see the evidence against him.

286. See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (2006).
287. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA
and FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1075 n.56 (2006) (explaining that
the “mechanics of reviewing CIPA materials is necessarily onerous and time
consuming”).
288. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 9, 94 Stat. 2025,
2027 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app § 9 (2006)). Only a lawyer who has received a
security clearance from the government is entitled to review the classified material.
See Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 118. Counsel’s review of such documents is subject to
a protective order that precludes any release of the information—including to the
defendant. CIPA § 3.
289. CIPA §§ 5–6.
290. See 2011 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 13, at 2, 5, 13 (providing a
comprehensive report of prosecution of terrorism-related crimes, including use of
CIPA in such prosecutions and calling the strategy of federal terrorism prosecution
“confident and focused”); ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 14, at 81–90 (detailing the
use of CIPA procedures and terrorism cases and reporting CIPA’s effectiveness in
such cases).
291. See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (“Due process . . .
requires that [the defendant] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be
heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine,
and to offer evidence of his own.”).
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According to the court, the evidence in Hashmi’s case was
292
“voluminous.” Faced with that vast quantity of evidence, his counsel
faced difficulty adequately sorting through what might be exculpatory
or revealing without input and guidance from Hashmi himself. For
instance, certain cell phone records, photographs, or emails might
seem insignificant or irrelevant to a defense lawyer, but if the
defendant himself were to see them, he might see meaning in
something his lawyer did not. Thus, requests to declassify evidence
for Hashmi’s review were necessarily guesswork from his counsel, and
could not fairly approximate what the scope of review would have
looked like if all the material were available initially to Hashmi to
make his own determination.
Moreover, such prohibitions strain the lawyer-client relationship.
293
The client cannot obtain clearance to see classified materials, and
the attorney is forbidden from discussing the materials, leading to
frustration and corroding the trust between attorney and client. The
defendant is effectively kept in the dark and cannot actively
participate in preparing his own case. The alienation produced by
CIPA evidence erodes rapport and the ability to build an effective
294
defense.
The current uses of CIPA stray significantly from its origins, as
terrorism cases do not typically involve the potential of graymail since
the defendant is not the one in possession of the classified
295
evidence. As Sam Schmidt and Joshua Dratel have argued, the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment implications of the use of CIPA in terrorismrelated cases are thus considerable:
Defendants are . . . denied the right to confront the evidence
against them. The right to confrontation is a personal right and is
not exercisable merely through counsel. Defendants also are
deprived of the rights to be present at the CIPA hearings to
determine the admissibility of evidence, a critical stage of the
proceedings, and to assist in the preparation and presentation of
the defense. . . . CIPA also violates Fifth Amendment rights
including the defendant’s right to: (1) testify in his own behalf; (2)

292. See Transcript of Oral Argument SAMs Challenge Hearing, supra note 118, at
30.
293. Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua L. Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government’s
Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 69, 80–81 (2004). For a thoughtful critique of CIPA from an ethics
perspective, including its effects on the attorney-client relationship, see Ellen C.
Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III Courts, FISA, CIPA and
Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 203, 207–14 (2006).
294. Schmidt & Dratel, supra note 293, at 81–82.
295. Id. at 81.
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present a defense, since classified evidence can be excluded
and/or diminished pursuant to CIPA; and (3) remain silent, since
in order to introduce classified evidence at trial, even through his own
testimony, the defendant must notify the government in advance of
precisely the evidence the defense seeks to have admitted in
296
evidence.

In terrorism trials, CIPA threatens to erode the adversarial process
that is at the heart of and necessary for just criminal prosecutions.
The government acts both as opposing counsel and the entity
297
responsible for classifying and de-classifying evidence.
Moreover,
298
CIPA effectively results in waiver of the work-product privilege.
Defense thoughts and impressions are supposed to be protected,
including documents and statements given to defense counsel during
299
the case’s investigation or defense.
Yet Hashmi was required to
provide notice to the court if he “reasonably expect[ed] to disclose or
300
to cause the disclosure of classified information.”
Moreover, by
asking for certain documents to be declassified and by previewing
witnesses, the defense is forced to reveal its thinking and its strategy

296. Id. at 82–83.
297. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 4, 94 Stat. 2025,
2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app § 4 (2006)).
298. The work product doctrine applies to criminal litigation, protecting counsel’s
mental processes, opinions, and strategy from disclosure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2);
see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (noting that “[a]lthough the
work-product doctrine most frequently is asserted as a bar to discovery in civil
litigation, its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system is
even more vital [because] [t]he interests of society and the accused in obtaining a
fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that
adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side
of the case”).
299. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2) (excluding information on litigation plans from
disclosure requirements); Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238–39 (stating that the work-product
privilege should be grounded in the realities of litigation, and thus applied liberally,
but can also be waived voluntarily).
300. CIPA § 5(a). This statutory command forces the defense to furnish crucial
details of the defense case to the prosecution, including: (1) the defendant’s own
anticipated classified testimony at trial; (2) the anticipated classified testimony of all
other defense witnesses; (3) the contents of all classified documents that the defense
intends to introduce at trial; (4) the classified information contained in counsel
questions and that the defense expects to elicit from prosecution witnesses on crossexamination; and (5) all classified matter in defense counsel’s opening and closing
statements.
Following submission of the CIPA section 5 notice, the hearing requirement of
section 6 demands further disclosure of the defense case. Upon request by the
prosecution, section 6 forces the defense to explain to the court and the
government, before trial, the relevance and significance to the defense of all of the
classified information set forth in the CIPA section 5 notice. Id. § 6(a). In practice,
the CIPA notice and hearing requirements compel the defense to disclose pretrial
the theory of its case, the means it will use to test the government’s case, and virtually
every detail of the supporting evidence.
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301

to the prosecution. These broad notice and hearing requirements,
enforceable through preclusion of evidence at trial, burdened
Hashmi’s constitutional rights, including the privilege against
302
compelled self-incrimination, the right to testify in his own defense,
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right to due
process of law.
2.

Unreviewability
Despite defense challenges to the CIPA restrictions, the court was
again unmoved by arguments surrounding infringements on
Hashmi’s constitutional rights, ruling:
The [c]ourt has no trouble concluding the CIPA strikes the right
balance. . . . [T]he “penalty” the Defendant faces is the possible
preclusion of undisclosed classified information possible because
preclusion is not mandatory under CIPA § 5(b). This potentiality,
when compared to the Government’s interest in protecting
classified information, is a legitimate regulatory interest like others
303
the law recognizes.

The court based its decision on its finding that “no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation. While
requiring security clearances may, to some extent, impose on the
Defendant’s right to his counsel of choice, that interest is outweighed
304
by countervailing government interests.”
According to the court,
the assertion of national security—regardless of whether it was
305
substantiated—thus trumped infringement of Hashmi’s rights.
Additionally, the court’s determination that the preclusion of
undisclosed classified information was only “possible” side-stepped
301. See generally id. §§ 4–5 (setting forth the discovery process of classified
information by defendants and requiring defendants to give notice to the
government of intent to disclose classified information).
302. The requirement that Hashmi disclose pretrial his own classified testimony
placed an impermissible burden on his “right to take the witness stand and to testify
in his . . . own defense,” guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987). CIPA sections 5 and 6 required Hashmi to pay a
price—in the form of pretrial disclosure to the prosecution—solely to preserve his
constitutional right to testify about relevant and admissible classified information.
CIPA §§ 5–6.
303. Memorandum & Order, supra note 124, at 11.
304. Id. at 16 (citation omitted). Hashmi argued that CIPA infringed on his right
to counsel of his choice because of the onerous and lengthy process required for
lawyers to obtain CIPA clearance. In upholding the use of CIPA in his case, the court
appeared not to consider that the denial of Hashmi’s Sixth Amendment right to
choice of counsel could constitute structural error. See United States v. GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148, 150 (2006) (holding that denial of criminal defendant’s
right to choice of counsel was structural error requiring reversal without harmless
error analysis).
305. Memorandum & Order, supra note 124, at 25.
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the first substantive step of the CIPA process, which is the volume of
classified evidence that defense counsel initially reviews; only then
does counsel ask for a portion of the evidence to be declassified for
306
the client. The court then rules on the relevance of that evidence,
and then the government decides whether to release it, to make an
adequate substitute for the classified information, or to face possible
307
dismissal. Under the current CIPA process, no defense counsel can
reasonably go to the court and say, “I think all the evidence is
relevant and should be declassified.” Thus the preclusion is not
simply “possible” but actual. In situations such as Hashmi’s, “CIPA’s
purpose is distorted . . . [because] the defendant never had and
308
never will have access to the material.” In this way, the invocation
of CIPA in terrorism cases becomes a tool the government can wield
to its legal advantage.
III. TRIAL
Adding to the earlier constellation of rights issues were several
pretrial rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence that,
individually and collectively, called into question both the fairness of
Hashmi’s trial as well as broader First Amendment concerns in the
realm of Islamic political speech and association.
A. Political Speech and Association as Evidence—But of What?
While acknowledging Hashmi’s First Amendment right to express
his political beliefs, the government was prepared to introduce tapes
309
of his political speeches at trial. It planned, for instance, to show a
tape of a 2002 demonstration outside the Indian Embassy where, in a
speech, Hashmi expressed his “approval of Hezbollah, Hamas, and
the Taliban” and called the President of the United States a
310
“terrorist.”
That the government had such tapes indicates the
306. Id. at 11.
307. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 6, 94 Stat. 2025,
2026 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. § 6 (2006)).
308. Yaroshefsky, supra note 293, at 210.
309. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Admit
Certain Evidence at Trial at 1, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2009), ECF No. 114.
310. Id. at 6. They also had an “undercover journalist” report from a student
meeting at Queens College where Hashmi allegedly explained, “We are not
Americans. We’re Muslims and they are going to deport and attack us,” and then
purportedly went on to say, “We reject the UN, reject the US, reject all law and order.
Don’t lobby Congress or protest, we don’t recognize Congress!
The only
relationship you should have with America is to topple it!” Id. at 6–7. That
“undercover journalist” was Aaron Klein, who writes for the conservative World Net
Daily and whose current book, THE MANCHURIAN PRESIDENT: BARACK OBAMA’S TIES TO
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considerable surveillance of Hashmi’s student political activities.
The defense filed a motion requesting that the FISA warrant by which
such information had been obtained be provided to the defense and
312
asked that materials derived from this surveillance be excluded.
313
The court denied the motion.
In response to objections from the defense regarding the threat to
Hashmi’s First Amendment rights and the ways that these political
views might unduly influence the jury, the government claimed the
tapes were necessary and demonstrated his “jihadist” state of mind—
314
and thus his intent—years later. The court allowed the speeches to
be used, finding they were “admissible as direct evidence of the
315
charged offense.” Yet the speeches never mention al Qaeda, nor do
they show either Babar or Hashmi telling people that jihadists need
provisions like socks and ponchos (in fact, the tapes do not show
316
Babar at all).
What they show is Hashmi making public political
speeches at open events, which invites the question: what about them
is “direct evidence of the charged offense,” except that they show
Hashmi making pointed criticisms of the United States and the
treatment of Muslims world-wide?
In assessing the use of Hashmi’s prior speech and the court’s
COMMUNISTS, SOCIALISTS, AND OTHER ANTI-AMERICAN EXTREMISTS (2010), raises
questions as to his journalistic integrity and reliability as a government source.
Klein’s report on this Queens meeting can be found at: Aaron Klein, Soda, Pizza, and
the Destruction of America, WORLD NET DAILY (Mar. 18, 2003, 1:00 AM),
http://www.wnd.com/2003/03/17795.
311. History again provides a cautionary tale of the ways such surveillance takes on
a life of its own. Perhaps the most well-known example of the Cold War era is
Hoover’s persistent surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr., under grounds of
potential Communist subversion. While the Bureau never found any ties to the
Communist Party, they did find evidence of King’s adultery—which they then made
use of by attempting to blackmail King in 1964. They also showed it to friendly
journalists who the FBI hoped would publish it and discredit King, despite that the
information possessed no real relevance to national security. See generally David J.
Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, ATL. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2002, at 80.
312. Motion for Disclosure & Review of All FISA Applications, Review of Rulings
Made by the FISC, & Suppression of All FISA-Derived Evidence at 1, United States v.
Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009), ECF No. 64. For a persuasive
critique of warrantless wire-tapping and misuse of FISA by numerous scholars and
advocates, see Letter from Ronald Dworkin et al. to Congress, On NSA Spying: A
Letter to Congress (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2006/feb/09/on-nsa-spying-a-letter-to-congress/.
313. Order at 1, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2009), ECF No. 92.
314. Government’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Admit Certain
Evidence at Trial, supra note 309, at 8, 13.
315. Transcript of Hearing on Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of Evan Kohlmann at 15, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2009).
316. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Admit Certain
Evidence at Trial, supra note 309, at 6–7.
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rulings regarding its admissibility, it is important to recall the charges
asserted against him, as well as those not asserted. Hashmi was
charged with providing and conspiring to provide material support to
317
al Qaeda. The government did not allege that he was a member of
al Qaeda, that he provided weapons to al Qaeda, that he assisted al
Qaeda in any act of violence, that he participated in a specific plot or
al Qaeda act, or, for that matter, that he had any direct contact at all
318
with al Qaeda. To try to establish the necessary link to al Qaeda for
purposes of the material support and conspiracy charges, the
government sought to focus on Hashmi’s association with ALM, a
religious-political group deeply critical of the United States
government that, as noted above, had never been designated by the
U.S. as a terrorist organization and was not charged in the
319
conspiracy.
By providing the jury with examples of Hashmi’s
political speech and his association with ALM, the government
sought to demonstrate, by implication, that Hashmi satisfied the
mens rea necessary for the crime of providing material support to al
320
Qaeda.
In this way, a troubling elision between dissent and terrorism was
invoked by the government and approved by the court to justify
including Hashmi’s political activities in the trial. The court
explained, “[t]he evidence at issue here, that this defendant
participated and spoke at an ALM protest and took part in a meeting
in 2003 to the same effect, is certainly not unfairly prejudicial in light
321
of the nature of the charges made against him.” To put it another
way, because Hashmi was charged with a terrorism-related crime, his
considerable criticisms of U.S. policy could be used to bolster the
government’s case that he had provided material support for
terrorism. If the prosecution of Hashmi was not about his politics but
about the actions he took, why were those actions not enough for the
317. Id. at 3; see 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
318. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Limit Evidence Related to Al Qaeda,
Osama bin Laden, Al Muhajiroun, Hamas, Hezbollah, & the Taliban at 2, United
States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2009), ECF No. 116.
319. Id. at 2–3.
320. On the mens rea required for a material support conviction, the statute states
that the defendant “must have knowledge that the organization is a designated
terrorist organization . . . that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist
activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(1). Until the HLP decision, exactly what this meant was somewhat
unclear. In HLP, the majority adopted the most expansive construction—mere
knowledge of an FTO’s connection to terrorism. Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010).
321. Transcript of Hearing on Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of Evan Kohlmann, supra note 315, at 16.
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government to support its case, particularly given that it had a
cooperating witness? Moreover, even though the government’s case
was only focused on conduct during a two-week period in London,
public political speeches Hashmi made more than a year earlier in
322
New York were considered directly relevant as evidence.
To solidify for the jurors the connection between “anti-American”
ideology and terrorist action, the government also was prepared to
323
call on terrorism-expert Evan Kohlmann. Willing to draw sweeping
associations among militant Islamic groups, Kohlmann has testified
324
for the government in more than twenty terrorism cases. His basic
methodology is to monitor jihadist websites and Muslim extremist
325
He does not read or speak Arabic, Urdu, Bengali,
news sources.
Pashtun, Chechen, or any other languages native to the Middle East
or Asia, and he pays a student assistant to translate the materials for
326
him.
He has no fieldwork experience and has never published a
327
peer-reviewed article or book.
Kohlmann often accompanies his
testimony with inflammatory slideshows that include pictures of
Osama bin Laden and graphic photos of gruesome violence, even in
322. Government’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Admit Certain
Evidence at Trial, supra note 309, at 4, 8–9.
323. See Transcript of Hearing on Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of Evan Kohlmann, supra note 315, at 23, 25; Expert Report I: U.S. v.
Syed Hashmi, United States v. Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
2009), ECF No. 115-3 (describing Kohlmann’s background and expertise as an
“International Terrorism Consultant”).
324. See About Us, NEFA FOUND., http://nefafoundation.org//index.cfm?page
ID=26 (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (listing cases).
325. With an undergraduate degree from Georgetown and a law degree from the
University of Pennsylvania, Kohlmann is not an academic but a paid government
expert who grosses more than $100,000 yearly for these testimonies. A senior
investigator for the “Nine Eleven Finding Answers” (NEFA) Foundation, he runs his
own website, globalterroralert.com, which features reports on terrorist activities and
threats on places as diverse as Bosnia, Somalia, Saudia Arabia, Libya, Chechnya,
Afghanistan, and Yemen. Not only is Kohlmann financially dependent on the money
he receives from such testimony (the bulk of the income he brings in each year
comes from this work), but it would be difficult to argue, given his lack of faculty
appointment, peer review, or other independent academic confirmation of his
research, that Kohlmann’s qualifications exist independent of the government’s
validation of him. Wesley Yang, The Terrorist Search Engine, N.Y. MAG., December 5,
2010, available at http://nymag.com/news/features/69920/.
While Federal Rule of Evidence 702 expressly contemplates the use of experts
who possess not only scientific and technical but also “other specialized knowledge,”
the advisory note rejects the idea that opinions based on such knowledge should be
treated “more permissively.” Instead, “[a]n opinion from an expert who is not a
scientist should receive the same degree of scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from
an expert who purports to be a scientist.” See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s
note—2000 Amendment.
326. Yang, supra note 325.
327. Tom Mills, Evan Kohlmann; The Doogie Howser of Terrorism?, SPINWATCH (Apr.
29, 2008), http://www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-category-mainmenu-8/74-terrorspin/4850-evan-kohlmann-the-doogie-howser-of-terrorism.
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cases with no direct tie to bin Laden or the violence depicted.
In Hashmi’s case, the government sought to have Kohlmann testify
about “the genesis, history and structure of al Qaeda,” “the genesis,
history and structure of al Muhajiroun,” and “the terrorist
329
organizations known as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban” —
despite Hashmi’s willingness to stipulate that he knew what al Qaeda
was and what it does—the purported reason for Kohlmann’s
330
testimony.
When the defense challenged Kohlmann’s
qualifications as well as the methodology he uses to render opinions
about al Qaeda’s “web of support,” the court found that academic
training and peer review were not necessary to make such
331
connections, and qualified Kohlmann to provide expert testimony
on ALM, along with al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah (even though
332
the charges did not involve Hamas or Hezbollah). In doing so, the
court gave the government significant latitude to put Hashmi’s
politics on trial, facilitating the prosecution’s efforts to use Hashmi’s

328. See Carol J. Williams, Guantanamo Jurors Shown Graphic Film on Al Qaeda, L.A.
TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A8 (describing the video that Kohlmann produced for the
Guantanamo military commissions’ trial of Salim Hamdan called “The Al Qaeda
Plan”). According to the military tribunal’s chief prosecutor, the film (which was
sponsored by the Office of Military Commissions) was intended to arouse emotions:
“It is prejudicial, which is why we show it.” Id.; see also United States v. Amawi, 552 F.
Supp. 2d 669, 671 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (barring Kohlmann’s testimony that included a
video montage of suicide bombings, civilian executions, and sniper shootings of
American soldiers even though the prosecution did not allege the defendants had
any connection to any foreign terrorist group, because of the very considerable
potential for unfair prejudice to the defendants).
329. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Limit Evidence Related to Al Qaeda,
Osama Bin Laden, Al Muhajiroun, Hamas, Hezbollah, & the Taliban, supra note 318,
2–3.
330. Alternatively, the proffer of Kohlmann’s testimony could be viewed as an
attempt to have an expert witness testify to a defendant’s mens rea in violation of
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which states that “[n]o expert witness testifying
with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the
mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a
defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.” FED. R.
EVID. 704(b); see Brian R. Gallini, To Serve and Protect? Officers as Expert Witnesses In
Federal Drug Prosecutions, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 407 (2012) (suggesting that
when the mens rea to support conviction is a matter of factual knowledge, there is
reason for concern that an expert’s testimony goes beyond merely factual matters
and “rather implicitly indicate[s] that those facts satisfy the statutory mens rea
requirement”). And there is a First Amendment layer to this as well, since
Kohlmann’s testimony would have effectively amounted to an expert testifying that
certain political speech is evidence of criminal mens rea.
331. Transcript of Hearing on Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of Evan Kohlmann, supra note 315, at 25, 28, 33 (noting “no particular
difference between Mr. Kohlmann’s background and these topics and those of Mr.
Gerges,” who is a Sarah Lawrence chaired professor and served as defense expert
witness).
332. Id. at 31–33.

ROVNER-THEOHARIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1396

6/14/2012 7:12 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1331

333

association with ALM as evidence of his intent.
In permitting
Kohlmann’s testimony, the court allowed him to play on the fears of a
lower Manhattan jury using examples of unrelated terrorist violence,
thus giving an “expert” veneer to the common prejudice that all
334
militant Muslims are connected to terrorism.
The court’s decision to admit this evidence raises significant First
Amendment concerns, as it is easy to envision the chilling effect on
future Islamic political speech and association for anyone familiar
with Hashmi’s case. Indeed, what happened to Hashmi, a politicallyactive young man who grew up and stood trial in New York, works as
a cautionary tale for those who would engage in inflammatory speech
or who are members of unpopular organizations—especially those
335
associated with more militant Islamic political ideals.
These kinds of concerns have motivated some scholars to
reexamine First Amendment jurisprudence and its relationship to
333. Id. at 33.
334. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring courts to exclude evidence “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”). As Hashmi’s
counsel argued:
The danger of this evidence is two-fold. The first level of danger is that the
jury will see it not as, quote unquote, background, but as simple propensity
that anybody—because Mr. Hashmi has expressed the kind of speech that he
has, and the government doesn’t argue that this is anything but protected
First Amendment speech, because he has expressed views, he is more likely
to have acted with the intent that the government charges him with. The
second level is that the jury, hearing views that may in fact be troublesome
and offensive to many jurors, will convict Mr. Hashmi not because of what he
did, but because of what he believes.
Transcript of Hearing on Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of
Evan Kohlmann, supra note 315, at 9. While “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not
prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to
prove motive or intent,” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1998)
(per curiam) (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted), the First Amendment does bar the evidentiary use of
speech to air a defendant’s “abstract beliefs” in front of a jury, see Dawson v.
Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992) (finding that “[w]hatever label is given to the
evidence presented, . . . [the defendant’s] First Amendment rights were violated by
the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence in this case, because the evidence
proved nothing more than [the defendant’s] abstract beliefs”). This is especially
true when such evidence is “employed simply because the jury would find these
beliefs morally reprehensible.” Id.
335. See Huq, supra note 73, at 852 (arguing that to the extent that post 9/11 law
enforcement efforts have targeted Islamic religious speech as a “signal” of terrorism,
such practices have the potential not only to chill individuals’ constitutionally
protected speech and association, but also their autonomy). Huq also notes that:
Because that speech concerns matters at the core of many individuals’
understanding of their identity, a chilling effect will impinge on “individual
autonomy understood as the practical power to choose one’s ends” that is at
the heart of some conceptions of the speech and association components of
the First Amendment.
Id. (quoting Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 178 (2003)).
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Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine in the context of information336
Starting from the premise that
gathering by the government.
“[d]emocracy depends upon citizens who are free to formulate their
own beliefs” and the idea that “[g]overnment information gathering
can threaten the ability to express oneself, communicate with others,
explore new ideas, and join political groups,” Daniel Solove argues
for the development of what he calls “First Amendment criminal
procedure” to protect against government information gathering that
337
implicates First Amendment interests. As Solove explains:
The chilling effect doctrine recognizes that the First Amendment
can be implicated indirectly and not just through direct legal
prohibitions on speech. The key to chilling effect is deterrence:
“A chilling effect occurs when individuals seeking to engage in
activity protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment are deterred from so
doing by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that
338
protected activity.”

Based on the government’s treatment of Hashmi, there is a
significant risk that those who witnessed this process and who share
his political views would feel chilled by the central role that his
political activities played in the government’s case against him.
B. Anonymous Jury
In yet another troubling aspect of Hashmi’s case, attempts to
highlight infringements of his rights also came under suspicion from
the government and the court. From the very outset, Hashmi’s family
and friends and Muslim Student Associations at universities across the
339
New York metro area sought to draw attention to his case.
More
than 550 academics and writers signed a Statement of Concern
noting issues around “the conditions of [Hashmi’s] detention,
constraints on his right to a fair trial, and the potential threat his case
336. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Guilt By Expressive Association: Political Profiling,
Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 622 (2004); Daniel J.
Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 117 (2007)
(asserting that “there are doctrinal, historical, and normative foundations for the
First Amendment to play a significant role in regulating government information
gathering”).
337. Solove, supra note 336, at 121, 142.
338. Id. at 142–43 (alterations in original) (quoting Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693
(1978)). While the Supreme Court has held that law enforcement presence or
recording of public speeches alone do not constitute cognizable First Amendment
injuries, lower courts have recognized such injuries when plaintiffs have been able to
produce evidence of deterrence or “indication[s] of palpable harmful future uses of
the information.” Solove, supra note 336, at 144–45 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.
1, 10–11 (1972)).
339. Theoharis, supra note 86.
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pose[d] to the First Amendment rights of others.”
In October
2009, Theaters Against War began holding weekly vigils outside MCC
featuring Broadway actors, playwrights, and musicians to protest the
conditions under which Hashmi and other terrorism suspects were
341
being held in New York.
Muslim students, professors, clergy, law
students, anti-war activists, mothers with children, high school
students, prisoner rights advocates, and Hashmi’s own extended
family gathered each week outside MCC for the six months preceding
his trial.
Because of this growing grassroots movement, progressive media
began to take an interest in Hashmi’s case and its attendant civil
342
rights issues.
A week before trial, the Center for Constitutional
Rights, Amnesty International USA, and the Council on American
Islamic Relations-NY released an open letter expressing their
concerns about Hashmi’s upcoming trial—calling attention to the
severity of his pretrial conditions of confinement, their impact on his
mental health, and his ability to effectively participate in his own
343
defense. Many people concerned about the rights issues at stake in
the case planned to attend the trial. There was an organizing
campaign, termed “500@500,” that asked New Yorkers to come
observe the trial at the federal courthouse (located at 500 Pearl
344
Street).
In response, the U.S. Attorney filed a motion citing the public
interest in the case as growing and dangerous, thus necessitating
340. Statement
of
Concern,
EDUCATORS
FOR
CIVIL
LIBERTIES,
http://www.educatorsforcivilliberties.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
341. See generally THEATERS AGAINST WAR, www.thawaction.org (last visited Apr. 14,
2012).
342. See, e.g., William Fisher, Feel Safer Now?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2010, 9:03
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-fisher/feel-safer-now_b_526675.html;
Chris Hedges, SAMs—The Creepy, Inhumane Legal Weapon the State Uses to Break
Prisoners, ALTERNET (June 13, 2011), http://www.alternet.org/world/151280/
hedges:_sams__the_creepy_inhumane_legal_weapon_the_state_uses_to_break_priso
ners/?page=entire (“Justice has become as unattainable for Muslim activists in the
United States as it was for Kafka’s frustrated petitioner.”); Amitava Kumar, Kidnapped
by
the
State,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Feb.
8,
2010,
11:17
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amitava-kumar/kidnapped-by-thestate_b_453462.html; Bill Quigley, Not Just Guantanamo: US Torturing Muslim Pre-Trial
Detainee
in
NYC,
HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr.
3,
2010,
1:34
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-quigley/not-just-guantanamo-usto_b_524226.html; Jeanne Theoharis, Guantánamo at Home, THE NATION (Apr. 2,
2009), http://www.thenation.com/article/Guantanamo-home; Guantanamo at Home,
DEMOCRACY NOW (June 5, 2009), http://www.democracynow.org/2009/6/5/hashmi.
343. Rights Groups Issue Open Letter on Upcoming NYC Trial of Syed Fahad Hashmi and
Severe Special Administrative Measures, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Apr. 23,
2010),
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/rights-groups-issue-openletter-upcoming-nyc-trial-syed-fahad-hashmi-and-sev.
344. Theoharis, supra note 86.

ROVNER‐THEOHARIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 7:12 PM

PREFERRING ORDER TO JUSTICE

different security measures for jurors.
increased media attention to the case:

345

1399

The government noted

Based upon the considerable local press coverage of this case over
the past three years since the defendant was returned to New York,
it is clear that the actual trial of this matter will generate a
substantial amount of publicity. Indeed, certain of Hashmi’s
supporters have worked hard to make sure that this is the case.
One need only look at the website dedicated to this case—
www.freefahad.com—to conclude that some are seeking as much
media attention for this case as possible. Moreover, those affiliated
with the website are organizing a demonstration outside of the
Courthouse called “500@500”.
According to the website,
“500@500” is “an effort to gather 500 people at SDNY’s
courthouse” at 500 Pearl Street on the morning of the first day of
trial. A flyer promoting the demonstration is attached. It is clear
that the trial of this case will receive at least substantial local press
346
coverage.

Although the government did not mention it in its brief, the media
attention had consisted of progressive media questioning the
government’s tactics in the case. There still had been almost no
mainstream media coverage of Hashmi’s case after the initial stories
around his indictment and extradition, many of which were based on
347
press releases from the U.S. Attorney’s office.
The government’s motion asked that the identities of jurors be
kept anonymous and that the jury be picked up and dropped off at a
secret location each day by bus and brought in and out of the
348
courthouse together with a security escort.
Nearly all of the legal
precedent cited by the government in support of their motion
involved actual evidence of jury tampering, but the prosecution
provided no evidence that Hashmi was seeking to do any such
345. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Anonymous
Jury & Other Related Protective Measures, supra note 62, at 1, 9 (requesting that the
jurors remain anonymous and that the court provide transportation for them each
day).
346. Id. at 9–10.
347. Indeed, save one story in the New York Times metro section on his conditions
of confinement, Kareem Fahim, Restrictive Terms of Prisoner’s Confinement Add Fuel to
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A27, the local media had largely ignored the case
since the indictment and extradition, except for the liberal Village Voice. Nat Hentoff,
A Brooklyn College Grad Experiences the Constitution in a Cage, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 5,
2008), http://www.villagevoice.com/2008-11-05/columns/a-brooklyn-college-gradexperiences-the-constitution-in-a-cage/.
348. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Anonymous
Jury and Other Related Protective Measures, supra note 62, at 2. The introduction to
the Government’s motion revealed their confidence that the court would again defer
to the government: “Indeed, since at least 1993, anonymous juries have been used in
every terrorism case in this District in which they have been requested.” Id. (emphasis added).
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349

thing.
Rather, the government’s brief focused on the identity of
the court observers and the danger they posed, or their appearance
350
as such. The U.S. Attorney concluded, “jurors will see in the gallery
of the courtroom a significant number of the defendant’s supporters,
naturally leading to juror speculation that at least some of these
spectators might share the defendant’s violent radical Islamic
351
leanings.”
The fact that people wanted to watch the trial was
352
framed as a problem and evidence of danger. The 500@500 poster
353
became Exhibit A in the government’s brief.
Suggesting guilt by implication, such measures would signal danger
354
to the jury before Hashmi stepped into the courtroom.
By
demonizing those who wanted to see the process as potentially
violent, radical Islamists, the government’s motion turned observers
in court into a cause for suspicion. The right of the public to watch a
trial was reformulated as something questionable and requiring extra
concern.
On April 26, 2010, over the defense’s considerable objections that
such measures would compromise the presumption of innocence and
355
frighten the jury, the court granted the government’s motion. The
349. Id.
350. See id. at 9.
351. Id. Similar concerns were articulated by the government to justify using
military tribunals. See Elisabeth Bumiller & David Johnston, Bush to Subject Terrorism
Suspects to Military Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/
11/14/national/14DETA.html (“White House officials said the tribunals were
necessary to protect potential American jurors from the danger of passing judgment
on accused terrorists.”).
352. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Anonymous
Jury and Other Related Protective Measures, supra note 62, at 9–10.
353. Id. at 10.
354. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (noting that ensuring the
presumption of innocence requires trial courts to attend to factors that undermine
the fairness of fact-finding procedures in a criminal trial); Christopher Keleher, The
Repercussions of Anonymous Juries, U.S.F. L. REV. 531, 532 (2010) (observing that “[t]he
state may not create trial conditions adversely affecting jurors’ perception of a
defendant”). Christopher Keleher has identified three repercussions of anonymous
juries:
First, it casts the defendant as a dangerous person. Second, it undermines
the presumption of innocence. Third, it hampers jury selection. The Sixth
Amendment and Due Process Clause guarantee a defendant the right to an
impartial jury. Analyzing the Sixth Amendment, Justice Harlan remarked,
“jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open
court than in secret proceedings.”
Id. at 553 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Citing psychological research demonstrating that “[a]ccountability and anonymity
are connected,” and asserting that “[t]hose held not accountable are more likely to
vote guilty,” Keleher calls for additional social science research into the psychological
effects of anonymity on juror honesty, accountability and bias. Id. at 564–65, 570.
355. Benjamin Weiser, Jury to Be Anonymous in Trial of Ex-Student Accused of Aiding
Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at A20.
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fact that people were concerned with the civil rights issues in
Hashmi’s case had led the court to defer to the government’s request
to further circumscribe his rights.
One day after the court ordered an anonymous jury, Hashmi
agreed to a government plea bargain of one count of conspiracy to
356
He made this decision having spent
provide material support.
three years in solitary confinement, having not seen his family in
more than five months, having not had the opportunity to consult
with an imam, and having been denied letters or visits except from
his lawyers.
The day before trial, the government dropped the other three
357
charges. That the prosecution was willing to offer a one-count plea
on the eve of trial raises the question as to whether they had applied
these draconian pretrial conditions not because they considered
Hashmi a high-level terrorist, but because they wanted to induce his
cooperation and conviction.
Hashmi’s final agreement to a government plea bargain also
follows a larger pattern of government “success” in these types of
domestic terrorism cases. In August 2011, Mother Jones and the
Investigative Reporting Program at the University of CaliforniaBerkeley released findings from a year-long study into the
prosecutions of 508 defendants in terrorism-related cases in the
358
Article III courts.
Of the 508 cases they reviewed, 333 defendants
had pled guilty, 110 had been found guilty, and 65 were awaiting
trial, leading the researchers to conclude:
“Once terrorism
359
defendants have been indicted, a charge is virtually certain to stick.”
The fact that the federal system has yet to issue a single complete
acquittal in a post-9/11 terrorism-related case strongly suggests that
the state of these criminal prosecutions weighs overwhelmingly in
360
favor of the government.
356. Judgment in a Criminal Case, supra note 277.
357. Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Brooklyn College Student Admits Conspiring to Help Al Qaeda,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/nyregion/
28hashmi.html.
358. Terror Trials by the Numbers, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 2011, available at
http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/terror-trials-numbers.
359. Id. (emphasis added).
360. As George Washington University professor Jonathan Turley has pointed out,
the United States criticizes such legal patterns when they happen in other countries.
Jonathan Turley, 10 Reasons the U.S. Is No Longer the Land of the Free, WASH. POST, Jan.
13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-the-united-states-still-theland-of-the-free/2012/01/04/gIQAvcD1wP_story.html. For further analysis of the
flaws of some of these prosecutions, see Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved
Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/28/
magazine/tm-wedick22; Petra Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist: The FBI Hunts for the
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Six weeks later, Hashmi was sentenced to fifteen years in prison
361
Far beyond luggage in
with three additional years of supervision.
his apartment, what was made clear at his sentencing was that he
362
posed a threat because of his ideology.
The federal prosecutor
explained the danger as “an ideology that was developed over years
while Mr. Hashmi was growing up here in New York as a product of
New York City public schools as well as local New York City
363
universities, an ideology of violence and intolerance.”
As the
government’s case turned on no actual act of violence, the U.S.
Attorney focused on Hashmi’s beliefs and associations, noting that
“not every person who supports Al Qaeda is going to pull a trigger, or
364
throw a bomb or launch an attack.” In accepting the government’s
sentencing recommendation in front of a packed courtroom and
overflow room that included many young Muslim-Americans, the
court echoed this logic of deterrence: “[W]hile it is self-evident that
specific deterrence is important in this case, deterring other United
States citizens—as well as those who are permitted to reside here—
from working to undermine our national security while aiding
365
foreign terrorist organizations is vital.”
At his sentencing, Hashmi was permitted to make his first public
statement in four years. Laden with numerous references to the
Qu’ran, he spoke extremely hurriedly, so quickly that the judge asked
him to slow down. He apologized, noting he had not been able to
366
speak much in the past years because of the SAMs.
In his speech, Hashmi took responsibility for his association with
Babar, apologizing for it and the ways he now saw that it violated his
own religious beliefs while also noting that Babar had forced himself

Enemy Within, HARPER’S, Aug. 2011, http://harpers.org/archive/2011/08/0083545;
Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance on Paid Informants Raises Questions About
Validity
of
Terrorism
Cases,
DEMOCRACY
NOW
(Oct.
6,
2010),
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/10/6/entrapment_or_foiling_terror_fbis_reli
ance.
361. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 27, United States v. Hashmi, 1:06-cr00442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2010).
362. Id. at 24 (discussing the ways in which “facilitators and sympathizers” should
be punished for supporting terrorism).
363. Id. at 19.
364. Id. at 21. The Assistant U.S. Attorney made an interesting slippage regarding
the criminalization of belief, stating that “[t]here is an entire network that spans the
globe . . . without which Al Qaeda simply could not survive. And it is for this reason
that these individuals, sympathizers, facilitators, the groups like the group that . . .
Hashmi [was] a part of . . . are essential to Al Qaeda.” Id. at 21–22 (emphasis
added).
365. Id. at 24–25.
366. Id. at 6–7.
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367

He also thanked
on him using religious codes of hospitality.
people, Muslim and non-Muslim, for speaking out about the rights
issues in his case:
To the non-Muslims . . . I hope insha Allah that Allah gives me the
opportunity to me to repay you your kindness. Clearly, you saw the
injustices of the cruel and unusual conditions that the government
put me under, and you stood up to protest against the
government’s tyranny. . . . I hope insha Allah that the bridges of
368
dialogue and debate that were built around this case remain so.

In his speech, he did not shy away from criticizing the U.S.
government for the “lies” it had told about him, along with the
injustice of its policies and its treatment of Muslim prisoners,
369
including his “brothers” at Guantanamo.
He spoke of the “Noble
Mugahideen,” and with allusions to Moses and the Pharaoh, criticized
the government for its inhumane treatment of him and other
370
Muslim-Americans.
On June 10, 2010, Hashmi began serving his sentence. In
December 2010, Judge Victor Marrero sentenced Junaid Babar—who
had been out on bail since 2008—to “time served” (four-and-a-half
371
years out of a possible seventy), citing his “exceptional” service.
IV. POST-CONVICTION RIGHTS ISSUES
A. Conditions of Confinement
In August 2010, Hashmi was transferred to the federal high security
prison in Florence, Colorado, where he was again held in solitary
367. Id. at 11–13.
368. Id. at 8.
369. Id. at 15–17.
370. Id. at 17. He questioned, “[I]s this the past favor you reproach me with . . . ?”
Id.
371. The court’s statement that Babar “began co-operating even before his arrest”;
his ability to visit the U.S. embassy in Pakistan without question (despite a public
interview in November 2001 from Pakistan attesting that “[t]here is no negotiation
with Americans . . . I will kill every American that I see”); his ability to fly from
Pakistan to the United States in March 2004 with no problems; his apprehension a
month later without force or even handcuffs; his subsequent interview with
government officials in an Embassy Suites in downtown Manhattan (without a
lawyer); and his own lawyer’s incredulity at the sentencing at how nice the U.S.
Attorney was being, all raised questions in Britain as to whether Babar had a
relationship with the U.S. government before his apprehension in April 2004. See
Shiv Malik, Mohammed Junaid Babar Left Prison Still Advocating Violence, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 9, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/09/
mohammed-junaid-babar-prison-violence?intcmp=srch; Shiv Malik, The al-Qaida
Supergrass and the 7/7 Questions that Remain Unanswered, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 13,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/14/al-qaida-supergrass77-questions.
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confinement under SAMs renewed by the Attorney General in
October 2010. He was then transferred to the U.S. PenitentiaryAdministrative Maximum (ADX) at the Florence complex. In
October 2011, the Attorney General did not renew Hashmi’s SAMs,
372
but he remains in ADX and continues to be held in isolation.
ADX is the most restrictive prison in the federal system. It houses
less than one-third of one percent of the entire federal inmate
373
population, or approximately 400 people.
All of the prisoners in
374
ADX—whether under SAMs or not—are in solitary confinement.
In an interview with “60 Minutes,” one of the prison’s own former
375
wardens described it as “a clean version of hell.”
ADX has been criticized by Amnesty International and Human
376
Rights Watch for its inhumane conditions.
In the “general
377
population” unit of ADX, prisoners are in solitary confinement for
twenty-two hours a day, five days a week and twenty-four hours a day
378
for the other two days, in cells that measure 87 square feet.
Each
cell contains a poured concrete bed and desk as well as a steel sink,
toilet, and shower. ADX prisoners eat all meals alone inside their
cells, within arm’s length of their toilet. Each cell has a small window
379
to the outside; however, the only view is of the cement “yard.”

372. See
Inmate
Locator,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/LocateInmate.jsp (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
373. Declaration of R. Wiley ¶ 6, United States v. Hamza (Gr. Brit. Magis. Ct. Oct.
3, 2007). The Declaration also notes that “95 percent of the inmate population was
transferred to the ADX from other facilities, while only 5 percent are direct court
commitments.” Id.
374. The only exception to this is those prisoners who have been admitted to the
Step-Down Program. Those prisoners are still housed in single cells, but have limited
opportunities to interact with a handful of other prisoners for brief periods of time.
Prisoners under SAMs, however, are not eligible for the Step-Down Program. Third
Amended Complaint ¶¶ 93–127, Ayyad v. Holder, No. 05-cv-02342-WYD-MJW (D.
Colo. Apr. 13, 2009).
375. 60 Minutes, Supermax: A Clean Version of Hell (CBS television broadcast June
19, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5101352n&tag
=related.
376. Letter from Jamie Fellner & Jennifer Daskal, Human Rights Watch, to Harley
G. Lapin, Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of Prisons (May 2, 2007) (on file with authors); The
Psychological Effects of Supermax Prisons, INSIDE PRISON (Apr. 2006),
http://www.insideprison.com/supermax-prisons-psychological-effects_2.asp.
377. The term “general population,” as it is typically used in the correctional field
is different than its meaning in the ADX context; at ADX, “general population” cells
are actually solitary confinement cells that are the most restrictive in the entire
federal BOP. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 4 n.1, Rezaq v. Nalley, Nos. 11-1069, 111072, 2012 WL 1372151 (10th Cir. Apr. 20, 2012). In any other BOP prison, these
cells would be termed “administrative segregation.” Id.
378. Rezaq, 2012 WL 1372151, at *1–2.
379. Maryanne Vollers, Inside Bombers Row: How America’s Most Dangerous Criminals
Mix with a Who’s Who of the Global Jihad in a Colorado Prison, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at
37–39.
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Prisoners at ADX cannot see any nature—not the surrounding
380
mountains or even a patch of grass.
The only time prisoners are regularly allowed outside of their cells
is for limited recreation, which occurs either in an indoor cell that is
381
empty except for a pull-up bar, or in an outdoor solitary cage. The
outside recreation cages are only slightly larger in size than the inside
cells and are known as “dog runs” because they resemble animal
382
kennels.
The warden can cancel recreation for any reason he
383
deems appropriate, including weather, shakedowns, or lack of staff.
Accordingly, ADX prisoners sometimes go for days without ever
384
leaving their cells.
Contact with others is rare. The prison was specifically designed to
385
limit all communication among the people that it houses.
Accordingly, the cells have thick concrete walls and two doors, one
with bars and a second made of solid steel. The only “contact” ADX
prisoners have with other inmates in the “general population” unit is
attempted shouting through the thick cell walls, doors, toilets, and
vents. All visits are non-contact, meaning the prisoner and visitor are
386
separated by a plexi-glass barrier.
Formal opportunities for rehabilitation are extremely limited. All
educational programming occurs via closed-circuit television in the
387
prisoners’ cells.
“Classes” consist of broadcasting shows such as
“World of Byzantium,” “Parenting I and II,” and “Peloponnesian War
388
I and II,” with the prisoner filling out a short quiz.
There is no
389
Perhaps most
interaction with an educator or other students.
significant for many Muslim prisoners, religious practice at ADX is
severely curtailed. Religious services are shown on the closed-circuit
390
television and group prayer is prohibited.
When it opened in 1994, ADX was originally conceived by the BOP
as a “behavior management” facility in which prisoners earned their
way in through a demonstrated inability to function in less restrictive
prison settings, and could earn their way out by demonstrating clear

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id.
Rezaq, 2012 WL 1372151, at *1, 11.
Id. at *11.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 377, at 5.
Id.; Vollers, supra note 379, at 40.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 377, at 5
Id.
Id.at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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391

conduct over time. This policy changed after 9/11. Pursuant to a
392
series of orders from the BOP, Muslim men convicted of terrorismrelated crimes were transferred to ADX from less restrictive prisons,
despite a lack of evidence that they had “earned their way in” through
their conduct while in prison or by being involved in any way with the
393
events of 9/11.
After several lawsuits challenged the transfer and continued
confinement of these men at ADX as violating their right to due
394
process, the BOP codified this practice. In yet another memo, the
395
BOP listed a set of criteria for placement in ADX. The first of these
is that “[t]he inmate is subject to . . . [SAMs,] or based on

391. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS PROGRAM STATEMENT
5100.07 ch. 10, at 11, 13 (1999). There have been some exceptions to this; high
profile prisoners such as Theodore Kaczynski, Eric Rudolph, and Terry Nichols were
all sent to ADX as their initial designation.
392. Memorandum from Michael B. Cooksey, Assistant Dir. of the Corr. Programs
Div. of the Fed. Bureau of Prisons on Guidance for Handling of Terrorist Inmates
and Recent Detainees (Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with authors) (“Following the tragic
events of September 11, 2001, all inmates in the custody of the BOP who were
convicted of, charged with, associated with, or in any way linked to terrorist activities
were placed in Administrative Detention as part of an immediate national security
endeavor.”). The memo purports to “provide[] guidance regarding the continuing
management and monitoring of select inmates having a Security Threat Group
assignment of ‘terrorist’ and inmates detained as a result of events that occurred on
September 11, 2001.” It proceeds to classify these inmates into four groups and
specifies that all of them “are to be housed in the Special Housing Unit under the
tightest restrictions allowed by our Administrative Detention policy,” and that they
are to be “housed and recreated alone.” Id. Their transfers to the ADX were
directed by a second memorandum. Memorandum from Michael B. Cooksey,
Assistant Dir. of the Corr. Programs Div. of the Fed. Bureau of Prisons on Guidance
for Handling Pre-September 11th Terrorist Inmates Currently Housed in
Administrative Detention (Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with authors).
393. An additional memo states that
[a]s of March 9, 2005, BOP facilities house 143 inmates or detainees
identified as having ties to terrorism. Each of these individuals has been
classified for appropriate monitoring and management. All inmates with a
conviction or verified major role in terrorism have been transferred to the
Administrative Detention Center (ADX) in Florence, Colorado, for
appropriate management, monitoring and control.
Memorandum from Dawn Zobel, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, on Management
Procedures for Terrorist Inmates Summary to Joyce Conley (Mar. 11, 2005) (on file
with authors).
394. See Second Amended Consolidated Complaint at 4–6, 10–11, 26, Saleh v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-cv-02467-PAB-KLM (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2009), ECF No. 251
(alleging that in the hours after the September 11th attacks, despite having no
connection to the events of that day, and absent notice or opportunity to be heard,
the plaintiffs—all Muslim men convicted of crimes related to the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing—were moved from open population units in various penitentiaries
to segregation units and subsequently to ADX). Professor Rovner, Director of the
Civil Rights Clinic at the University of Denver College of Law, supervised the student
attorneys who represented the plaintiffs in this action.
395. See Memorandum from Michael K. Nalley, Reg’l Dir., Fed. Bureau of Prisons
N. Cent. Reg’l Office 3 (Nov. 2, 2007) (on file with authors).
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documented reliable information from a government agency that the
inmate was convicted of, charged with, associated with, or in any way
linked to terrorist activities and as a result of such, presents national
396
The term “terrorist activities,”
security management concerns.”
however is not defined, meaning that even conduct such as Hashmi’s
is sufficient reason to be sent to ADX—a facility purportedly reserved
for the most violent and unmanageable prisoners in the federal
system.
Moreover, similar to pretrial, there appears to be a
disproportionate tendency to impose and maintain SAMs on Muslim
prisoners convicted of terrorism-related charges as compared to nonMuslims convicted of terrorism-related charges. For instance, radical
Christian-militant Eric Rudolph was convicted of the Centennial
Olympic Park bombing, as well as bombing a lesbian bar and
397
abortion clinics in Atlanta and Birmingham.
He is serving a life
398
A website posts his
sentence and is presently housed at ADX.
current writings on abortion, the Iraq war, racism, and conditions at
ADX, along with numerous Biblical quotations and a justification for
bombing the Birmingham “abortion mill” and his use of deadly
399
force.
When questions were raised by victims in Birmingham about
Rudolph’s continued ability to disseminate his ideas, U.S. Attorney
Alice Martin, one of the prosecutors for the Alabama bombing, said
the prison could not restrict Rudolph, and that “[a]n inmate does
400
not lose his freedom of speech.” The website provides coordination
and dissemination of information on many anti-abortion prisoners; it
includes a link to send a “thank you” card to Scott Roeder and
writings by other prisoners such as Shelley Shannon, convicted for
burning abortion clinics, including her essays justifying the use of

396. Id.
397. See Rudolph Agrees to Plea Agreement, CNN JUSTICE (Apr. 12, 2005),
http://articles.cnn.com/2005-04-08/justice/rudolph.plea_1_emily-lyons-eric-robertrudolph-atlanta-attacks?_s=PM:LAW.
398. See Inmate Locator, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/
LocateInmate.jsp, (last visited May 6, 2012).
399. Rudolph explains,
I had nothing personal against either of these individuals, Sanderson and
Lyons. I did not target them for who they were—but for what they did. . . .
My actions that day were motivated by my recognition that abortion is
murder. Because it is murder, I believe that deadly force is indeed justified
in an attempt to stop it.
Eric Rudolph’s Homepage, ARMY OF GOD, http://www.armyofgod.com/EricRudolph
Homepage.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
400. Extremist Taunts His Victims from Prison, USA TODAY (May 15, 2007, 10:13 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-05-14-rudolph-prison_N.htm.

ROVNER-THEOHARIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1408

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/14/2012 7:12 PM

[Vol. 61:1331

deadly force against clinics and providers and admonitions about the
401
pressures of law enforcement. Replete with Biblical quotations, the
website provides religious justification for the violent actions of antiabortionists such as Shelley, Roeder, and Rudolph and provides
politically-like-minded people ways to support and correspond with
402
these prisoners. Respecting the constitutional protections covering
their Christian political views, the government has not placed
403
Shannon, Roeder and Rudolph under SAMs. Such recognition has
404
been considerably less forthcoming for Muslim inmates at ADX.
B. Unreviewability
Despite the severe restrictions ADX confinement imposes on
prisoners—particularly those under SAMs—there is virtually no
procedural due process provided, either before or after the SAMs are
405
imposed and renewed.
While federal regulations state that
“[d]esignated staff shall provide to the affected inmate, as soon as
practicable, written notification of the restrictions imposed and the
basis for these restrictions,” the regulations also allow that “[t]he
notice’s statement as to the basis may be limited in the interest of
406
prison security or safety.”
As a practical matter, some SAMs
prisoners are given only very general allegations as to the reason for
the SAMs restrictions, such as that they have been convicted of a
407
terrorism-related crime.
Once they have exhausted the administrative remedy process,

401. ARMY OF GOD, http://www.armyofgod.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
Postings on the website also urge surreptitiousness among those contemplating
similar acts: “[Do] not tell ANYONE; before, during or after, if you are planning on
taking action. Your family, pro-lifers and your church ‘friends’ will sell you out in a
heartbeat, thinking they are doing God’s will.” Id.
402. Id.
403. There also seems to be an arbitrariness—and political character—as to which
domestic actions are deemed terrorism (and relatedly, given a terrorism
enhancement), such as animal rights and environmental actions. The rights
questions in such designations are also significant. See Animal Enterprise Terrorism
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-374, 120 Stat. 2652 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)).
404. Two recent decisions that suggest that at least some consideration exists for
the First Amendment rights of Muslims convicted of terrorism-related offenses are
Sattar v. Holder, No. 07-CV-02698-PAB-KLM, 2012 WL 882401 (D. Colo. Mar. 15,
2012), and Mohammed v. Holder, No. 07-CV-02697-MSK-BNB, 2011 WL 4501959 (D.
Colo. Sept. 29, 2011).
405. See Second Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 394, at 7–8, 13
(describing lack of notice given to inmates); see also Judith Resnik, Detention, the War
on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 671 (2010) (suggesting that
the same due process concerns that exist concerning Guantanamo Bay detainees also
exist in relation to federal inmates spending long periods of time in isolation).
406. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(b) (2011).
407. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint, supra note 374, ¶ 106 (Apr. 13, 2009).
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prisoners may attempt to challenge their SAMs in court. So far,
however, the same deference to the Executive demonstrated by the
pretrial SAMs rulings in Hashmi’s case is also evident in postconviction challenges to the SAMs brought in conditions of
confinement cases. In the few cases in which prisoners have sought
408
to challenge their SAMs in the federal courts, the courts have
declined to closely scrutinize the executive’s decision to impose or
409
maintain the SAMs. To date, we have been unable to locate a single
case in which a federal court has held that the conditions of
confinement for a prisoner under SAMs give rise to a due process
410
violation.
411
A recent example is Al-Owhali v. Holder, in which a SAMs prisoner
at ADX filed suit challenging multiple aspects of his SAMs on

408. There have been relatively few cases challenging post-conviction SAMs.
There are several reasons for this, including a dearth of lawyers willing to litigate
these cases. And even where counsel is available and willing to represent prisoners in
cases challenging their SAMs. The government has occasionally impeded access to
counsel. See, e.g., Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration at 6–7,
Ayyad v. Holder, No. 05-cv-02342-WYD-MJW (D. Colo. July 31, 2008) (upholding
government’s decision to deny clearance for law students working for the Civil Rights
Clinic at the University of Denver College of Law, which was representing two
prisoners who were challenging their confinement at ADX and their SAMs). By
doing so, the court made it impossible for the Clinic to represent the prisoners. The
lack of counsel in these cases makes an already difficult situation even harder due to
the following factors: (1) most of these prisoners are not familiar with law
(particularly assertions such as national security and law enforcement privileges,
deliberative process privilege and other issues that can be extraordinarily complex);
(2) unfamiliarity with the U.S. judicial system; (3) English may not be the first
language of some of these prisoners; (4) SAMs prisoners frequently are not
permitted to see some of evidence used by government; and (5) prisoners have
limited access to legal research resources.
409. While a few of these cases have survived motions to dismiss on due process
grounds, none has yet survived a motion for summary judgment on a procedural due
process claim. Currently, Professor Rovner serves as counsel to two prisoners under
SAMs in a lawsuit challenging their conditions of confinement on first amendment
and procedural due process grounds. The government’s motion for summary
judgment on all claims is before the court. See Motion for Summary Judgment by
Defendants, Ayyad v. Holder, No. 05-cv-02342-WYD-MJW (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2011).
410. See, e.g., Sattar v. Holder, No. 07-CV-02698-PAB-KLM, 2012 WL 882401, at *11
(D. Colo. Mar. 15, 2012) (granting government’s motion for summary judgment on
procedural due process claim); Mohammed v. Holder, No. 07-CV-02697-MSK-BNB,
2011 WL 4501959, at *12 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2011) (same); Al-Owhali v. Holder, No.
07-cv-02214-LTB-BNB, 2011 WL 288523, at *1–3 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2011) (same);
Jabarah v. Garcia, No. 08 Civ. 3592, 2010 WL 3834663, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2010) (refusing to consider challenges to SAMs because not brought pursuant to
habeas statute). Nor have we located any decisions in which a court has permitted an
Eighth Amendment challenge to a prisoner’s SAMs to survive summary judgment.
As of this writing, there are only two cases in which a federal court has permitted any
challenge to a prisoner’s SAMs to proceed to trial, and those are in the First
Amendment context. See Sattar, 2012 WL 882401, at *4–6; Mohammed, 2011 WL
4501959, at *7–10.
411. No. 07-cv-02214-LTB-BNB, 2011 WL 288523 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2011).
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412

constitutional grounds. In his decision granting the Government’s
Motion to Dismiss, the district judge wrote:
At oral argument, the Court engaged in dialogue with counsel
alluding to the Kafka-esque nature of this case. It was a poor and
inept analogy as Joseph K, Kafka’s fictional character, never even
knew the nature of his charges against him. Indeed, he never had a
trial at all. In contrast, of course, Mr. Al-Owhali received the full
panoply of constitutional and procedural rights to which he was
entitled before he was duly convicted and sentenced for his key
role in the August 7, 1998 bombing of the American Embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya . . . [and h]is conviction was affirmed on appeal.
Such is the nature of a terrorist and the Government’s rational interest in
413
setting the conditions of confinement.

The court in Al-Owhali effectively concluded that because a
prisoner has been afforded a criminal trial on the terrorism charges
asserted against him, there is no role for the federal courts in
414
reviewing his conditions of confinement post-conviction. The sole
fact of the terrorism conviction justifies absolute deference to the
Executive in determining the prisoner’s conditions—even when
those conditions raise serious constitutional and human rights
415
concerns.
The presumption is that the extreme conditions of confinement

412. See Proposed Second Amended Complaint at 16–22, Al-Owhali, 2011 WL
288523 (No. 07-cv-2214-LTB-BNB) (asserting that plaintiff’s SAMs violate his right to:
procedural and substantive due process; equal protection; to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment; freedom of speech, expression and association; and right to
communicate with counsel).
413. Al-Owhali, 2011 WL 288523, at * 4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
414. See id. at *3–4 (rejecting magistrate’s recommendation because magistrate
did not give enough deference to the government).
415. Additionally, to date no court has ever held that confinement in ADX—even
for upwards of thirteen years—gives rise to a protected liberty interest meriting due
process. See, e.g., Rezaq v. Nalley, Nos. 11-1069, 11-1072, 2012 WL 1372151 (10th Cir.
Apr. 20, 2012); Saleh v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-cv-02467-PAB-KLM, 2010 WL
5464294, *4–5 (D. Colo. Dec. 29, 2010) (agreeing with magistrate that plaintiff’s due
process rights were not violated by imprisonment at ADX); Rezaq v. Nalley, No. 07-cv02483-LTB-KLM, 2010 WL 5157313, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2010) (same);
Georgacarakos v. Wiley, No. 07-cv-01712-MSK-MEH, 2010 WL 1291833, at *12–13 (D.
Colo. Mar. 30, 2010) (finding conditions in the present case were comparable to
those in Jordan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 191 F. App’x 639 (10th Cir. 2006), a
case in which the court ruled there was no liberty interest in avoiding incarceration
at ADX). Even in cases about conditions of confinement from prisoners convicted of
non-terrorism crimes, court review of those conditions is quite deferential since the
Supreme Court’s resurrection of the “hands off” approach to prisoners’ rights cases.
See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“[T]he problems of
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not
readily susceptible of resolution by decree.”), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 190
U.S. 401 (1989) (adopting flexible reasonableness standard from Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
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for prisoners post-conviction, including the SAMs, are justified
because those prisoners had a fair pretrial process. Indeed, the fact
of a trial, of a legal process, becomes grounds for the treatment. But
as Hashmi’s situation illustrates, these cases beg the question: What
kind of process?
CONCLUSION
It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would
sanction the subversion of . . . those liberties . . . which make the defense of
the Nation worthwhile.
–United States v. Robel416
We no longer ask of a judicial ruling or a legislative act: is it good? Is it
fair? Is it just? Is it right? . . . Those used to be the political questions,
even if they invited no easy answers. We must learn once again to pose
them.
–Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land417

Fahad Hashmi’s case demonstrates that having a legal process in a
terrorism case is not the same as having a just process; indeed, it
shows that the fact of a legal process can be a mechanism for
enabling injustice. The cascading series of rights deprivations—
beginning with the initial surveillance of Hashmi’s student political
activities and the subsequent material support charges brought
against him; his three years of pretrial solitary confinement under
SAMs that degraded his health and ability to participate effectively in
his own defense; his inability as a U.S. citizen to review all the
evidence against him and the long process for his lawyers to be
granted clearance to see the CIPA evidence; the government’s use of
his political activities as evidence at trial and the casting of public
concern around his case as dangerous—happened in daylight, were
justified by the government’s assertion of national security, and were
upheld by the court. That this took place in New York, just a dozen
miles from where Hashmi grew up, and not in a place like
Guantanamo, where individuals were held and abused in a zone that
was believed to be outside the reach of U.S. law, is disturbing,
418
particularly because of the court’s role in legitimizing it.
That
416. 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).
417. TONY JUDT, ILL FARES THE LAND 1–2 (2010).
418. Though disturbing, it is not unique in the annals of American jurisprudence.
A review of African-American history, for instance, demonstrates that many of the
worst human rights violations needed the law and government bureaucracy to give
them common sense and force, from slavery, segregation and voting rights denial, to
school zoning, urban renewal, and red-lining. For discussions of these issues, see
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rights abridgement occurred throughout the process reveals that this
was not an unfortunate or aberrational occurrence. Rather, it
demonstrates how the rights protections of Muslims accused of
terrorism-related crimes in post-9/11 America can be and have been
treated as expendable.
This significant pattern of rights violations within the federal
system has in part been obscured by equating a trial in an Article III
court with rights and reviewability. Many civil libertarians have
focused on the urgency of the situations of Guantanamo detainees
and thus contributed, however unintentionally, to the misimpression
that systemic injustice and rights degradation occur primarily outside
the reach of the American legal process. Hashmi’s case and those of
many other Muslim men and women facing terrorism-related charges
in the federal system are a disturbing counterpoint to the situation at
Guantanamo, precisely because they occur within the law.
There are troubling questions that often go unasked. In a War on
Terror costing billions of dollars that requires evidence of the
effectiveness of law enforcement, a record of arrest, indictment, and
conviction is paramount. Vast sums of money have been devoted to
419
counterterrorism in the past decade, and such expenditures must
be justified. The pressures and demands on law enforcement
produce an environment that can lead to overreaching. To counter
these pressures, courts must be more vigilant and provide more
oversight.
And history is again instructive. Times of war have often been
when, beset with national imperatives and fear, the government has
severely overreached, yet these are also the times when courts have
been the most deferential. Indeed, as the Supreme Court dissents in
Korematsu and Dennis presciently remind us, in the moment these
decisions occur, judicial deference is cast as necessary and wise for
the safety and security of the nation—but later comes to be regretted
420
as imperiling constitutional protections.
generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND THE
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996); KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); MARK S.
WEINER, BLACK TRIALS: CITIZENSHIP FROM THE BEGINNINGS OF SLAVERY TO THE END OF
CASTE (2004); CRAIG STEVEN WILDER, A COVENANT WITH COLOR: RACE AND SOCIAL
POWER IN BROOKLYN (2000); THE MYTH OF SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM (Matthew D.
Lassiter & Joseph Crespino eds., 2010).
419. See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,
WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, at A1 (illustrating the massive expenditures devoted to
counterterrorism).
420. “Public opinion being what it now is,” Justice Hugo Black wrote, “few will
protest the conviction of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that
in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some
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The belief that the federal courts are now immune to this kind of
distortion is ahistorical and has largely insulated them from critique.
Jenny Martinez has recognized in the context of the Guantanamo
cases a point equally, if not more, applicable to domestic terrorism
trials—that having a procedure often covers up the injustice
embedded in the process:
Those who are not looking too closely may think that justice has
been done because the litigants have already had their day (or
year) in front of a neutral, objective federal court. In other words,
the legitimizing role that procedure plays in perceptions of justice
421
may be part of the problem, not the solution.

For many in post-9/11 America, a trial in the Article III courts has
become emblematic of American values—as U.S. District Judge
William Young stated to “shoe bomber” Richard Reid: “we all know
422
that the way we treat you . . . is the measure of our own liberties.”
The federal courts are held up as the “anti-Guantanamo”—the
converse of indefinite detentions, military commissions and other
manifestations of second-class due process. But whether this view is
warranted for Muslims charged with terrorism-related offenses is a
debatable proposition. As Fahad Hashmi’s case demonstrates, it is
important to look closely—and the tendency to avoid scrutinizing the
federal process has allowed these practices to occur and take root
over the past decade.
Nancy Murray of the ACLU has referred to this differential
423
standard as the “Muslim exemption.”
Perhaps we should not be
surprised by this kind of jettisoning of rights; history has shown that
the courts, like the other branches of government, are not immune
424
to the pressures and prejudices of wartime.
Although some
later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place
where they belong in a free society.” Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581
(1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
421. Martinez, supra note 22, at 1087.
422. Reid: ‘I Am at War with Your Country,’ CNN (Jan. 31, 2003, 11:10 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/31/reid.transcript/.
423. Carol Rose, It’s Official. There Is a Muslim Exemption to the First Amendment, BOS.
GLOBE ON LIBERTY BLOG (Apr. 12, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://boston.com/community/
blogs/on_liberty/2012/04/its_official_there_is_a_muslim.html.
424. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
internment of Japanese-Americans during WWII). Additionally, as Justice Robert
Jackson observed in 1948:
No one will question that this power is the most dangerous one to free
government in the whole catalogue of powers. It usually is invoked in haste
and excitement when calm legislative consideration of constitutional
limitation is difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes
moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by the Judges
under the influence of the same passions and pressures.
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commentators have argued that a form of “social learning” occurs
in the wake of crises like Japanese internment and the McCarthy era
that makes future overreactions less likely, there is ample reason to
believe, as David Cole suggests, that this social learning may simply
consist of government decision-makers learning to more effectively
426
mask the repetition of past civil liberties violations.
During such periods, the role of the courts as a check on Executive
power becomes even more critical. And yet as Hashmi's case
illustrates, the courts’ deference to claims of national security has
eroded such separation. Such deference is made all the more
dangerous by the ways it has gone largely unseen, obscured by the
binary drawn by many civil libertarians between the unchecked
Executive power at Guantanamo and the rights and reviewability of
the federal system. Indeed, as such rights violations occur as part of
the federal process and are sanctioned by the courts, they become
woven into the fabric of the justice system. And as they become more
ingrained in the fabric itself, the violations are not only harder to see,
427
they are also harder to remove, affecting not only those charged

Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
425. See generally Mark Tushnet Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties
in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273 (articulating the “social learning” theory as the idea
that courts tend to learn from past crisis periods that government claims of national
security have, in retrospect, often been exaggerated, thus making people more
skeptical about such claims in the present context). We disagree with Professor
Tushnet, as our review of history suggests that national security issues are always
rendered as unique, urgent, and unparalleled, thus requiring new, expansive
responses.
426. Cole, supra note 73, at 2 (“In short, just as we did in the McCarthy era, we
have offset the decline of traditional forms of repression with the development of
new forms of repression. A historical comparison reveals not so much a repudiation as
an evolution of political repression.”).
427. Others have warned that the risk of trying terrorism suspects in federal courts
is that the extraordinary measures, departures, and/or exceptions deemed necessary
for such trials will become fixed in the law and applied in non-terrorism cases, “what
we might characterize as either a ‘distortion effect’ or a ‘seepage problem.’”
Vladeck, supra note 36, at 1501. To address this concern, some scholars have
advocated the use of emergency executive powers exercised in a way that is expressly
extra-constitutional, in order to avoid “contaminating and manipulating” the
ordinary legal system with emergency powers. Oren Gross, Chaos And Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1099, 1133
(2003); see also Tushnet, supra note 425, at 306–07. Indeed, the “seepage” risk has
led some scholars to conclude either that trial by military commissions is necessary or
to advocate for the creation of “national security courts.” Amos N. Guiora, Creating a
Domestic Terror Court, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 617 (2009).
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with and convicted of terrorist-related crimes in the Article III courts,
428
but also the Constitution itself.

428. As Owen Fiss has observed,
What is missing from this calculus . . . is a full appreciation of the value of the
Constitution—as a statement of the ideals of the nation and as the basis of
the principle of freedom—and even more, a full appreciation of the fact that
the whole-hearted pursuit of any ideal requires sacrifices, sometimes quite
substantial ones. It is hard for the Justices, or for that matter anyone, to
accept that we may have to risk the material well-being of the nation in order
to be faithful to the Constitution and the duties it imposes. Still, it must be
remembered that the issue is not just the survival of the nation—of course
the United States will survive—but rather the terms of survival.
Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, supra note 5, at 256.

